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Electronic markets, driven by the rise of the Internet and the establishment of the world
wide web, spread out amongst business entities as well as private individuals. Albeit nu-
merous approaches on designing and developing electronic markets exist, e.g., Roth’s Mar-
ket Design or Weinhardt et al.’s Market Engineering, a unified approach targeting market
development, redesign, and refinement has been lacking.
The work at hand studies the potential of continuously improving electronic markets
from a market provider’s perspective. It comprises five experiments conducted on different
instances of prediction markets targeted to forecast macroeconomic indicators as well as
political outcomes. Thereby, the experiments’ design focuses on the three distinct aspects
of Agent Behavior, Interfaces, and Auxiliary Services in electronic markets.
First, behavioral aspects of market participants (agents) are linked with both, the qual-
ity of their trading decisions and trading behavior, by combining trade data with replies of
a specifically compiled questionnaire. Hereby, traders’ market predispositions, i.e., their
aptitude for trading, can be assessed ex ante and might serve as a measure to counsel
traders. Second, in a political stock market, traders’ political preferences are deduced
from their trading behavior. Interestingly, a simple model considering the agents’ behav-
ior is yet sufficient to explain participants’ political preferences correctly to a high extent.
Third, a comparison is drawn of participants’ trading performance and trading behavior
between a web interface and a similar mobile application. Results show that albeit mobile
interfaces are accepted by participants, trading conducted via the provided web interfaces
is more successful in a pecuniary sense and provides higher predictive power concerning
the predicted event. Fourth, the trading interface’s impact on the Disposition Effect (i.e.,
the disposition to hold losing stocks too long whilst selling winning stocks too early) is
explored. To this end, two trading interface modifications are evaluated: a trend indicator
arrow, reflecting the development of traders’ portfolio value, and textual advice about the
disposition effect. Results reveal that increasing transparency of traders’ portfolio value
increases the disposition effect, whereas textual advice does not seem to be apt in decreas-
ing the effect’s strength. Fifth, since prediction markets are an established mechanism to
acquire quantitative information, an endeavor is made to also assess qualitative informa-
tion via auxiliary services from dispersed agents, i.e., the crowd. Therefore, external as
well as different kinds of internal survey systems are evaluated. The gained research in-
sights comprise a better understanding of trading behavior in electronic markets, and thus,
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“ If the world was stable, there would be no need to
change business operations and methods, nor to under-
stand what has changed and what works well. How-




MARKETS are very efficient and effective mechanisms to exchange goods and ser-vices. From classical market places where physical goods are exchanged, through
stock markets, up to emissions trading, markets are used. Individuals in modern soci-
eties rely on numerous markets in their daily life – often even unknowingly. Business-to-
business (B2B) markets, for example, belong to a family of markets most people never
interact with directly. Nevertheless, when you switch on the lights in the morning, the
electricity was probably traded on an exchange.1 When you buy goods in retail stores, the
price is most likely influenced by wholesale market prices. When you book a flight, the
price depends inter alia on foreign exchange markets, as they determine currency prices




and thus affect jet fuel prices. Participants in B2B markets are often professionals with
a certain trading experience. With the rise of the Internet and the establishment of the
world wide web2 (WWW) in the 1990’s, electronic markets started to attract business en-
tities in addition to private individuals. New forms of electronic markets emerged, often
separated into business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce and business-to-customer (B2C) e-
commerce.3 Historically, electronic markets are a rather new way of implementing market
mechanisms and have a couple of advantages. They hardly need physical space, transac-
tion costs are often strikingly reduced, and market rules can be changed and monitored
centrally. Besides the use-cases mentioned above, markets are also used to trade informa-
tion or even expectations about future events as will be subsequently shown.
The design of markets plays a pivotal role in relation to ‘how well’ markets function.
Generally, a market’s objective influences its requirements, which in turn determines the
market’s resulting design. This comprises, inter alia, the design of the transaction object,
the market microstructure, or, in case of electronic markets, the market’s implementation
and thus its graphical user interface. Consequences emerging from certain design decisions
are a highly discussed issue in economic literature. A seminal article concerning this topic
is Roth’s (2002) work on Market Design, wherein he proposes to transition the planning
process of markets from a rather conceptual design approach into a more rigid engineer-
ing approach based on theoretical insights. In his 2008 follow-up article he defines three
preconditions for properly functioning markets: First, markets have to provide thickness,
which means “[. . . ] to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants [. . . ]”
(Roth, 2008). Second, overcoming congestion, which can be evoked by thickness; i. e., pro-
viding a sufficient amount of adequate alternative transactions. Third, markets have to be
safe and easy to use in order to be attractive for participants and thus preventing potential
participants from circumventing the market. The idea of market design is revisited and
taken further by Weinhardt et al. (2003), resulting in the concept of Market Engineering
as most recently described by Gimpel et al. (2008). Subsequently, the Market Engineering
concept was applied to the development of numerous markets; inter alia a sports pre-
diction market for the FIFA Worldcup 2006 called STOCCER (Luckner et al., 2005) or a
2An interesting background report on the ideas and concepts of the WWW can be found Berners-Lee and
Fischetti (2000).
3Teo and Ranganathan (2004) define business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce as “the buying and selling of
products and services among businesses” and business-to-customer (B2C) e-commerce as “the sale of products
and services to individuals”.
A slightly more precise definition of B2B e-commerce can be found in Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2001)
and reads: “The popular phrase ‘B2B e-commerce’ refers to the substitution of computer data processing and
Internet communications for labor services in the production of economic transactions.”
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multi-attributed combinatorial exchange called MACE (Schnizler et al., 2004; Schnizler,
2008). From another point of view, slightly restructuring Roth’s (2008) prerequisites, even
the best designed market will only be successful if (i) it is accepted by the participants
and (ii) participants behave as expected by the market designer, i. e., assumptions made
about market participants’ behavior hold true.4 Therefore, it is indispensable to develop
a deeper understanding of market participants, since ultimately, participant behavior and
hence the participants’ acceptance of a market is the main determinant for a market’s out-
come and thus its success. For instance, individual’s risk aversion or cognitive abilities have
been shown to influence decision making (e. g., Subrahmanyam, 1991; Frederick, 2005).
Furthermore, emotions are known to impact individuals economic decision making (e. g.,
Loewenstein et al., 2001). Hence, this thesis attempts to include these aspects of individ-
ual behavior in the consideration of market participants’ behavior in electronic markets.
Following the typology of Service Analytics (Fromm et al., 2012), this approach can be clas-
sified as advanced analytics on customer data. Bearing in mind that Market Engineering
is not solely the engineering perspective of designing and introducing of markets, but also
describes their further development, the aspect of continuously tracking and improving a
market – from a market provider point-of-view – is up to now under-addressed. Addi-
tionally, up to now, economic literature lacks an explicitly documented case of continuous
tracking and supporting a market in the context of Market Engineering.
Why, should markets be tracked, supported, and improved in a continuous manner?
For what reasons could a fit-and-forget approach for markets be insufficient and eventu-
ally fail? At least two views on that issue should underline the necessity for Continuous
Market Engineering. First, it can be observed that numerous market providers repeatedly
changed and extended their markets for intrinsic motivated reasons – for instance, reach-
ing out to a new set of clients by satisfying their needs or implementing new features to
enhance customer loyalty. It can further be observed that a range of markets adapted or
extended their functionality to improve internal processes. Second, as time goes by things
change. Although, admittedly, this reads trivial, it leads to the class of external motivated
changes. It implies that design decisions drawn once, based on reasonable assumptions at
a particular point in time, have a probability to not hold true forever. In other words, as-
sumptions leading to once sensible design decisions can be increasingly violated and even
lose their validity due to omitted adaptations to a changing environment, trends in partici-
pant behavior, or due to technological causes. Consequently, solely the aim of conserving a
4The first point primarily relates to Roth’s (2008) second and third prerequisites (‘thickness’ and ‘safe’),
whereas the second point concerns all three preconditions.
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market state once intended can be a sufficient necessity to continuously track and improve
a market – and thus motivating Continuous Market Engineering. In contrast to changes in
the socio-economic and legal environment, as laws and regulatory standards, changes in
individual behavior are not as easy to spot or foresee. Hence, the work at hand stresses the
importance of Continuous Market Engineering by (i) documenting two continuously engi-
neered markets as well as (ii) developing a deeper understanding of market participant’s
behavior.
Summing up, stakeholders of a market can benefit from a better understanding of
market participants’ individual behavior. Since environmental conditions and individ-
ual behavior are subject to change, market design decisions have to be monitored and
re-evaluated. Markets require continuous adaption and redesign in order to constantly
achieve their desired market outcome. The work at hand furthers the understanding of
individual trader behavior and demonstrates the power of Continuous Market Engineering
by presenting several studies conducted on two play-money prediction markets.
1.2 Research Outline
This thesis stresses the importance of a continuous approach to the Market Engineering
framework (Weinhardt et al., 2003; Gimpel et al., 2008) from a market provider’s point of
view while focusing on individual trader behavior.5 Specifically, the Market Engineering
framework as presented in Section 2.4 provides guidance for engineering electronic mar-
kets. It comprises a specified prescriptive design process model and a toolbox of methods
supporting that aim. The research objective of the work at hand is to apply Continuous
Market Engineering on electronic markets, thus demonstrating its potential and necessity
for successful markets. Furthermore, based on the above mentioned framework, a Contin-
uous Market Engineering Process (cf. Section 2.6) is derived from the experiences gained
so far. The studies are conducted on two prediction markets presented in Chapter 4 and
presented closely following the Market Engineering Object (cf. Figure 2.4a).
Personal attributes like risk aversion (RA), cognitive reflection abilities (CRA), and emo-
tion regulation strategies (ERS) are known to influence individual behavior. Up to now,
it seems unclear how these personal attributes influence (i) trading behavior (i. e., trader
behavior in the market) and (ii) decision quality (i. e., quality of trading decisions) in a




prediction market context. Hence, advanced Service Analytics (Fromm et al., 2012) are
applied on the customer data of a prediction market in order to better understand Agent
Behavior. This approach delivers comprehensive insights on traders’ predisposition for
markets. Based on the gained knowledge, it is feasible to substantially improve service ex-
perience. This can be achieved by adapting the Market Structure to agent’s preferences and
abilities via personalized tweaks (interface adaption, product choice, etc.). In particular,
the following questions are addressed:
Research Question 1: How do selected personal attributes (RA, CRA, and ERS) influence
trading behavior in markets?
Research Question 2: How do selected personal attributes (RA, CRA, and ERS) influence
decision quality in markets?
After it has been shown that personal attributes do influence trading behavior, the ques-
tion arises whether trading behavior can reveal information about the traders themselves.
For instance, whether it is possible to ‘read a trader’s mind’ from his actions performed
on the market. Therefore, individual trading behavior on a prediction market is analyzed
in order to estimate individuals’ preferences. Specifically, on a Political Stock Market, the
relation between trading behavior and political preferences is examined by answering the
following research question:
Research Question 3: How well can an unobtrusive analysis of trading behavior reveal
trader preferences?
After examining traders’ actions on markets from a behavioristic angle, the market
providers perspective is taken. It is common sense, that interface design can influence
individual decision behavior and thus decision outcome (e. g., Kauffman and Diamond,
1990). With the rise of mobile information systems, the question arises whether and which
impact different devices have on decision behavior and decision outcome. Furthermore,
the setting in which individuals tend to use mobile devices often differs from stationary
settings. Hence, the following research questions is evaluated in this thesis:
Research Question 4: Are decision behavior and decision outcome affected by the kind
of device used?
Besides interface design, behavioral biases do influence and often harm individual’s
decision behavior (e. g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). An important and well studied
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behavioral bias especially traders tend to suffer from is the disposition effect (cf. Shefrin
and Statman, 1985). An endeavor is made to gain insights how differences in trading
interfaces influence the disposition effect. First, the effect of providing information about
the disposition effect in trading interfaces is examined. Second, the impact of a commonly
used interface element of electronic market systems, a trend indicator arrow reflecting
a trader’s portfolio state, is investigated. Considering the relative strength of behavioral
biases in the face of small interface changes, two research questions are addressed:
Research Question 5: Is providing information about the disposition effect suitable to
lower the strength of the disposition effect exhibited by an individual?
Research Question 6: Does a trend indicator arrow affect the strength of the disposition
effect exhibited by an individual?
Prediction market operators try to gain insights about future events from participants.
Market operators may, every once in a while, also have the desire to gather feedback or
learn more about their participants. Insights gained through such endeavors might help to
improve the market and thus raise loyalty as well as attract more customers. Still focusing
on the user interface, an attempt is made to find a suitable way to acquire such feedback
and additional information from and about market participants. Although, much research
has been conducted on how to design and conduct questionnaires (e. g., Babbie, 1990;
Fowler, 2014; Andres, 2012) as well as whom to include in a survey to reach certain
goals (e. g., representativeness, response rate), little is known on where exactly – in a
technical sense – to conduct surveys. In the specific domain of prediction markets, as
well as in the broader domain of online communities, it is largely undecided whether it
is beneficial to integrate a survey on the same platform versus conducting the very same
survey on an external specialized survey platform. Besides implications on the graphical
representation and on the user guidance, this decision impacts development as well as
operation costs of the market. Therefore, the final aspect of this thesis poses the following
research question:
Research Question 7: Are integrated surveys more accepted by participants of a predic-
tion market than standalone surveys?
The aforementioned research questions can be assigned to the components of the Mar-
ket Engineering Object as shown in Figure 1.1.6 From a Market Engineering perspective,
6For an in-depth description of the Market Engineering framework, containing the Market Engineering
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1.2 Research Outline
research questions 1 and 2 connect Agent Behavior with Market Outcome, whereas research
question 3 solely focuses on Agent Behavior. The (IT) Infrastructure is subject to research
question 4. Research questions 5 and 6 additionally concerns the Microstructure. Finally,
research question 7 focuses on Auxiliary Services.


















RQ1: How do selected personal attributes (RA, CRA, and ERS) influence trading behavior in markets?
RQ2: How do selected personal attributes (RA, CRA, and ERS) influence decision quality in markets?
RQ3: How well can an unobtrusive analysis of trading behavior reveal trader preferences?
RQ4: Are decision behavior and decision outcome affected by the kind of device used?
RQ5: Is providing information about the disposition effect suitable to lower the strength of the disposition effect
exhibited by an individual?
RQ6: Does a trend indicator arrow affect the strength of the disposition effect exhibited by an individual?
RQ7: Are integrated surveys more accepted by participants of a prediction market than standalone surveys?
FIGURE 1.1: Placement of Research Questions in Market Engineering Object
(based on Gimpel et al., 2008)
Object, see Section 2.4. Note, that some research questions relate to multiple components of the Market
Engineering Object. In such cases, a best-fit approach is taken and the research question is assigned to the
component, which it relates to most.
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The work at hand is structured in five parts as shown in Figure 1.2. Part I motivates this
thesis, presents the examined research questions, and gives an overview of the structure of
this thesis. Part II introduces Continuous Market Engineering (see Chapter 2) and presents
theoretical foundations on Prediction Markets (see Chapter 3) before two instances of pre-
diction market are described (see Chapter 4).
Part III presents selected insights derived from applied Continuous Market Engineering
conducted on the two prediction markets described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 examines
how Agent Behavior can be analyzed and whether certain characteristics lead to a specific
Market Outcome (hence addressing research questions 1 and 2).7 Further analyzing Agent
Behavior, Chapter 6 describes what a specific trading behavior denotes about a trader’s
attitude and beliefs (hence addressing research question 3).8 Chapter 7 analyzes how
Agent Behavior is influenced by the choice of (IT) Infrastructure offers (hence addressing
research question 4).9 Chapter 8 shows how small design changes in the (IT) Infrastructure
can raise or lower a trader’s behavioral bias (hence addressing research questions 5 and
6).10 Chapter 9 describes how Auxiliary Services can be provided that simultaneously im-
prove a trader’s platform experience as well as support the market provider’s goals (hence
addressing research question 7).11
Part IV concludes this thesis by stating the contributions made in the context of Contin-
uous Market Engineering, giving a research outlook, and summarizing this work. Appen-
dices are contained in Part V.
7Parts of this chapter are based on joint work with Florian Teschner and Christof Weinhardt and have
been presented at the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 2014 (Kranz et al., 2014b).
8Parts of this chapter are based on a joint article with Florian Teschner, Philipp Roüast, and Christof
Weinhardt which has been presented at the International Conference on e-Society 2014 (Kranz et al., 2014).
9Parts of this chapter are based on joint work with Florian Teschner and Christof Weinhardt and have
been presented at the Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik 2012 (Teschner et al., 2012). Other parts of this
chapter are based on a joint article with Florian Teschner and Christof Weinhardt which is published in the
International Journal of E-Services and Mobile Applications (Kranz et al., 2014c).
10Parts of this chapter are based on a joint working paper with Florian Teschner and Christof Weinhardt
which is currently under review.
11Parts of this chapter are based on joint work with Florian Teschner, Philipp Roüast, and Christof Wein-
hardt which has been presented at the European Conference on Information Systems 2014 (Kranz et al.,
2014a).
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“ [. . . D]esign is important because markets don’t al-
ways grow like weeds — some of them are hothouse
orchids.”
ALVIN E. ROTH, 2002
2.1 Introduction
DESIGNING markets is a major challenge for market engineers, as hinted by the in-troductory quote. A meaningful market may seldom have a purpose of its own but
often is a plain tool to achieve a certain goal, which in turn determines a market outcome.
Thus, it seems fruitful to take a step back in order to assess what should be achieved, before
prerequisites and goals can be translated to market characteristics. Furthermore, before a
profound proposition on how to design ‘good’ markets can be suggested one has to fathom
a market’s typical lifecycle and ecosystem. Hence, this chapter starts by introducing a
stylized market lifecycle followed by selected literature dealing with the design process
of market systems. First, Roth’s (2002) ideas on Market Design are presented, followed
by Market Engineering (Weinhardt et al., 2003) and one of its derived forms, Agile Market
Engineering (Block, 2010). These approaches may help in supporting a market engineer
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in creating markets to achieve desired goals. Finally, the significance of a continuous ap-
proach to the design and improvement of markets, called Continuous Market Engineering,
is highlighted.
2.2 A Typical Market Lifecycle
Literature describing and developing models of lifecycles are around since many decades
and were applied to many research domains; starting from the biological sciences, but also
in social sciences (e. g., O’Rand and Krecker, 1990), in organizational sciences (e. g., Quinn
and Cameron, 1983), object-oriented programming (e. g., Henderson-Sellers and Edwards,
1990), regional clusters (e. g., Fornahl and Menzel, 2007) or to describe typical phases in
a product’s life (e. g., Vernon, 1966; Wells and Gubar, 1966; Segerstrom et al., 1990).
Typically, an electronic market comprises multiple components making up the market as
such; i. e., the market software, computer systems, etc. Additionally, auxiliary services such
as customer service processes or billing processes usually support the market system. Even
though, an electronic market is not a product in the classical sense, it befells a lifecycle
and can hence be matched to a product lifecycle fairly well.
The lifetime of a product is usually separated into phases which are traversed through-
out a product’s lifecycle. Figure 2.1 depicts the five phases of a product’s lifecycle as de-
scribed by Stark (2011), products – including services, and thus markets – run through
in their existence: ‘Imagine’, ‘Define’, ‘Realise’, ‘Use/Support’, and ‘Retire/Dispose’. He
further groups those activities as follows. First, Beginning-of-Life (BOL) of a product com-
prises the three phases ‘Imagine’, ‘Define’, and ‘Realise’. Second, Middle-of-Life (MOL) is
described by ‘Use/Support’ of a product. Third, the phase ‘Retire/Dispose’ makes up the
End-of-Life (EOL) of a product.
Imagine Define    Retire/DisposeRealise Use/Support
Beginning-of-Life (BOL) Middle-of-Life (MOL) End-of-Life (EOL)
FIGURE 2.1: Product Lifecycle
(based on Stark, 2011)
The Stage-Gate System by Cooper (1990), as depicted in Figure 2.2, is based on a slightly
different lifecycle model. It separates the BOL in five stages, which are each connected with
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so-called gates, fulfilling quality assurance functions that will not be discussed here. Every
new product starts with an idea, and enters the first stage ‘Preliminary Assessment’, fol-
lowed by the stage ‘Definition’. Afterwards, the product will enter the stage ‘Development’
and pass on to stage ‘Validation’. The last stage is called ‘Commercialization’ and deals,
inter alia, with production, sales, and related processes. Both Cooper’s and Stark’s phases
of a product’s BOL find their equivalence in the Market Engineering Process, as depicted
in Figure 2.4b, that will be discussed in the next section. However, the MOL and EOL
are described rather shortly with one phase each in the model of Stark (2011). As Cooper
















































FIGURE 2.2: Stage-Gate System
(based on Cooper, 1990)
A more detailed depiction for the MOL is the stylized market lifecycle as shown in
Figure 2.3, which comprises four phases.1 It describes, in a simplified way, the alteration
of sales and profits of a market during its utilization. The caption ‘sales’ of the upper curve
in Figure 2.3 is not meant literally, but represents the turnover generated with the market
– the analogy to sales in a manufactured product context – rather than realized sales on the
market. In the first phase, the ‘Emerging phase’, the yet unknown market is introduced to
the intended audience. Tasks in that phase include the involvement of marketing methods
in order to advertise the market. Nevertheless, the market is already fully operative and
is used by a small, but steadily increasing number of participants.
Although, the market does already generate some sales, it generally yields negative
profits. This changes in the following ‘Growth’ phase, where the market starts to return
1 Even though called ‘Market Lifecycle’, this prototypal view can also be applied to a general product
context and under certain assumptions also to a service context.
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FIGURE 2.3: Stylized Market Lifecycle
(based on Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007)
positive profits. Furthermore, the sales’ growth rate increases until the sales reach an
inflection point from which the phase of ‘Maturity’ starts. This is generally the phase in
which most profits are yield and least resources need to be invested. The profits and sales
tend to stay largely constant. Afterwards, at a certain point, the sales start to decrease,
followed by diminishing profits; indicating the start of the ‘Decline’ phase. Finally, the
market reaches its EOL and is discontinued. Summing up, the presented lifecycle models
assume a linear, serial and thus non-repetitive phase model for products. They are well
suited for a simplified descriptive reflection of product lifecycles and thus furthers the
understanding of basic patterns in a product’s lifetime. Nevertheless, they do not focus
on the possibility to re-iterate certain phases in order to adapt a product in a dynamic
environment.
2.3 Market Design
In his seminal paper, Roth (2002) discusses the changing expectation on economists to
not only analyze markets, but to design them. Hereby, he implicitly calls for new methods,
guidelines and frameworks for market designers. This very change from an analytical ex-
post based perception to a formative ex-ante way of thinking implies the need for new ap-
proaches. Hence, research should not only concentrate on a conceptional, characteristics-
based track, but extend efforts to investigate cause-effect relationships of market features
18
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to eventually enable an anticipatory design approach. Furthermore, he postulates two
theses guiding the advent of Market Design. First, [. . . ] in the service of design, experimen-
tal and computational economics are natural complements to game theory” (Roth, 2002).
Second, he states that [. . . ] we need to foster a still unfamiliar kind of design literature in
economics, whose focus will be different than traditional game theory and theoretical mech-
anism design” (Roth, 2002). In 2008, Roth concretizes his earlier work, where he also
postulates three prerequisites for markets to flourish: thickness, congestion, and safety.
First, thickness must be provided by markets in the sense of attracting a sufficiently large
share of a market’s target group. Second, markets need to have a certain level of liquidity
in order to overcome potential congestion. Third, markets must provide safe and simple
trading opportunities to prevent participants from choosing any outside option. Finally, he
corroborates his approach to market design on the basis of detailed examples of medical
and academic labor markets, kidney exchanges, and school assignment problems. “After
a market has been designed, adopted, and implemented, it has a continuing life of its own”
(Roth, 2010). In the light of the latter quote, Roth (2010) revises his earlier publication
(Roth, 2008) and reports developments and insights gained so far. Although, the pre-
sented markets still operate effectively, he nevertheless identifies unsolved problems that
call for solutions. Milgrom (2011) sees market design closely linked to mechanism de-
sign, yet admitting that relevant questions of market design such as product definition,
communicational concerns, incentives, and linkages among markets are not well studied
in the context of mechanism design.2 Examples of applied mechanism design in areas of
market design include online advertisement markets (e. g., Edelman et al., 2007; Levin
and Milgrom, 2010), electricity markets (e. g., Wilson, 2002), or radio spectrum auctions
(e. g., McMillan, 1994).
Summing up, “[. . . ] market design calls for an engineering approach” (Roth, 2002) and
stresses that details matter in relation to the market’s mechanics and thus its purpose.
Stated differently, it lacks a structured procedure model, capable of guiding a market de-
signer in the creation process.
2.4 Market Engineering
Market Engineering as defined by Weinhardt and Gimpel is “[. . . ] the process of consciously
setting up or restructuring a market in order to make it an effective and efficient means for
2 “Market design is an engineering discipline linked to mechanism design.” (Milgrom, 2011)
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carrying out exchange transactions” (Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007).3 It requires “[. . . ] an
integrated, [holistic] view on markets, a multiplicity of methodologies, an interdisciplinary ap-
proach, and the understanding that details matter” (Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007). Market
Engineering can be seen as an advancement to Market Design as described in the preceding
section, although it is slightly different. In contrast, to Roth’s (2002) focus on the appli-
cation of market mechanisms, Market Engineering describes a systematic development
process for markets (Market Engineering Process, cf. Figure 2.4b) besides a framework
(Market Engineering Object, cf. Figure 2.4a) which supports market engineers in structur-
ing the creative leeway. It hereby focuses on implementation details whilst considering
environmental conditions and influences on agent behavior in order to reach the desired
market outcome.
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FIGURE 2.4: Market Engineering Framework
(based on Gimpel et al., 2008)
The Market Engineering framework describes a Market Engineering Object (Figure 2.4a),
consisting of multiple components, which gives an orientation for market engineers as well
as a Market Engineering Process (Figure 2.4b) that describes the necessary steps in creat-
ing a market. All components of the Market Engineering Object are embedded within
a Socio-Economic and Legal Environment which comprises applicable laws, social norms,
3Another definition can be found in Neumann (2007): “Market [E]ngineering is the engineering design of
all institutional rules of an electronic market” (Neumann, 2007).
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and others. The Socio-Economic and Legal Environment is considered as given and can
usually not be modified by the market engineer. A market engineer’s aim is to achieve a
certain Market Outcome (e. g., activity, liquidity, allocation efficiency). This goal can be
reached by designing the Market Structure, the Transaction Object, and the Auxiliary Ser-
vices. Market Structure encompasses three interdependent components: Microstructure,
(IT) Infrastructure, and Business Structure. Microstructure defines the market mechanism,
like allocation and pricing rules. The (IT) Infrastructure comprises technical implemen-
tation details and interfaces to the market. Finally, trading fees as well as business and
pricing model details belong to the Business Structure. Here, one has to be aware of the
fact that the three aforementioned components, which make up the Market Structure, are
strongly interdependent and thus cannot be designed independently of each other. Agent
Behavior results from those components as well as from certain agent characteristics (cf.
Chapter 5). In other words, it is not feasible for a market engineer to directly influence
Agent Behavior. Therefore, he has to anticipate a certain Agent Behavior as result of his
design decisions in order to achieve a desired Market Outcome.
The Market Engineering Process, based upon waterfall models as known in software
engineering, leads a market engineer in creating a market. First, subject to the market
objectives, the requirements are gathered by means of an Environmental Analysis. Second,
based on the derived requirements list, the market Design is created. Afterwards, the
Evaluation of the market is conducted on the basis of a conceptual model of a market
system. Depending on the outcome of the evaluation step, the process re-iterates the
design step or continues with the Implementation, where the market is created based on
the preliminary list of requirements to be satisfied (‘preliminary requirement satisfaction
list’). Finally, Introduction of the market marks the last step of the Market Engineering
Process. Weinhardt and Gimpel (2007) characterizes the Market Engineering Process as
a “basically sequential process” that, nevertheless, allows iterations of process steps. Albeit
acknowledging the necessity of iterations, the discussion on conditions and requirements
thereof is not further stressed.
A juxtaposition of the main phases of the Market Engineering Process (Figure 2.4b)
besides those of the discussed lifecycle models from Section 2.2 is depicted in Figure 2.5.
As depicted, the Market Engineering Process supports the Market Engineer in each step
throughout the Beginning-of-Life phase. Similar to the Stage-Gate System and the Product
Lifecycle Phases introduced earlier, the Market Engineering Process does hardly concern
the Middle-of-Life nor End-of-Life phases.
Market Engineering has successfully been applied to the creation process of markets in
21
Chapter 2 Continuous Market Engineering
Beginning-of-Life (BOL) Middle-of-Life (MOL)
   Retire/DisposeUse/Support
Product Lifecycle Phases (Stark, 2011)
Market Engineering Process (Gimpel et al.,2008)
Stage-Gate System Phases (Cooper, 1990; simplified)
Environmental 
Analysis Design Evaluation Introduction











FIGURE 2.5: Juxtaposition of Lifecycle Models in the Beginning-of-Life
(based on Cooper, 1990; Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007; Stark, 2011)
various domains like (computing) grid markets (e. g., Schnizler et al., 2004, 2008), sport
prediction markets (e. g., Luckner et al., 2005), economic indicators (e. g., Teschner et al.,
2011), or environmental predictions (e. g., Stathel et al., 2009). It has been proven suitable
in supporting market engineers in the creation process of markets. Nevertheless, albeit it
allows for re-iterations, it lacks a focus on continuous monitoring and improvement of an
existing market.
2.5 Agile Market Engineering
Block (2010) suggests Agile Market Engineering as a specialized advancement to Market
Engineering. It contains a development process model including propositions for respon-
sibilities4 and software development methodologies as well as a collection of accompa-
nying software tools. In its core, Agile Market Engineering is still based on aspects of
the aforementioned Market Engineering framework, especially it makes use of the Market
Engineering Object. Its main contribution is to describe an agile development process in
detail, which is enriched with the experienced knowledge gained from practical market de-
velopment projects. The Agile Market Engineering Process is depicted in Figure 2.6 and shall
be understood as a “[. . . ] collection of best practices, experiences, and tools and furthermore
shows one way to orchestrate them [. . . ]” (Block, 2010). It comprises three phases, namely
the Pre-Development Phase, the Development Phase, and the Operation Phase, whereas each
of these phases consists of three process steps.
4The proposed responsibilities/roles are business owner, market developer, market expert, market oper-
ator, change manager, and market participants. For further details see Block (2010, pp. 49)
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FIGURE 2.6: Agile Market Engineering Process
(based on Block, 2010)
First, in the Pre-Development phase, the Business Owner develops a vision for the mar-
ket and assesses the market’s environment. For the first subtask, Block (2010) proposes
to make use of creativity techniques like freewriting (Belanoff et al., 1991), brainstorming
(Osborn, 1953), or mindmapping (Buzan and Buzan, 1993). Second, the Business Owner,
assisted by the Market Expert, collects initial requirements for the upcoming market. He
suggests to rely on user stories (Beck, 2000; Jeffries, 2001) for that purpose. Third, the
Business Owner, accompanied by the Market Engineer as well as the Market Developer eval-
uate potentially existing market platforms by their similarity to the market’s vision, which
may act as a starting point for development. Therefore, Schönfeld and Block (2010) de-
veloped a market template repository. According to the Agile Market Engineering Process,
it will take a few hours to several days to complete these steps. As result, a set of initial
requirements is obtained, which initiates the Development phase. The steps of the devel-
opment phase may be repeated numerous times. Each iteration is expected to last from
one week to one month. First, the requirements are prioritized by the Business Owner. For
this purpose, it is suggested to make use of prioritization schemes like MoSCoW (Clegg
and Barker, 1994; Ash, 2007) or the one Selhorst (2006) developed on the basis of Kano
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et al. (1984). Second, the Business Owner along with the Market Developer finalizes the
requirements and chooses a subset of user stories to implement in the following phase.
Third, the Market Developer with the backing of the Business Owner, the Market Expert,
and the Change Manager design, implement, and test the current set of user stories. Here,
a test-driven development process (Beck, 2002) is proposed. This phase ends with a re-
lease of the market system. Afterwards, the Operation phase, which runs continuously,
starts. First, the most recent release of the market system is deployed on the production
system by the Market Operator and the Market Developer. Second, the Market Operator, the
Business Owner, and the Market Expert observer and assess the market’s activity. This aims
to ensure proper operation of the market system in both the business and the technical
dimension, which also includes monitoring for fraudulent activity for which approaches
like the one described in Blume et al. (2010) are eligible. Third, the Business Owner, the
Market Developer, the Market Expert, and the Market Operator revise the market’s require-
ments based on their experiences gained in the latter step as well as on implicit (Kelly and
Teevan, 2003) and explicit feedback. Those revised requirements will potentially trigger
a new iteration of the Development phase, which in turn eventually leads to a new market
release.
2.6 The Need for Continuous Market Engineering
In contrast to the simplified concept that markets are planned, implemented, run, and
finally closed, reality often narrates a different tale. Also, the ‘classical’ lifecycle phases
of emerging, growth, maturity, and decline are an abstraction which is too simplified for
many areas of application. On the one hand, sometimes markets turn out to be far more
successful during their operation than expected in the planning phase. Thus, their run-
time is often prolonged which in turn raises the probability for changes in market’s envi-
ronment or objectives that will create a necessity for adjustments. The opposite can also
be observed, and calls for an analogous approach of identifying and analyzing (design)
weaknesses and conducting subsequent improvements. On the other hand, markets can
be planned with an open end date from the beginning, knowing that their initial concept
is rather a first approximation than a final design, and conscious of the need for further
adjustments. Both situations described often require a regular or even continuous revisit-
ing of the market’s initial objectives and requirements as well as the way they are imple-
mented. In these cases, the Market Engineering approach, although it explicitly allows the
possibility to re-iterate process steps of the Market Engineering Process (i. e., re-design of
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markets), does not stress the continuous aspect satisfyingly with the relation to reality’s
needs. Especially the Market Engineering Process (cf. Figure 2.4b) lacks explicit advice for
a market’s Middle-of-Life phase (cf. Section 2.4) and thus for a continuous monitoring and
improvement process. In particular, a structured process address changes is not contained
in the Market Engineering framework.
As already quoted from Roth (2010)5, after its development a market is not simply
released into a static reality, but rather in a dynamic context in which the market might
not necessarily be able to fulfill its purpose without proper readjustments. Weinhardt and
Gimpel (2007) describe this circumstance as a “fusion of design- and runtime”6 and stress
the advantages of these cases by stating that “[. . . ] service operators can continuously ex-
periment with subsets of their user groups [. . . ] and the real-time feedback allows continuous
improvement in the design of their online businesses”, eventually leading to “a competitive
advantage over potential new entrants” (Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007). Roth (2010) further
stresses the importance of continuously monitoring running markets in order to ensure that
they fulfill their purpose: “For those involved directly in the market, it is useful to continue
to monitor it to make sure it is functioning well” (Roth, 2010). Especially in the context
of prediction markets, it is known that “[m]arkets can fail and have been observed to pro-
duce anomalous behavior (Thaler, 1993; Thaler and Ziemba, 1988) thus understanding how
to design prediction markets for successful deployment to minimize these failures is critical”
(McHugh and Jackson, 2012). In turn, the Agile Market Engineering Process contains this
very step by (potentially) continuously reiterating the development and operation phases
in turn. This resembles a potential connection between ‘Introduction’ and ‘Environmental
Analysis’ in the Market Engineering Process.
This thesis suggests a Continuous Market Engineering Process, as depicted in Figure 2.7,
based on many years of experience gained while operating the prediction markets ‘Eco-
nomic Indicator eXchange’, ‘Political Indicator eXchange’, and ‘Kurspiloten’ (cf. Chapter 4).
The process was derived by a combination of describing the interplay of operating, moni-
toring and refining taking place on the aforementioned prediction markets as well as from
knowledge and insights gained throughout this time. It hereby attempts to structure and
abstract the approaches conducted and the lessons learned so far. Similar to the Agile
5“After a market has been designed, adopted, and implemented, it has a continuing life of its own.” (Roth,
2010)
6Taken from the following quote: “For some Internet market platforms, like eBay and Amazon, an in-
teresting tendency can be observed: after the initial introduction of the electronic market platform, there is
no clear cut distinction between design-time and runtime any more. This equals the fusion of design- and
runtime of other Internet services like Google, for example” (Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007).
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FIGURE 2.7: Continuous Market Engineering Process
Market Engineering Process, the Continuous Market Engineering Process can basically be
viewed as an enhancement to the Market Engineering Process (Figure 2.4b) by aspects of
continuous operation, monitoring, and refinement. In contrast to the latter, it does not end
after the step ‘Introduction’, but moves on into the step ‘Operation’. This step summarizes
all activities of the market operator in running the market system (i. e., the market itself
as well as auxiliary services supporting the market’s operation). It is only interrupted by
either (i) an introduction of a new release of the market system, which equals a restart of
the step ‘Operation’, or by (ii) reaching the End-of-Life of the market, which results in a
controlled suspension and closure of the market. The step ‘Introduction’ is accompanied
by a ‘Monitoring’ step, which furthermore surveillances the ‘Operation’ of the market con-
tinuously. It describes all efforts undertaken by the market operator focusing on observing
the market, i. e., the market’s internals (e. g., technical operation of the market system,
the market’s metrics, etc.), the trader’s behavior in the market, as well as environmental
influences on the market (e. g., technological, legal and socio-economic changes). Mon-
itoring the technical operation of the market system comprises monitoring the hardware
and software the market system runs upon, as well as the market software system itself.
Proper solutions may be built on top of common IT infrastructure monitoring solutions.
By using market-specific key performance indicators, essential market metrics may be de-
rived and conveniently monitored.7 Semi-automatic monitoring tools a way to monitor
trading behavior, like trading pattern recognition (e. g., Blume et al., 2010) or special-
ized logging facilities, which record key events. Environmental changes may be classified
7Generally, there are various possibilities to derive KPIs for a market. In case of prediction markets, a




as technological, legal, and societal changes. Examples for technological changes of the
environment are accruing security issues, changes in trader’s IT systems, or innovations
rendering certain technologies obsolete. Legal changes, inter alia, comprise regulatory
interventions forcing market operators to adapt their systems. Finally, socio-economic
changes may affect traders’ behavior and preferences, which in turn can result in different
needs and demands on the market system. Each of the aforementioned monitoring goals
are described rather abstract, as their particular design largely depends on the market’s as
well as the market provider’s specific objectives. While a market is operating, usually the
Continuous Market Engineering Process finds itself – besides in the ‘Operation’ step – in
the ‘Monitoring’ step, continuously observing market parameters. There are basically two
possibilities that will trigger a continuation of the Market Engineering Process. First, in
case the ‘Monitoring’ step identifies a deviation from what is considered as normal opera-
tion, the step ‘Deviation Analysis’ is triggered, aiming to identify the underlying mechanics
leading to this very change. Subsequently, it is decided how extensive the corrective ac-
tions have to be and thus triggering the ‘Redesign’ step, which needs to be initiated in
order to refine the market. Second, changes of the market’s objectives, resulting in the
adaptation of subsequent input variables (namely, requirements, or conceptual changes;
cf. ‘Input’ in Figure 2.7), can trigger the step ‘Deviation Analysis’ directly. For instance, a
market operator decides to change its service portfolio (e. g., extending it by introducing
a new class of products) will trigger the ‘Deviation Analysis’ directly. In turn, this process
step will evaluate the available input parameters, eventually preparing the execution of
the step ‘Redesign’. Analogous to the Market Engineering Process, here the ‘Redesign’ step
deals with the design of the market structure, as depicted in Figure 2.4a, followed by the
‘Evaluation’ step, which tests the market system with regards to functionality, acceptance
and market outcome. For instance, reacting to a change in trader’s activity by introducing
additional transaction objects will result in a redesign of the market. Another example
is the reaction to a security issue, which will result in a redesign of the market system’s
technical implementation. After conducting a ‘Redesign’ step, the process flow continues
its way through the process model, reaching the step ‘Introduction’, which launches a new
market release, and preliminary ends in the ‘Operating’ and ‘Monitoring’ steps.
2.7 Summary
This chapter presents different abstractions of lifecycles applicable for markets. Subse-
quently, the concept of Market Design is introduced before the Market Engineering frame-
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work, the related Market Engineering Process and an advancement, Agile Market Engi-
neering, was discussed. Consistently, the importance of continuity in operating, moni-
toring, and re-designing markets in order to operate successful markets is stressed. Lastly,
the Continuous Market Engineering Process, intended to guide market engineers in continu-
ously operating and improving a market is presented. The derived approach of Continuous
Market Engineering is applied subsequently to the work at hand.
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Prediction Markets – Theoretical
Foundations
“ Prediction is very difficult, especially if it’s about the
future.”
NIELS H. D. BOHR
3.1 Introduction
PREDICTIONS about future events and scenarios which are reliable and trustworthyare often a prerequisite for economic as well as political decisions.1 Common ways
to gain insights about future developments are expert polls and mathematical prediction
models using formal statistical methods such as regression analysis and ARIMA2. With the
growth of the Internet, markets that are accessible via a web interface trading predictions
about future events have emerged as a promising alternative forecasting tool. In these
Prediction Markets3, participants trade contracts with payoffs depending on the outcome
1Note, the words ‘prediction’ and ‘forecast’ are used interchangeable in this work.
2For a detailed description of the Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model see Box
and Jenkins (1976).
3For an introduction to Prediction Markets containing a selection of successful applications see also
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004).
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of uncertain future events (see Section 3.2). Usually, participants submit their future ex-
pectations as orders like one does when trading stocks in financial markets. Prediction
markets have been successfully applied to a wide range of topics such as sports betting
(e. g., Borghesi, 2009) or political forecasts (e. g., Forsythe et al., 1992) as shown in Sec-
tion 3.5.
Prediction markets derive their predictive power from a market design that provides in-
centives for traders to truthfully reveal their information and an algorithm which weights
individual opinions. By aggregating dispersed information and expectations about future
events into market prices, they generate a forecast and thus facilitate decision making. The
price system plays an essential role to this end, whereto von Hayek (1945) wrote: “The
most significant fact about [the price system] is the economy of knowledge with which it oper-
ates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order to be able to take the right
action.” In this context, the most important assumption of von Hayek (1945) states that
gains from trades and equilibrium prices can be obtained even without common knowl-
edge and perfect information. This holds especially for cases in which trader do not have
(or reveal their) rational expectations, or whereby traders have only limited information
of the markets state, or even if the number of market participants is rather ‘small’. Smith
(1982) examined three experimental market settings and found strong support for the so-
called Hayek Hypothesis4. In a sense, the Efficient-Market Hypothesis (EMH), developed by
Fama (1970), can be seen as a concretization of the Hayek Hypothesis. Simply speaking,
von Hayek (1945) described the price system’s capability to aggregate dispersed informa-
tion into (equilibrium) prices even under suboptimal circumstances, whereas Fama (1970)
hypothesizes that market prices already reflect all available information. Fama (1965) de-
fines an ‘efficient’ market as a market “[. . . ] where prices at every point in time represent best
estimates of intrinsic values.” According to the Efficient-Market Hypothesis, the fundamen-
tal value of a stock5 in an efficient market is completely represented by the market price,
which contains all relevant information of a stock and the market itself (Fama, 1970). In his
1970 paper, Fama breaks the EMH down into three subforms (weak-form efficiency, semi-
strong-form efficiency, and strong-form efficiency) which he redefined slightly in 1991. In
the weak form, past stock prices as well as other historic information do not completely
determine future stock prices. Hence, past stock prices cannot predict future stock prices.
Nevertheless, market participants cannot systematically exploit those inefficiencies to gain
4For a complementary study to Smith (1982) proving Hayek’s hypothesis cf. Al-Ubaydli and Boettke
(2011).




profits. Accordingly, stock prices follow a random walk model. In the semi-strong form,
all publicly available information is – in addition to past price developments – incorpo-
rated into current prices. In the strong form, all relevant public and private information
regarding the market are incorporated into market prices.
However, there are also preconditions a forecasting goal has to fulfill so that a prediction
market can be used to generate a forecast for the particular event. Basically, a Prediction
Market can be used to predict any future event that matches the following requirements:
First, the event in question can be transformed into a number (i. e., a price). Second, as a
forecast tries to describe the state of the given event at a specific date, it must be possible
to determine the outcome of the event in question doubtlessly at the specified point in
time.6
The remainder of this section, structured based on the Prediction Market Framework
Teschner (2012) developed based upon Zhang et al. (2011), is as follows. First, the market
microstructure is presented. Subsequently, the importance of a well-designed incentive
scheme is stressed, followed by a discussion of ways to design the trading system as well
as the market interface and their particular implications. Finally, exemplary use cases are
presented.
3.2 Market Microstructure
Market Microstructure can be defined as “[. . . ] the study of the process and outcomes of
exchanging assets under explicit trading rules” (O’Hara, 1995, p. 15). First, the trading
mechanism is presented before we turn towards the design of tradable contracts.
3.2.1 Trading Mechanism
Prediction markets neither rely on a specific trading mechanism nor are restricted to simple
binary outcomes. The most basic trading mechanism for prediction markets is based on a
continuous double auction (CDA) for a contract that represents the outcome of an upcoming
event. Probably the most widely used market mechanism is a continuous double auction
(Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). Besides its low complexity and easy of implementation, a
6For details see paragraph on ‘Contract Design’ in Section 3.2.
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CDA guarantees by design, that trading is a zero-sum game and hence is without financial
risk to the operator.
If the number of participants and/or market liquidity is rather low or noisy (defined as
‘thin markets’), a plain CDA is usually not an appropriate mechanism. Instead the use of
market makers is beneficial under such circumstances.7 Hereby, it is regardless of whether
a human market maker or an automated market maker (i. e., an algorithm) is used. For in-
stance, Hanson (2003) describes an automated market maker based on a market scoring
rule to constantly provide trading opportunities. Stathel et al. (2009) discusses differ-
ent market-maker approaches – amongst them the aforementioned one – and presents an
own approach, which is also used in an intra-organizational prediction market presented
in Stathel et al. (2010). This approach consists of an automated arbitrageur and an auto-
mated liquidity provider. The presented market (Stathel et al., 2010) comprises multiple
stocks, each representing the probability of occurrence of a certain future scenario, includ-
ing an outside option. According to the used payout function, the price of each product
represents the probability of occurrence one to one (e. g., $ 12 equals 12 %). Hence, the
sum of all stocks must relate to the sum of probabilities of occurrence of all future sce-
narios, which obviously is 100 %. Additionally, throughout the market runtime bundle
trading was allowed.8 By design, the market did not prevent traders from influencing the
price of products so that the sum of open buy or sell orders lead to arbitrage opportunities.
The automated arbitrageur described in Stathel et al. (2009) regularly checked for such
arbitrage opportunities and leveled those by actively buying and selling as the circum-
stances require. The liquidity provider component of Stathel et al.’s (2009) market maker
behaved similar to the one described by Boer et al. (2007). Generally, on the positive
side, a market maker opens the possibility to provide rather small markets, but also has a
downside. The market maker might cost some money to quote prices. In case of a human
market maker, usually a salary and supplementary costs have to be paid, additionally both
types of market maker might lose money when trading. Although, the maximum amount
of money an automated market maker will cost in the worst-case scenario can often be
calculated, a market engineer should be aware of that fact.9 In marked contrast to most
electronic trading systems, usually no trading fees are charged in Prediction Markets as
this would have counter-productive effects on forecast accuracy, “[. . . ] because it inhibits
7A market maker can either be an individual, an organization, or an algorithm, providing liquidity to
the market by quoting both sell and buy prices.
8In the given setting, Bundle trading describes the market feature to sell one stock of each kind to the
market system and receive $ 100 in return, or to buy one stock of each kind for a total price of $ 100 from
the market system.
9For an in-depth analysis see Hanson (2007), Luckner (2008), and Chen and Pennock (2012).
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rational participants from executing trades with an expected profit of less than the trading
fee, thus, creating a bias” (Spann and Skiera, 2003, p. 1318).
3.2.2 Contract Design
There are multiple ways to design a contract in a prediction market, wherein the forecast-
ing goal is the major determinant for that choice. The precondition to forecast any event
with a prediction market is that the outcome can be quantified at a specific point in time.
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) describe three possible contract types. First, a Winner-takes-
all contract that models events with a binary outcome, as for instance the chance that a
certain candidate will be elected in a majority election. Second, an Index contract that
is suitable to predict a numeric value representing a future event. Examples are the vote
share of a certain party in a proportional representation or the number of unemployed
persons at a given time (cf. Teschner et al., 2011). Third, a Spread contract which can
be used to reveal the markets median expectation of a future event. In contrast to the
aforementioned, it defines a fixed payoff and determine a particular spread via a market
mechanism.
Any specific event and the corresponding tradable contract are connected via their pay-
out function. The payout function is the key to market transparency as it enables partic-
ipants to determine a priori what outcome equals which contract price, or as Antweiler
(2012) expressed it: “The ability of a trader to quickly convert and visualize the relation-
ship between outcome and price is important.” Imagine a Winner-takes-all contract for a
candidate ’A’ in an upcoming election taking place with the method of majority decision.
In this example, the payout function (see Equation 3.1) ensures one currency unit (1 CU)




1CU, Candidate ’A’ wins the election
0CU, otherwise
A more complex payout function for an Index contract might look like Equation 3.2.10
Here, the inflation rate (I) is predicted and results in the price pInflation as stated. The
10This example is based on Teschner et al. (2011).
33
Chapter 3 Prediction Markets – Theoretical Foundations
relative difference to last years’ value of I (i. e., It=0−It=−12It=−12 ) multiplied by scaling factor α
(here, 10) and added to 100 is paid out.
(3.2) pInflation = 100CU+αCU×
It=0 − It=−12
It=−12
, withα= 10 and t in months
Let us assume a rational risk-neutral market participant formed his expectation about
the inflation development and derived with high certainty a relative change of 2.54 %. By
using the payout function (Equation 3.2) the price per stock related to the given expec-
tation can be calculated. In case the assumption was right, the resulting payout will be
125.40 CU. If the current market price of that contract will be below this value, the mar-
ket participant should buy those stocks. In the opposite case, with market prices above
125.40 CU, the market participant should sell his stocks, since he expects them to be paid
out for a lower price. In case of equality of expected payout value and market price, the
market participant should be undecided whether to buy or to sell.11
Last, a Spread contract is explained in detail. It is again a zero-sum game for market
operators and defines a fixed payoff which is paid when the event in question realizes.
Here, as the amount available to pay out is determined by a fixed price both sides pay for
a contract, market participants in a way negotiate the payout function itself. An example
is depicted in Equation 3.3.
(3.3) psA =
¨
2CU, s∗ > s (Candidate ’A’ wins more than s % of the vote)
0CU, otherwise
Imagine a contract in form of an even-money bet (i. e., the winner’s stake is doubled,
while the loser receives nothing). Specifically, it shall be priced for $ 1, paying $ 2 if a
election candidate ‘A’ wins a vote share s∗ of more than s percent, $ 0 otherwise. Hereby,
traders submit bid and ask offers for the spread s, which in turn determines the potential
payoff of that very contract.12 For instance, a rational risk-neutral trader expecting candi-
date ‘A’ to win 30 % of all votes (i. e., s∗ex pected = 30%) would submit bids for that contract
11As the market participant’s confidence will only in rare cases be 100 %, it is most likely, that he would
sell his stocks in favor for cash than buying additional stocks that bear a risk of losing money. Furthermore,
aspects like market activity and past price development – just to name a few – might play an important role
in such a situation.
12Note, that s varies.
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for less than 30 % and asks starting at 30 %, since s∗ex pected > s has to hold in order to dou-
ble the stake. If bid and ask orders for s overlap, both traders pay the contract’s price ($ 1).
Furthermore, to conduct the final payout, the market system has to store the specific s of
that transaction. After the event in question can be quantified, each transaction has to be
paid out; i. e., it has to be determined, whether the (transaction-dependent) s is smaller
than s∗. In turn, this decides which ‘side’ receives its doubled stake. Such a contract design
follows that the bids and asks gathered in the order book will form the market’s median
expectation for s∗.
3.3 Incentives
Proper incentives are a crucial factor for a prediction market’s success. Thus, an important
part of a market engineer’s work is to design and implement a suitable incentive system.
There are numerous ways to classify incentives, like the very rough division into intrinsic
(e. g., joy) and extrinsic (e. g., monetary reward) incentives or the finer-graded taxonomy
of financial, moral, coercive, and natural incentives. In the context of prediction markets,
it is common to make use of extrinsic (i. e., financial) incentives – also due to the fact, that
creating moral, coercive or even natural incentives is a tough endeavor.
Regardless of whether a prediction market is run with real or play money, the market
operator should provide monetary incentives. In case of play-money prediction markets,
this can be achieved by supplying material prizes or vouchers. Besides that, incentives
have to be communicated in a transparent way in order to be understood by participants
and thus take full effect.
3.3.1 Currency
Every prediction market needs some kind of currency to enable trading. Using real money
is by far the most straight-forward approach to fulfill that premise as participants as well
as the market operators are used to it. On the downside, it can imply additional burden
for market operators as they might – depending on their location – have to obey certain
laws on lottery, gambling, or money laundering.13 Additionally, using real money might
13Even though the Socio-economic Environment (cf. Chapter 2) can be assumed as given, it might be
possible to circumvent those regulations. For instance, the market operator might call a single participation
fee of €10 for granting market access including 10 play-money units to participants.
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discourage participants who are not willing to risk real-money although they want to share
their estimations of future events. Furthermore, they additionally might be concerned to
provide payment information. As research indicates, the predictive power of prediction
markets – given a suitable incentive system – does not suffer, when using play money in
combination with an appropriate incentive system (e. g., Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004;
Christiansen, 2007; Slamka et al., 2008).
3.3.2 Tournament
Especially in case of play-money prediction markets, a ranking mechanism can be used
to provide incentives for participants to reveal their true estimations. A public ranking
can create a tournament-like setting for participants, that motivates a constructive and
steady participation in the market. Furthermore, a ranking can be used to construct an
additional incentive for play-money prediction markets. For instance, material prizes can
be raffled amongst the best performing participants. In an insightful study, Luckner (2006)
compared the influence of incentive schemes on prediction accuracy including rank-order
tournaments. In contrast to naive expectation, he found that predictive accuracy was
highest in the rank-order tournament treatment.
3.4 Technology
A prediction market is usually implemented as an online market, reachable from the In-
ternet or in some cases as an intra-organizational market that is only accessible from an
internal network (cf. Section 3.5 for an example). Besides aspects of usability, which are
dealt with at the end of this section, questions of speed, scalability, and reliability are of
interest from a trading system perspective.
3.4.1 Trading System
Multiple processes in a trading system are influenced by its speed. First, the number of
orders that can be conducted per time unit gives an indication of throughput. Second,
consistent with Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012), the time it takes from submitting an
order until feedback about the order is available, after it is accepted and possibly executed
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from the trading system, indicates the latency of an order. “Latency in electronic order-
driven markets is determined entirely by the hardware and software (IT systems) used to
match and report orders.” (Riordan and Storkenmaier, 2012, p. 417) Those measures gain
importance when it comes to high frequency trading, or algorithmic trading in general.
In case of solely human traders, the latency of a market system can be neglected, when
it achieves a certain minimal quality that is far off modern stock exchanges.14 Especially
on prediction markets normally only human traders are involved and thus requirements
for prediction market IT systems are usually moderate. The scalability of a trading system
is a technical characteristic which is important for a market operator in order to assure a
reactive market system, even under highly flexible demand patterns. Finally, the general
reliability and safety of the trading system is a key prerequisite (cf. ‘safe’ in Section 1.1).
Server
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FIGURE 3.1: GRAILS Framework
An established framework meeting those requirements is GRAILS15. It builds upon es-
tablished technologies like Java Platform Enterprise Edition16, the dynamic programing
14For instance Deutsche Börse’s Xetra system version 8.0 (released in 2007) reportedly already had an
average latency of 10 milliseconds (according to Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012)), which is distinctly
below the visual reaction time of an average person of 180-200 milliseconds (according to Kosinski (2013)).
15Accessible at the URL https://grails.org/ .
16Accessible at the URL http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javaee/overview/index.
html .
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language for the Java Virtual Machine Groovy17, and the persistency framework Hiber-
nate ORM18 and others. The following example illustrates the process of requesting a web
page from a GRAILS application (Figure 3.1): The client requests a specific page (i. e.,
URL) via a HTTP-Request (cf. Berners-Lee et al., 1996; Fielding et al., 1999) of the form
http://Base-URL/Controller-Name/Action/Parameters (see label ‘1’ in Figure 3.1). The
application server routes that request to the indicated action of the specified controller
including the specified parameters (see label ‘2’). Depending on the implementation of
the requested action, the controller accesses or modifies necessary data from the data
model (called ‘Domain Objects’ in grails terminology; see labels ‘3’ and ‘4’) backed by
GORM. Thereby, the controller can make use of additional functionality offered by sin-
gleton instances available to all controllers (‘Services’ in grails terminology) or plug-ins19
(see labels ‘5’ and ‘8’). Services and plug-ins can themselves access and modify data from
the model (see labels ‘6’ and ‘7’). Next, the controller compiles the necessary data and
passes it on to the corresponding view of the requested action (see label ‘9’). The view
is responsible for generating a HTML file based on the data received (i. e., rendering). In
that process, the view can make use of templates and additional programming logic to
generate the HTML output, as indicted by the connection to the SiteMesh library in Figure
3.1. Finally, the application server replies the browser request with the generated HTML
(see label ‘10’). A more specific example would be the submission of an order in one of
those markets presented in Chapter 4. In that case, a trader would first login on the market
system and would request the trading interface, analogous to the former example. When
submitting an order, the client would send the necessary information as an HTTP request
to the market system (see label ‘1’). The controller in charge for receiving orders would
extract the order-related information from that HTTP request (see label ‘2’). Afterwards,
it will generate a new domain object representing that order (see labels ‘3’ and ‘4’). The
domain object will be persisted by GORM according to the database settings configured in
the respective application. Next, this very domain object is passed on a GRAILS service,
that conducts the allocation, clearing and settlement of orders (see labels ‘6’ and ‘8’). If the
order can be matched to a standing order, the responsible service performs the necessary
steps and saves the involved orders as well as writes and transaction log (see labels ‘5’
and ‘7’). In case that the order cannot be matched, it will be saved as an open order and
appear in the order book (see labels ‘6’ and ‘7’). Finally, the controller passes the result on
to the view (see label ‘9’), which renders a result screen, which is subsequently transfered
17Accessible at the URL http://groovy.codehaus.org .
18Accessible at the URL http://hibernate.org .
19For instance using the GRAILS mail plugin to send emails.
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to the trader’s client system (see label ‘10’). Both types of prediction markets discussed in
the work at hand are implemented and operated with this very framework.
3.4.2 Interface
The market interface is a trader’s major point of contact and interaction with a market and
hence plays a pivotal role for a market’s success. Furthermore, the interface can be used
to ‘nudge’ (Thaler et al., 2010) traders into sensible behavior. Besides a form to submit
orders, information about the market state are necessary for market participants to trade.
Typical information presented to traders in a market interface are (i) name and descrip-
tion of the tradable contract, (ii) a chart showing past prices, (iii) an ordered list of un-
matched buy and sell orders (order book), (iv) the last price at which two orders have been
matched, (v) participant’s holdings in that particular contract, (vi) participant’s amount
of cash available for trading, (vii) participant’s open orders, (viii) additional information
(e. g., price trends or order volumes). In case of an unexperienced market participant,
this amount of information might be perceived as complex or even overwhelming. Thus,
the question arises, whether every trader really needs every available piece of information
and hence, if that complexity can be reduced. This question is primarily of importance
when the negative effects of ‘too much’ information on individual’s decision performance
(i. e., information overload) are considered. In his 1984 paper, Jacoby examined informa-
tion overload on customers and showed that consumers can be overloaded, albeit he was
convinced that information overload will not occur. In a reply to Jacoby (1984), Malhotra
(1984) was able to show empirically that information overload does occur in real-life set-
tings, and thus that the simple relation ‘more information is always better’ does not hold.
A more positive approach on the interdependencies of information and decision quality is
the theory of cognitive fit. This theory examines the positive effects ‘right’ and ‘appropriate’
information has on decision quality. According to Vessey (1991), that a fit among prob-
lem representation and problem solving task leads to better and faster decision making.
In a further study, Kleinmuntz and Schkade (1993) confirmed Vessey’s (1991) main state-
ment. A related school of thought is the resource matching theory (cf. Anand and Sternthal,
1989; Tan et al., 2010), which tackles the relationship of mental resources demanded for
a certain task and mental resources available.
A major challenge of interface design is to present the right amount of information
necessary for a market, suited to individual capabilities. As markets might also be used
in domains where individuals do not expect them or find their application unnatural, one
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could alternatively take a step back and ask, whether it is necessary to confront individ-
uals with a market at all. For instance, consider a fully dynamic pricing mechanism for
electricity, in which consumers are unwilling to trade for every bit of electricity, but rather
would use a rule based system through which they might set subjectively acceptable price
bounds. Such a system would in a way encapsulate the market and thus hide complex-
ity from the user. Against this background, Seuken et al. (2010) proposed the concept of
hidden markets. In his work, he describes two sub-forms of hidden markets. First, weakly
hidden markets attempt to “find the right trade-off between hiding or reducing some of the
market complexities while maximizing economic efficiency attained in equilibrium” (Seuken
et al., 2010, p. 1662). Second, strongly hidden markets completely hide some semantic
aspects of the market. Even though hidden markets’ main purpose was to increase user
acceptance in domains where markets do not play a pivotal role, that concept is especially
apt to be used in order to simplify a prediction market’s interface as shown by Teschner
and Weinhardt (2012).
Besides the trade-oriented market interface, a portfolio overview, a trading history and
a profile page might supplement the interface. Furthermore, a prediction market usually
contains additional static web content like game instructions and legal information.
3.5 Applications
Prediction markets have been applied to numerous domains since their appearance. This
section presents a selection of exemplary applications of prediction markets, with the in-
tention to provide an overview of interesting real-world use cases.
Political Stock Markets
Political Stock Markets (PSM) are one instance of prediction markets. They share their
main objective, namely aggregating information from its participants in order to create
efficient forecasts for uncertain future events. In this case, these uncertain future events
are of political nature, i.e. elections, nominations for elections or policies.
Using prediction markets for political forecasts offers many advantages compared to
traditional polls or expert surveys. As PSMs are usually open round the clock, partici-
pants can trade whenever they like and therefore react to news promptly (Snowberg et
al., 2007). Since prediction market prices are updated immediately when participants
incorporate their expectation by trading, PSMs provide continuously and timely updated
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forecasts. Usually, their market interface is interactive and the setting gamified, in marked
contrast to most surveys, and thus providing further incentives for participation. Most
surveys rely on random samples for validity and accuracy. In prediction markets, in com-
parison, those with the best information are the best participants – the very individuals
who are most likely to self-select into the market. Additionally, as successful participants
accumulate their profits they gain forecasting weight over time compared to less successful
participants. With surveys, this process of self-selection would introduce a sampling bias,
but with markets, the incentive system forces low performers out of the market in the long
run. Turning to the disadvantage of markets over surveys, one has to mention the higher
complexity burdening participants (Graefe et al., 2010). First, participants have to under-
stand the trading mechanism. Second they have to understand how events are related to
contracts. The process of understanding the ‘task’ (i. e., filling in a questionnaire or sub-
mitting an order) is more structured and better researched for surveys than markets. The
forecast performance of prediction markets in general is still in debate. On the positive
side, they have proven repeatedly to be very potent information aggregation mechanisms
(e. g., Berg et al., 2008; Ledyard et al., 2009; Bennouri et al., 2011). Although, other
evidence suggests that the relative performance advantage of markets may be small com-
pared to surveys or polls (e. g., Goel et al., 2010; Erikson and Wlezien, 2008; Rothschild,
2009). Compared to eliciting expert opinions, prediction markets eliminate the effort of
identifying experts and motivate their participation. In many cases they allow anonymous
participation, which may increase the likelihood of nonconformists to participate and re-
veal information while they do not need to deal with conflicting opinions.
A famous example of PSM are the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM)20 operated by the
University of Iowa launched in 1988 (cf. Forsythe et al., 1992). The question of PSMs’ per-
formance compared to polls has sparked some attention in the last years. Berg, Forsythe,
Nelson, and Rietz (2008) analyze the results of more than ten years’ worth of PSM pre-
dictions on the IEM against corresponding polls and conclude that market results out-
performed the polls in most cases. Similarly, Berlemann and Schmidt (2001) find that
– though by a less broad margin – European PSMs significantly outperformed respective
polls as well. There has been some doubt with respect to the naive manner polls were
used in their comparisons, i.e. Erikson and Wlezien (2008) argue that polls needed to be
properly adjusted before comparison, but as Rothschild (2009) points out, fairly adjusting
both PSM and poll results yields PSM as the overall more accurate predictor.
20Accessible at the URL http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/ .
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Economic Predictions
It has been known for long that the accuracy of classical economic forecasts are often dis-
appointing (McNees, 1992). Even worse, inter alia, Heilemann and Stekler (2012) found
that hardly any improvement in economic forecast accuracy could be observed in the last
decades. With that in mind, Teschner et al. (2011) and Teschner and Weinhardt (2014)
described a prediction market to forecast economic indicators called Economic Indicator eX-
change (EIX). The predictive accuracy of selected macroeconomic indicators are promising
and sometimes outperforming established forecasting methods (Teschner and Weinhardt,
2014). For a detailed description of the EIX see Chapter 4.3.
Sports Betting
One example of prediction markets used for sports betting is Tradesports.com, Inc.21. On
that platform, numerous so-called contests for different forms of sport22 are listed. A series
of stocks is associated with each contest. Usually, the stocks are Index contracts (cf. Sec-
tion 3.2). Tradesports.com was the object of a couple of prediction market studies targeting
inter alia market efficiency, transaction costs, intra-game price movements, and disposition
effect (e. g., O’Connor and Zhou, 2008; Borghesi, 2009; Hartzmark and Solomon, 2012;
Borghesi, 2013). Sports betting prediction markets are similar to traditional odds-based
sports betting platforms like Betfair23 and others. In contrast to the aforementioned type
of sports betting, the prediction market approach can deliver a more intuitive representa-
tion of current expectations, since the prices are usually easier to convert to probabilities.
Furthermore, the rules platform providers apply for setting their odds commonly differ
between sports betting providers as well as from the way market prices are derived in a
prediction market.
Intra-Organizational Markets
Contrary to the ongoing development in the personal sphere of (self-)disclosing more and
more information and thus eroding privacy24, for companies information is often a valu-
able asset that has to be actively secured and kept undisclosed. Prediction markets are
21Accessible at the URL http://www.tradesports.com/ .
22At the time of writing the following forms of sport are listed: American Football (NFL and NCAA FB),
Baseball (MLB), Basketball (NBA), and Golf.
23Accessible at the URL http://www.betfair.com/ .
24Remember Scott McNealy’s famous 1999 quote (“You have zero privacy anyway. — Get over it.”) or
Marc E. Zuckerberg’s 2010 claim that privacy is no longer a social norm (“People have really gotten comfortable
not only sharing more information and different kinds, but more openly and with more people. That social norm
is just something that has evolved over time.”).
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also suitable to be used in such settings that demand discretion. For instance, prediction
markets can be used in a company to forecast whether an internal development project
will be successful, on time or within budget. Another example is an intra-company predic-
tion market used to assess and evaluate ideas and innovations (cf. Stathel et al., 2010). In
both examples it is crucial to restrict access to the prediction market platform accordingly
by technical provisions.
3.6 Summary
As has been shown in this chapter, prediction markets are not the ultimate off-the-shelf
solution for forecasting challenges, due to their flexibility. However, properly designed
prediction markets have shown to be successful in a variety of applications in the last
decades (e. g., Forsythe et al., 1992; Zitzewitz, 2006; Huber et al., 2008; Berg and Rietz,
2010; Teschner et al., 2011). They have a long track of successful field applications, e.g.,
in political elections (e. g., Berg et al., 2008), sport events (e. g., Luckner and Weinhardt,
2008) , finance (e. g., Bennouri et al., 2011), innovation assessment (e. g., Stathel et al.,
2010), and predicting market development (e. g., Spann and Skiera, 2003).25
The roots of their predictive power are twofold; prediction markets can provide in-
centives for traders to truthfully disclose their information and an algorithm by which to
weight opinions. They facilitate and support decision making through aggregating ex-
pectations about forthcoming events (cf. Berg and Rietz, 2003; Hahn and Tetlock, 2005;
Hanson, 1999).
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THE studies presented in Chapters 5 – 9 are conducted on two prediction marketssubsequently described here. First, the prediction market Kurspiloten is introduced,
which is used in the studies detailed in Chapters 5, 7 & 8. Second, the Economic Indicator
eXchange (EIX) and its submarket, the Political Indicator eXchange (PIX), which are used
in the studies in Chapters 6 & 9 are introduced. Third, an overview is given about the
runtimes of the different markets, the studies conducted, and the products tradable in
different versions of the markets.
4.2 Kurspiloten
The Kurspiloten1 market was the yearly stock-market game of the leading German business
newspaper Handelsblatt in 2011 (cf. Table 4.2). It is a prediction market for selected stock
1engl. ‘Quotation Pilots’
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indices and commodities, developed at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) by the
Institute of Information Systems and Marketing. The market is designed as a continuous
double auction without a market maker, operating from 2011-09-02 until 2011-11-25. The
cooperation with Handelsblatt helped to reach out to a broad and well-informed audience
interested in financial markets and economic developments.
4.2.1 Market Design
The work presented in Chapters 5, 7 & 8 is conducted on a prediction market called Kur-
spiloten. It is a web-based prediction market designed to forecast the stock exchange value
of selected stock indices and commodities on a weekly basis. Participants registered free
of charge and traded with play money.2 Therefore, they could not lose any real money.
Prizes worth over€70,000 were drawn among well-performing participants to incentivize
them to reveal their true beliefs (cf. Section 3.3).
Like in financial markets, Kurspiloten is set up as a continuous double auction with one
stock representing the final (real-world) price of one of the twelve predicted stocks at a
given time. Six stock indices, three commodities, one commodity index, one future con-
tract and one exchange rate can be traded (Table 4.1). The tradable contracts represent
their underlying stock one-on-one. Participants are expected to buy if they think that cur-
rent Kurspiloten prices underestimate their estimation of the final value of the underlying
stock market index or commodity and sell if they think prices overestimate the final value.
By trading their price expectations of twelve selected stock indices and commodities on a
weekly basis, participants are able to share their private information with others.
Although Kurspiloten uses play money, participants are provided incentives to behave
similar to a real-money market. Prizes worth over€70,000 were drawn to well performing
traders in order to provide incentives for truly reveal information. As the amount of play
money was not extensible by some analogy of a deposit, participants had an incentive to
economize their play-money budget (cf. Section 3.3). Hence, the dominant strategy of
participants is to buy undervalued stocks and sell overvalued stocks. Furthermore, they
should realize gains as well as losses in order to increase their buying power. The traders’
total assets (i. e., total amount of money and stocks at market prices a trader owns) is used
as a performance measure. Weekly prices worth around€1,500 are awarded according to
2Due to legal restrictions the market had to rely on play money; nonetheless ‘€’ was used as currency
name. To avoid confusion ‘P€’, ‘EIX€’, or ‘PIX€’ are used in this thesis as currency sign for play money and
‘€’ for real money.
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TABLE 4.1: Tradable Stocks on Kurspiloten Market
Stock ISIN Underlying (currency, unit)
DAX DE0008469008 30 major German companies (€, Index)
MDAX DE0008467416 50 major German companiesa (€, Index)
TecDAX DE0007203275 30 largest German technology companies
(€, Index)
EuroStoxx 50 EU0009658145 50 Eurozone companies (€, Index)
Dow Jones US2605661048 30 major US companies ($, Index)
Industrial Average
Nikkei 225 XC0009692440 Tokyo Stock Exchange (¥, Index)
EUR/USD EU0009652759 EUR-USD exchange rate ($, €)
Euro-Bund Future DE0009652644 Future contract on German national
loan (€, €)
Gold XC0009655157 Gold (€, Ounce)
Silber XC0009653103 Silver ($, Ounce)
Brent Crude Oil XC0009677409 Brent-Oil ($, Barrel)
Rogers International NL0000424505 38 commodities from 13 international
Commodity Index exchanges (€, Index)
Notes: In Kurspiloten market all stocks are traded in P€, regardless of the currency of their underlying
(e. g., Nikkei 225 at ¥ 13,045 will have a payout value of P€13,045); aExcluding DAX and TecDAX
the ranking of the participants’ assets at the end of each week. The main prize worth over
€40,000 is given to the most successful trader according to his overall assets, i. e., – since
all stocks are paid out – the total amount of money one owns at the end of the game.
Upon registration each participant receives an initial endowment of P€100,000 and
1,000 stocks of each tradable asset. The trading period for all stocks is seven days. Each
Friday at 5:30 pm, the market is closed for trading. To attenuate endgame effects the
market is closed for trading five minutes prior to the payout. Afterwards all 12 products
(Table 4.1) are paid out according to the stock exchange prices at 5:35 pm. All participants
receive their new endowment consisting of 1,000 stocks each for the next seven-day trad-
ing period.3 Finally the market is reopened for trading. As the experiment ran for twelve
3Due to a bad money/stocks-ratio a second account was introduced for each user called “Geldspeicher”
(engl. Money Bin). Starting on 2011-10-23 all money exceeding P€10,000,000 is booked to the Money Bin
in the weekly payout procedure.
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weeks, 144 payouts were executed. Any order submitted for a paid out product can be
rated ex post as ‘informed’ or ‘uninformed’ in relation to the payout price. For instance,
the stock ‘DAX 07.10.2011’ was tradable from 2011-09-30 until 2011-10-07 at 5:30 pm
and represents the (real-world) price of DAX on 2011-10-07 at 5:35 pm (GMT+1), which
is 5,673.08. Imagine (a) a buy order for this stock with a limit price of P€5,715 and (b)
a buy order for this stock with a limit price of P€5,660. Order ‘a’ is an uninformed order,
since its limit price is higher than the payout price (i. e., the final value of the underlying
stock) and will therefore most likely result in a loss. In contrast, order ‘b’ can be regarded
as an informed order, since its limit price is below the payout price and thus its execution
will result in a gain of P€13.08 per stock when it is paid out.
Registration for Kurspiloten was free of charge and open for anyone. In the registration
process participants only had to enter a valid email address and a username. Participants
could register up to three days before market opening, or at a later time. Due to the re-
peated endowments of stocks for following trading periods a trader receives after each
payout, participants who registered after market opening would be disadvantaged. In
order to give those traders a chance to catch up with the competitors, their initial en-
dowment is adjusted to the account balance a hypothetical user who registered on the
first day would have.4 If a user registers after market opening, he receives the amount of
money a hypothetical user who registered on the first day would currently own (i. e., all
past endowments multiplied with their corresponding payout values) including the initial
portfolio for the current week.
Proper incentives are set by using a public ranking list containing the usernames based
on the traders’ absolute assets. This ranking’s primary use is to award the €70,000 in
prizes. The ranking was accessible for all traders throughout the market’s runtime. Thus,
the second incentive is a trading-performance dependent social comparison. In order to in-
form participants about the market rules, general instructions explaining the basic market
rules and conditions of participation are provided. The instructions were neither indi-
vidualized in any way nor adapted to the specific treatment a participant might be part
of.
4This is achieved by creating a dummy user account on the first day of the market which receives the





The trading interface of the Kurspiloten web interface is displayed in Figure 4.1. Partic-
ipants have convenient access to their portfolio and account information (W1), market
information (W2) such as the last trading day, the order book with five visible levels of
depth (W3), and an up-to-date financial news stream (W4) provided by the Handelsblatt.
As additional information, a chart of the Kurspiloten prices is displayed in comparison to
the stock’s price development (W5). Finally, a short reminder about the rules of the game
is displayed (E).
FIGURE 4.1: Kurspiloten Web Trading Screen
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Kurspiloten Mobile Interface
The Kurspiloten App (KAPP) is a mobile client for the Kurspiloten Market designed for iOS
version 4 and above of Apple’s iPhone. KAPP’s design is a compromise of two goals: First,
KAPP is intended to be easy to use for all users. Therefore, the design followed Apple’s iOS
Human Interface Guidelines5 to look and feel native on the iOS platform. Second, existing
Kurspiloten-users should be able to use the App with minimal learning-effort. Therefore,
KAPP uses the same wording, trading workflow, and – as far as possible – information
elements as the Kurspiloten’s web-interface. Due to the limited screen size of the iPhone
platform, it is not reasonable to let KAPP look exactly like Kurspiloten’s web-interface.
Nevertheless, KAPP’s frontend tries to be close to Kurspiloten’s web interface inter alia by
sharing the same menu structure and nomenclature.
(A) upper part (B) lower part
FIGURE 4.2: Kurspiloten Mobile Trading Screen
KAPP contains all core features of the Kurspiloten Market (Figure 4.2), i. e., submission




of orders, cancellation of orders, examination of own holdings in the portfolio and the
available amount of money. Analogous to the Kurspiloten web interface, the KAPP trading
screen offers access to six dedicated information screens (Figure 4.2b). Most of them are
congruent to the web interface’s information entities, namely the order book with five
visible levels of depth (A1, cf. W3 in Figure 4.1), a chart containing the stock’s real price
development in comparison to the Kurspiloten price (A2, W5), the user’s own holdings
of the stock (A3, W1), the last value and closing time of the contract (A4, W2), and an
interface to the same news stream as in W4 (A5). Additionally, participants have access
to previous (real) stock values (A6). KAPP lacks some secondary features of Kurspiloten,
namely the online-help and ranking list. KAPP was submitted to the App Store and could
be downloaded at no charge while Kurspiloten was operational. In order to gain a broad
user-base, an ‘advertisement’ – consisting of link to KAPP and a short description text –
was put on the homepage of the Kurspiloten website.
To allow research about users’ information usage prior to submitting an order, the con-
sumption of the six information screens are logged in KAPP (information entities A1-A6,
Figure 4.2). Kurspiloten and KAPP both track the time a user needs to create and submit an
order. As KAPP uses separate screens to display stock related information, it also records
the user’s consumption time of these information units on a per item basis.
4.2.3 Dataset and Descriptive Statistics
The dataset used is taken form the Kurspiloten market running from 2011-09-02 until
2011-11-25. In total 3,463 participants registered for the Kurspiloten market. 3,217 par-
ticipants activated their accounts by confirming their email address. Of those, 2,283 sub-
mitted at least one order. 1,912 participants submitted at least one order that led to a
transaction. During the sample period 144 stocks were paid out. Overall, participants
submitted 215,432 orders. Since not every order can be executed against a matching
counter-order (e. g., too high/low price), the submitted orders resulted in 131,561 exe-
cuted transactions. Just 327 of them are submitted via KAPP (cf. Chapter 4.2.2). For every
single order the trading value can be calculated and thus, if an order was profitable or
not.
Most participants registered in the first few days and thus were able to participate for
the majority of the market’s runtime (Figure 4.3a). After the first week the registration
count per day stabilized around 25 before it dropped to around five in the last two weeks.
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Nevertheless participants registered until the last day of the market. The number of or-
ders peaked in the market’s first week and stayed above 2,000 orders per day for about
two-thirds of the runtime (Figure 4.3b). In the last third of the market lifecycle, it slowly
declines towards the minimum point of around 800 orders per day. With more than 2,500
orders submitted on an average per day (Figure 4.3b) the dataset contains 131,561 trans-
actions.
Registrations per day
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FIGURE 4.3: Activity per Day including Simple Moving Average (SMA)
4.3 Economic Indicator eXchange
The Economic Indicator eXchange (EIX)6 is a prediction market for macro-economic indi-
cators. Initially, the market was designed to forecast economic indices only, as the name
indicates. It launched in October 2009 to predict indicators for, e. g., unemployment fig-
ures, gross domestic product, and inflation rates (cf. Figure 4.4). Starting in November
2013, the EIX was extended for political indicators (cf. Figure 4.2). This extension was
marketed as the Political Indicator eXchange (PIX).
4.3.1 Market Design
The work presented in Chapters 6 & 9 is conducted on a prediction market called Economic
Indicator eXchange (EIX). The goal of EIX is to “scientificly test and respectively demonstrate
6It was marketed as Handelsblatt Prognosebörse EIX.
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the possibility of conducting economic forecasts with a prediction market in a field study.”7
The EIX play money prediction market was started in 2009.8 It is designed to forecast
macro-economic variables. In order to reach out to a broad audience interested in eco-
nomic trends the market was also operated in cooperation with the leading German eco-
nomic newspaper Handelsblatt.
The EIX was planned as a one year project, but was continued in yearly rounds due to
its success.9 Teschner et al. (2011) details the reasoning behind market design for the first
two versions of the EIX. Until May 2011 the EIX was run as a web-based system only. In
June 2011 a mobile trading application was released called EIX-Market-App (EMA) which
provides mobile access to the underlying market system. The goal of the market is to
forecast economic indicators up to nine months in advance by continuously aggregating
economic information. The market is designed as a continuous double auction without
a market maker. After registration participants are endowed with 1,000 stocks of each
contract and EIX€100,000 (short for ‘Economic Indicator eXchange €’). The continuous
economic outcomes are represented by one stock and paid out at data release according
to a linear payout function as depicted in Table 4.4. To increase participants’ motivation
and to provide incentives to truly reveal information, in version 3 of EIX prizes worth
€36,000 are offered; eight yearly prizes (total value €10,000) are awarded according to
the portfolio ranking at the end of the market period. In version 4, the value and number
of the prices are slightly smaller. Specifically, prizes worth €4,550 are raffled amongst
participants; one yearly prize worth €299.99, and three prizes per quarter with a total
worth of around €800 in markets dealing with economic indicators as well as more than
€1,000 in political markets (see following paragraph).
Political Markets
In 2013, the EIX was extended to include political markets, called the Political Indicator
eXchange (PIX). Initially, the PIX was used to collect predictions on the Lower-Saxony state
elections. Afterwards, a similar setup attempted to predicted the German federal election
7Author’s translation; original: “Ziel des Forschungsprojektes ist es im Rahmen einer Feldstudie die
Möglichkeit der Konjunkturprognose mit einer Prognosebörse wissenschaftlich zu testen beziehungsweise zu
demonstrieren.” (Jäger-Ambrozewicz, 2009)
8The EIX was set up as a joint project. Besides the Institute for Information Systems and Marketing (IISM)
at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, the EIX project was supported by Forschungszentrum Informatik
FZI, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, and Verlagsgruppe Handelsblatt.
9The work at hand focuses on the years three (2011-11-01 – 2012-10-31) and four (2012-11-05 –
2013-10-29) of the EIX. The years one (2009-11-30 – 2010-10-31) and two (2010-10-01 – 2011-10-31)
are covered as far as necessary. For an in-depth analysis of the first two year of EIX see Teschner (2012).
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in late 2013. Specifically, two markets are run in order to gather predictions: The candidate
market is comprised of Winner-takes-all contracts (cf. Section 3.2) representing the chances
of being elected for Chancellor candidates respectively Minister-President candidates. The
party market contains different Index contracts (cf. Section 3.2), one for each promising
party as well as a rest-of-field contract. These markets run on the EIX market system but
are separate from the economic indicators. Trading takes place in a separate play-money
currency called ‘PIX€’. Additionally, a separate ranking for political markets is provided.
The German federal voting system, in which each voter has two votes, is rather complex.
It makes use of proportional representation (PR) and method of majority decision (MD) and
works roughly like this: the Erststimme (first vote) determines in each constituency which
delegate is sent to the Bundestag (parliament) using MD; the Zweitstimme (second vote)
uses PR to determine the share of seats each party achieves. If no party is able to gain the
bare majority of votes, elected parties start exploratory talks in order to form a coalition.
Afterwards, the Bundestag (i. e., all delegates of the parliament) elects the Chancellor on a
proposal of the Bundespräsident. The Lower-Saxony state election system is quite similar
to the aforementioned voting system. Put simply, voters elect representatives sent to the
Landtag (parliament) using PR, which subsequently elects the Minister-President using
MD.
The Lower-Saxony state election market operated from 2012-11-05 to 2013-01-20.10
The candidate market contains four Winner-takes-all contracts (cf. Section 3.2) represent-
ing David McAllister, Stephan Weil, and rest-of-field. In the party market, seven Index
contracts are used to represent the parties CDU, SPD, FDP, Grüne, DIE LINKE, Piraten,
and rest-of-field.11 Afterwards, an analogous market design is used for the German fed-
eral elections. It operated from 2013-01-23 until just before the election on 2013-09-22.12
A quite long runtime of eight months allows plenty of time for collecting data. The Ger-
man federal elections market predicts the election outcome continuously from 2013-01-23
until the election on 2013-09-22.
For the German federal elections, the candidate market is comprised of four Winner-
takes-all contracts (cf. Section 3.2) belonging to Chancellor candidates Dr. Angela Merkel,
Peer Steinbrück, an unnamed Green candidate (placeholder) and rest-of-field. The party
market contains eight different Index contracts, for CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, Grüne, DIE LINKE,
10The market closed at 07:45 o’clock on 2013-01-20, as the election started the same day at 08:00 o’clock.
11The entire names of the abbreviated parties can be found in the List of Abbreviations.
12The market closed at 07:45 o’clock on 2013-09-22, as the election started the same day at 08:00 o’clock.
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Piraten, AfD13, and rest-of-field.
The best performing traders by portfolio value win prizes after the market closes. To
account for percentage values, Winner-takes-all contracts pay PIX €100 if the respective
candidate becomes the next Minister-President of Lower-Saxony respectively the next Ger-
man Chancellor, and Index contracts pay their respective parties’ election result percentage
in PIX €. Registration is free, but every person is only allowed one trading account. Upon
registration, traders receive an initial endowment of PIX €100,000 and 1,000 stocks of
each contract. Since the contracts in each market are interdependent due to their dif-
ferent underlying events, this constraint dictates that prices should sum up to PIX €100
(which corresponds to 100 %). To easily enforce this, traders have the possibility to buy
and sell the unit portfolio, consisting of one of each contract in a market, for PIX €100.
Therefore, if the sum of best bids equals up to over PIX €100, or the sum of all best asks
equals up to less than PIX €100, there is opportunity for arbitrage. For an in-depth dis-
cussion of bundle trading see “Basic Portfolios” in Luckner and Weinhardt (2008, pp. 55).
The remaining market details are analogous to the EIX market (cf. Section 4.3): Partici-
pants can submit limit orders continuously – with the exception that short sales are not
allowed. As limit orders with an extreme price can be used, there is no need for market
orders. Orders are matched continuously according to the order precedence rule. The five
best bids and asks for each contract are displayed in an order book.
4.3.2 Market Interfaces
EIX Web Interface
The web-based trading interface of version 3 of the EIX is displayed in Figure 4.4a.14 Fig-
ure 4.4b depicts the web-based trading interface of the PIX, which was introduced in ver-
sion 4 of the EIX. In both interfaces, participants have convenient access to the price devel-
opment (W1), the account information (W2), market information (W3) such as the last
trading day, the order book with five levels of visible depth (W4). As additional infor-
mation, Handelsblatt provides access to an up-to-date economic news-stream (W5) which
13In April 2013, the rest-of-field contract rose over 10 %. An integrated survey (as presented in Chapter 9)
was used to gather insights about that development from the market participants. As a majority suspected
the newly founded party AfD to be behind that increase, it was decided to split the rest-of-field contract in a
new rest-of-field contract and an AfD contract in 2013-04-30.
14As the trading interface of EIX did not change notably between version 3 and version 4, no dedicated
screenshot of version 4 is contained.
55
Chapter 4 Prediction Markets – Use Cases and Data
(A) EIX Web Trading Screen (Version 3) (B) PIX Web Trading Screen (Version 4)
FIGURE 4.4: EIX and PIX Web Trading Screens (annotated)
was included in the EIX interface only. Furthermore, the trader’s average purchase price
of the current indicator (W6) is displayed.
The trading wizard for the PIX is depicted in Figure 4.5a. First, all tradable contracts
are shown in an overview chart (1), where their current prediction in the market is shown
as a bar plot. By clicking on the specific bar, traders can choose the indicator to trade.
(A) PIX Web Trading Wizard (Version 4) (B) EIX Web Trading Wizard (Version 3)
FIGURE 4.5: EIX and PIX Web Trading Wizard Screens (annotated)
Additionally, the indicator can be chosen from a drop-down list below the overview chart.
Second, traders report their estimation of the election outcome with the help of a slider
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(2). The resulting percentage is used to derive a limit price for the order suggested. Third,
traders report their confidence via another slider (3). This value is used to determine
the quantity of stocks configured in the resulting order. Finally, the suggested order is
displayed (4) and traders can submit these with the clicking of a button. Figure 4.5b
depicts the trading wizard for the EIX in version 3.15 It differs slightly from the PIX trading
wizard in two aspects. First, it does not offer the possibility to chose the product to trade
inside the trading wizard itself. This is a consequence of the defined work flow for trading
economic indicators, which lets users chose the product to trade in a separate screen.
Second, instead of picking an exact expectation, traders can set their expectation’s upper
and lower bounds (2). Subsequently, traders set their confidence level (3), before they are
able to submit the derived order (4).
EIX Mobile Interface
The EIX-Market-App (EMA) is a mobile client for the EIX designed for Apple’s iPhone. EMA
offers all of EIX’s core features, i. e., submit and cancel orders, checking one’s holdings
in the portfolio, additional information like the order book, news, and so forth. EMA’s
frontend is a compromise of two design goals. First, EMA was intended to be easy to use
for new users. Second, existing EIX-users should be able to use the App with minimal
learning effort. Due to the limited screen size of the iPhone, it is not reasonable to let EMA
look exactly like EIX’s web-interface. EMA’s frontend tries to be close to EIX’s web-interface
by sharing the same menu-structure and nomenclature (Figure 4.6).
Analogous to EIX’s web-interface, EMA offers six stock related information screens
linked from the trade screen (Figure 4.6b). To allow research about users’ information
usage prior to submitting an order, the consumption of the six information panels (respec-
tively screens, in case of EMA) are logged in both IS. Both EIX and EMA track the time a
user needs to create and submit an order as well as the information used in this process.
15As the trading interface of EIX did not change notably between version 3 and version 4, no dedicated
screenshot of version 4 is contained.
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(A) upper part (B) lower part
FIGURE 4.6: EIX Mobile Trading Screen
4.3.3 Dataset and Descriptive Statistics
EIX
Figure 4.7 depicts logarithmized activity measures for versions 3 & 4 of the EIX market from
2011-11-01 until 2013-10-29.16 Specifically, Figure 4.7a shows the number of persons
registering for EIX aggregated on a weekly basis. Furthermore, this Figure contains a
monthly simple moving average of the registration figures. On average more than seven
persons registered per week. Figure 4.7b depicts the number of orders submitted per week
besides a monthly simple moving average. Nearly 600 orders were submitted per week on
average.
16These charts do not contain data related to the political stock market PIX. Instead, only orders concern-
ing economic indicators as well as registered persons that traded those products are considered.
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Registrations per Week


















     sd: 11.24
4 weeks SMA 
(A) Registrations per Week
Orders per Week

















     sd: 294.38
4 weeks SMA 
(B) Orders per Week
FIGURE 4.7: EIX Activity per Week including Simple Moving Average (SMA)
PIX
Figure 4.8 displays the logarithmized time series of the number of registered persons and
submitted orders for the PIX market. Both charts show weekly aggregated data in addition
to a four weeks simple moving average. As shown in Figure 4.8a, on average more than 36
persons registered per week. Here, participants submitted on average about 2,500 orders
per week as depicted in Figure 4.8b.
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FIGURE 4.8: PIX Activity per Week including Simple Moving Average (SMA)
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4.4 Continuous Market Engineering – Timeline
This section gives an overview of the changes carried out on the beforehand introduces
prediction markets.
TABLE 4.2: Operational Timeline of Regarded Prediction Markets
Market Area of Prediction Version Opening Date Closing Date
EIX Economic Indicators 1 2009-10-30 2010-10-31
EIX Economic Indicators 2 2010-10-01 2011-10-31
EIX Economic Indicators 3 2011-11-01 2012-10-31
EIX Economic Indicators 4 2012-11-05 2013-10-29
PIX Lower Saxony State Election 4.1 2012-11-05 2013-01-22
PIX German Federal Electiona 4.2 2013-01-23 2013-09-22
Kurspiloten Stock Indices and Commodities 1 2011-09-02 2011-11-25
Notes: aIntroduction of contract ‘AfD’ in German federal election market took place on 2013-04-30.
Table 4.2 depicts the runtime of the prediction markets alongside their major versions.
The first version of EIX started to operate in late 2009. Teschner (2012) describes the first
and second version of EIX in detail. The work at hand focuses on version 3 & 4 of EIX, its
submarket PIX, and Kurspiloten. These operated between September 2011 and November
2013.
TABLE 4.3: Timeline of Conducted Studies
Study Chapter Market Begin End
Trader’s Market Predispositiona 5 Kurspiloten 2011-09-02 2011-12-14
Reading a Trader’s Mindb 6 EIX (v4.2) 2013-06-21 2013-09-23
Stationary vs. Mobile 7 Kurspiloten 2011-09-02 2011-11-25
Interface/Disposition Effect 8 Kurspiloten 2011-09-02 2011-11-25
Survey Comparison 9 EIX (v4.2) 2013-07-29 2013-08-25
Notes: aMarket data from 2011-09-02 until 2011-11-25 was considered. The follow-up questionnaire
was conducted between 2011-11-30 and 2011-12-14; a reminder was sent out on 2011-12-06; bA trans-
lated version of the question “Which party can you identify with the most, when it comes to national
politics?” (cf. Sjöberg, 2009) was asked at two different periods (2013-06-21 until 2013-07-31 and
2013-08-26 until 2013-09-23).
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Table 4.3 lists the studies conducted in the subsequent chapters along with the asso-
ciated prediction market instance. Table 4.3 relates the studies conducted in the work at
hand to the specific market they are based upon. Furthermore, the timeframe in which
data was collected can be found in the aforementioned table. Additional details can be
found in the Table notes.
TABLE 4.4: Timeline of Tradable Contracts on EIX Market
Version
Indicator Unit Cycle Payout Function 1 2 3 4
Export % monthly 100+α× ( It−It−1It−1 ) Ø
Export Bil. € monthly 30+ ABS(It )109 Ø Ø Ø
Gasoline € monthly ABS(It) Ø
GDP % quarterly 100+α× ( It−It−3It−3 ) Ø Ø Ø Ø
Inflation % monthly 100+α× ( It−It−12It−12 ) Ø Ø Ø Ø
Ifo Index % monthly 100+α× ( It−It−1It−1 ) Ø
Ifo Index Points monthly ABS(It) Ø Ø Ø
Investments % quarterly 100+α× ( It−It−1It−1 ) Ø Ø Ø
Unemployment Num. monthly 100+ ABS(It )106 Ø Ø Ø Ø
Notes: I : Indicator; t: time in months; α=10
Tables 4.4 & 4.5 are compilations of all products that where tradable on the EIX and PIX
during their runtime. Table 4.4 lists all economic indicators that were tradable throughout
the first four versions of EIX.
TABLE 4.5: Tradable Contracts on PIX Market
Indicator Unit Contract Type Payout Function
Candidates LSSEa % Winner-takes-all PIX€ 100 if C is elected, otherwise PIX€ 0
Party LSSEa % Index ABS(Vote ShareP)
Candidates GFEb % Winner-takes-all PIX€ 100 if C is elected, otherwise PIX€ 0
Party GFEb,c % Index ABS(Vote ShareP)
Notes: C: Candidate; P: Party, t: time in months; aLSSE: Lower-Saxony State Election 2013; bGFE: German
Federal Election 2013; cIntroduction of contract ‘AfD’ in German federal election market on 2013-04-30
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Basically, there are two points in time at which indicators, respectively their payout
function, were changed. First, between version 1 and version 2, the payout function of
the indicators ‘Export’ and ‘Ifo Index’ were modified from a relative measure with scaling
towards an absolute representation.17 In case of ‘Export’, the payout function was addi-
tionally scaled and added to a fix amount. Second, starting with version 4, the indicator
‘Investments’ was canceled due to low activity in favor of ‘Gasoline’, which was expected
to be (i) easy to understand and (ii) more strongly connected to participants’ daily routine
than its predecessor.
Finally, Table 4.5 list the four different indicator classes used in PIX besides their payout
functions. The timeframe, in which indicators of each classes were tradable resemble
the runtime of the PIX as depicted in Table 4.2. The candidate stocks are modeled as
Winner-takes-all contracts, which means that they pay PIX€ 100 in case the candidate
represented by this stock is elected Chancellor respectively Minister-President; otherwise
they are worthless. In contrast, Index contracts are used to model the party stocks. Hence,
they pay vote share of their underlying party in PIX€ at the time of release of the election
results.
4.5 Summary
This chapter presented the prediction markets used in the work at hand. First, the Kur-
spiloten market, used in Chapters 5, 7 & 8 is introduced. Second, the Economic Indicator
eXchange with its submarket, the Political Indicator eXchange is described. It builds the
basis for the studies described in Chapter 6 & 9. Besides their web-based user interfaces
both markets also provided mobile user interfaces in forms of specifically designed mobile
applications. A major distinction lies in the markets’ durations; whilst Kurspiloten has a
rather short runtime of 12 weeks, each version of EIX operated for about one year. More
specific descriptive data on the prediction markets described can be found in the respective
chapters.
17See Teschner (2012) for a detailed discussion on this topic.
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Part III




Analyzing Agent Behavior: Assessing
Trader’s Market Predisposition
“ In economics, the majority is always wrong.”
JOHN K. GALBRAITH
5.1 Introduction
IN this study behavioral aspects of market participants are linked with the quality oftheir trading decisions and behavior in the market. Creating a link between behavioral
aspects of the participants and quality is important in that the quality of the predictive
power is directly negatively affected if participants make systematically biased decisions.
This is a relatively well known, but still not well understood or studied hypothesis of be-
havioral finance literature. In Kurspiloten market decision quality is obviously described by
the participants’ trading performance as well as their share of profitable trades. Current
research does not clearly answer the question which personal attributes support or hinder
specific successful behavior in markets – and maybe never will. The current approach is
extended by taking user heterogeneity aspects such as personal attributes into account. Be-
sides trading performance it focuses on trader activity and whether they provide or take
liquidity to/from the market as qualitative measures for trading behavior. Specifically, a
two-staged study is conducted to investigate the influence of cognitive reflection abilities,
65
Chapter 5 Analyzing Agent Behavior: Assessing Trader’s Market Predisposition
grade of risk aversion, and use of emotion regulation strategies on trading behavior and
decision quality in a prediction market context.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 gives a review of
related work on personal attributes, risk aversion, and trading behavior. The experimen-
tal setting and research questions are presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes the
dataset and the methodology used. Subsequently, the results are presented from two per-
spectives: trading behavior and decision quality. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes this chap-
ter.
5.2 Related Work
5.2.1 Personal Attributes and Trading Behavior
Psychologists have demonstrated a variety of systematic departures from ‘rational’ decision-
making by individuals. These lead to substantial information processing biases or judg-
ment biases and colored expectations (Forsythe et al., 1999). Markets suffer from biases
as well and there is an ongoing debate to which extent their efficiency is affected (Ar-
row et al., 2008). Objectively irrelevant (Huber et al., 2008) and selectively presented
information (Dittrich et al., 2005) can and does influence individual trading behavior. A
promising approach to describe and explain financial decision-making may be the explicit
consideration of psychological factors. Lo et al. (2005) for example have shown the nega-
tive influence of extreme emotional states on trading performance. Additionally, they con-
clude that “[t]he lack of correlation between personality traits and trading performance begs
for additional data and a more refined analysis [. . . ]” (Lo et al., 2005). Their approach of
acquiring psychological factors via personality questionnaires seems promising. Frederick
(2005) introduced a well-established questionnaire to measure cognitive ability, the cog-
nitive reflection test (CRT). It builds upon the existence of two types of cognitive processes
which Stanovich and West (2000) call “System 1” and “System 2” processes. “System 1
processes occur spontaneously and do not require or consume much attention. [. . . ] System 2
processes [are] mental operations requiring effort, motivation, concentration, and the execu-
tion of learned rules” (Frederick, 2005). By offering participants three short tasks, which
– at first glance – seems to be solved best by “System 1” processes while actually being
more complex tasks (i. e., “System 2”), it is possible to differentiate the more impulsive
from the more cognitive reflective ones. The ten paired lottery (TPL) introduced by Holt
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and Laury (2002) is a widely used risk aversion test that offers “[a] menu of paired lottery
choices[,] structured so that the crossover point to the high-risk lottery can be used to infer
the degree of risk aversion” (Holt and Laury, 2002). Participants can choose between ‘A’
(safe choices) and the more risky ‘B’. By design, the risk neutral choice pattern is four ‘A’
choices followed by six ‘B’ choices. Gross and John (2003) introduced a questionnaire to
determine emotion regulation strategies, the emotion regulation questionnaire. It consists
of ten statements – four concerning suppression and six concerning reappraisal – the par-
ticipant agrees or disagrees with on a seven-point Likert scale. The concept of reappraisal
takes place in the context of antecedent-focused emotion regulation and means a cognitive
change in the interpretation of a situation. Suppression happens in the context of response-
focused emotion regulation and aims to hide a specific emotion. All three questionnaires
are rather short whilst reliable and can therefore be used altogether in one questionnaire
without overly stretching a participant’s attention.
5.2.2 Risk Aversion and Trading Behavior
Several authors have identified risk aversion as a reason for certain market behavior (e. g.,
Subrahmanyam, 1991). It may cause participants to not make profitable but risky trades
in a market. If participants suffer from this aversion, valuable information may not be
impounded into prices and thereby reduce the predictive power of a market. Unfortu-
nately, useful insights can only rarely be obtained from empirical data on security prices
since risk aversion measures must be obtained independently of trading data. By merg-
ing household investment decisions with data from external risk questionnaires Wärneryd
did not find a relationship between risk aversion and portfolio choice (Wärneryd, 1996).
This is in line with findings from an empirical asset market in which participants’ portfolio
choice is unrelated to a risk aversion proxy (Güth et al., 1997). In contrast to portfolio
choice, individual market behavior seems to be influenced by risk aversion. Fellner and
Maciejovsky (2007) find that the higher the degree of risk aversion, the lower the observed
market activity. Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) find the higher the degree of risk aver-
sion the lower the total number of contracts traded. In an early experimental study, Ang
and Schwarz (1984) separated participants in two markets according to their degree of risk
aversion. They show that the market with lower risk aversion (speculators) exhibit greater
volatility but it also tend to converge closer and faster to the expected equilibrium price
than the risk averse (conservative) market. Finally, the interaction between risk attitude
and overconfidence with respect to trading activity deserves further attention. Theoretical
67
Chapter 5 Analyzing Agent Behavior: Assessing Trader’s Market Predisposition
finance models predict higher market activity as a consequence of overconfidence1 (Barber
and Odean, 2001). People tend to be overconfident about their capabilities and level of
knowledge. This could also negatively impact the information content of prices.
5.2.3 Trading Behavior in the Market
Trading behavior in the market is measured via two measures. First, the traders’ activ-
ity is used; i. e., the number of submitted orders. Second, their ‘roles’ in the market are
regarded. A common perspective to categorize trading behavior is to group traders depend-
ing on how they submit their orders. One possibility is to separate between a) liquidity
providers or market makers and b) liquidity takers or price takers. Market makers usually
buy and sell the same contract at the same time, trying to profit from the spread. Another
feature is placing orders on top of the order queue instead of taking the opposite first of-
fer. The marginal trader hypothesis by Forsythe et al. (1992) assumes that marginal and
not average traders determine prices. These traders ‘make the market’ and appear to be
more rational (Oliven and Rietz, 2004), plus they are more unlikely to produce trading
violations (Forsythe et al., 1992). Oliven and Rietz (2004) report that price takers make
errors on average 47 % of the time whereas market makers had an average 8 % error rate.
Consistently Forsythe et al. (1999) describe an error rate for price takers as high as nearly
6 times the error rate for market makers. As a result when traders act as market makers,
they make fewer mistakes and hence appear more rational. Furthermore market makers
serve as liquidity providers and allow continuous trading (Luckner, 2008). The usually
small group of market makers has a disproportionately large effect on aggregated market
behavior (Sunstein, 2006). Previous work on trading behavior consistently suggests that
liquidity providers perform better in market environments. In order to understand the mo-
tives behind the self-selection into these roles, Oliven and Rietz (2004) use demographic
information. They find that “[. . . ] this choice is significantly affected by market-specific ex-
perience and general financial knowledge, education, sex, and religious affiliation [. . . ]” but
nevertheless “[. . . ] remains largely unexplained” (Oliven and Rietz, 2004).
5.2.4 Service Analytics
Following Fromm et al. (2012, p.143), service analytics can be classified in two dimen-
sions. First, complexity can be separated in basic analytics as a foundation (comprising
1Overconfidence refers to the habit of overestimating one’s ability to perform a task.
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data management and reporting) and advanced analytics using methods from statistics
and operations research building on top of it. Especially the latter is predestined to unveil
a service’s full potential. Second, the analytics’ scope can be ranged in provider, encounter,
or customer data. In an e-service system context such as a prediction market, the customer
data to apply advanced service analytics can often easily be obtained, since the provider and
customers are connected by design (Fromm et al., 2012).
5.3 Setting and Research Questions
5.3.1 Experimental Setting
In order to answer the research questions presented in the next Subsection (5.3.2) a two-
staged field study on the Kurspiloten market (cf. Section 4.2) is conducted. In a first
phase, participants took part in an online prediction market. For the study’s second phase
all market participants are invited to take part in a four-section online survey, five days
after the market’s end. The first section concerns general feedback of the market plat-
form and its game design. The main part combines the three questionnaires introduced
in Subsection 5.2.1. Namely, the cognitive reflection test, followed by the emotion regula-
tion questionnaire, and last the ten-paired lottery. The questionnaire closes with a “final
evaluation question” which asks if participants answered truthfully throughout the ques-
tionnaire. The survey was active for 14 days and participants were incentivized by giving
away ten Amazon vouchers worth €30 each via a raffle.
5.3.2 Research Questions
Advanced service analytics is applied on an e-service system in order to gain comprehensive
insights on customers’ market predisposition. Based on this, it should be possible to sub-
stantially improve a customer’s service experience in a second step. This can be achieved
by adapting the service to customers’ preferences and abilities via personalized tweaks
such as interface adaptions, and product choice. In particular, an attempt is made to shed
some light on the research questions 1 (following an aspect of Oliven and Rietz (2004))
and 2 presented in Subsection 1.2, which are:
Research Question 1: How do selected personal attributes (RA, CRA, and ERS) influence
trading behavior in markets?
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Research Question 2: How do selected personal attributes (RA, CRA, and ERS) influence
decision quality in markets?
Specifically, this analysis focuses on the influence of cognitive refection abilities, risk
aversion, and emotion regulation strategies on the aforementioned trading behavior and
decision quality. As a person’s cognitive reflection is known to be positively correlated to
her IQ as well as other measures for cognitive ability (Frederick, 2005), it is assumed that
a higher cognitive reflection leads to ‘better decisions’ in general. For trading behavior, – in
particular for activity – it is not quite clear, what ‘better’ means, nevertheless it is expected
that the more cognitive reflective traders are less likely liquidity takers (i. e., price takers)
(Forsythe et al., 1999). In case of decision quality, it is expected that a high CRT-value leads
to a higher trading performance as well as a higher probability to make a profit. As stated
in Section 5.2, risk aversion has been shown to have an impact on trading behavior. Hence,
it is expected that risk averse traders are less active. Furthermore, it is assumed that risk
attitude does induce certain trading behavior. According to a study of Fenton-O’Creevy
et al. (2011), the emotion regulation strategy used by traders differs according to their
experience and performance. Therefore, it is expected that certain behavioral patterns
depending on the emotion regulation strategy used are discovered. Among others, these
behavioral patterns include how traders engage in a market, what their decision quality
will be or how they self-select into the roles of price takers or market makers.
5.4 Results
In this section the empirical findings are presented, starting with descriptive statistics. Sub-
sequently, trading behavior in the market and the traders’ decision quality is analyzed.
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Methodology
In total, 512 at least partly processed online questionnaires are received; 386 of them are
completely filled. 320 of those contain a positive answer to the “final evaluation question”.
The median processing time of those 320 replies is 11 minutes 26 seconds (mean: 26m
43s) for the whole questionnaire and 9 minutes 21 seconds (mean: 24m 26s) for the main
part containing CRT, ERQ, TPL. In order to statistically analyze this dataset the survey
responses have to be filtered and – as well as the trading data – operationalized. Therefore,
replies are filtered based on the answer for the TPL. The so-called “stay in bed” types (i. e.,
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participants that report to be irrational risk averse) are filtered. These respondents have
chosen ‘A’ over ‘B’ in question nine and/or ten of the TPL, where the expected payoff is lower
for ‘A’ than for ‘B’ ($ 1.96 vs. $ 3.47 and $ 2 vs. $ 3.85). Note, that the so-called “ABBA”
types of the TPL (i. e., respondents who switch multiple times forth and back between A and
B) are not filtered. According to Holt and Laury (2002) “[e]ven for those who switched back
and forth, there is typically a clear division point between clusters of A and B choices, with few
‘errors’ on each side. Therefore, the total number of ‘safe’ A choices will be used as an indicator
of risk aversion.” In this survey, the mean difference in the number of ‘A’ answers with and
without “ABBA” types is a mere 0.03 (4.86 to 4.89). After this step, 246 questionnaires
are left. Of those, 50 participants did not actively trade in the Kurspiloten market, i. e.,
they submitted no order at all. This leaves 196 usable questionnaires for evaluation. This
corresponds to 10.25 % of active participants (50.78 % of completely filled questionnaires)
or to an overall response rate of 20.19 % (completely filled questionnaires in relation to
active participants), which is a fairly normal response rate for online questionnaires (e. g.,
Cook et al., 2000; Ranchhod and Zhou, 2001; Deutskens et al., 2004). The variables used
in the analyses (Table 5.1) are described in the following.
TABLE 5.1: Variables
Variable Description Value
CRThigh Cognitive Reflection Test 1 or 0
– Three correct answers = 1
TPLrisk averse Ten Paired Lottery 1 or 0
– Five or more ‘safe choices’ = 1
ERQsuppress Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 1 or 0
– Suppression is used = 1
ERQreappraise Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 1 or 0
– Reappraisal is used = 1
buyo Order o is a buy = 1 1 or 0
initializeo Order o initializes a trade = 1 1 or 0
quantityo Size of order o in stocks [1, inf]
limit priceo Limit price of order o [.01, inf]
profito Profit made with order o [-inf, inf]
wino Order o was profitable = 1 1 or 0
order countp Number of orders executed by participant p [1, inf]
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The CRT consists of three questions that can be answered either correctly or incorrectly.
To derive a dichotomous variable for the CRT, participants with zero to two correct answers
are assigned into the group CRTlow; thereby only participants who answered all three ques-
tions correct are put in the group CRThigh. Since the responses of the ERQ are collected
via a seven point Likert scale, the mean of the answers concerning the suppression and
reappraisal strategy are calculated separately and normalized to the interval [−1,1]. Fi-
nally, 1 is assigned to the dummies ERQsuppress or ERQreappraise if the normalized averages of
replies concerning the corresponding strategy are greater or equal zero; else they are set
to 0. The reliability of the ERQ is estimated with Cronbach’s α (Cronbach, 1951), which
is 0.673 for the ERQsuppress questions and 0.819 for the ERQreappraise questions. With an
α of more than 0.8, the assessment of ‘Reappraisal’ can be considered good. Although,
the α for ERQsuppress is slightly below 0.7, the survey’s results can be considered reliable
since the latent construct ‘Suppression’ is measured – by design of the ERQ – with just four
items. Since, by design, Cronbach’s α rises with N, the aforementioned α value is in an
acceptable range for a four-item construct. Responses of the TPL are also segregated into
two groups: TPLrisk averse is set to 1 for participants with five or more ‘A’ choices, while it is
0 for participants with four or less safe choices. The trading direction is identified by the
variable buy, which is 1 for a buy and 0 for a sell order. The variable initialize is used to
distinguish between liquidity taking and liquidity providing orders. An order that is not
immediately executed provides liquidity to the market, whereas an order that initializes
a trade directly after submission to the market ‘takes’ liquidity from it. (For example, a
buy order a of 125 Stocks for P€120.00 is submitted while a sell order b of 100 stocks
for P€120.00 and another sell order c of 150 Stocks for P€119.95 are the highest sell
orders in the order book. The initializing order is order a, since it initializes the trade,
as it completely fulfills order b and partly (25 units) order c. Note, that under certain
circumstances order b and c can also be initializing, due to a prior (partly) execution.)
In the first case initialize is set to 0, since the order does not trigger a trade, else it is set
to 1, i. e., if an order takes liquidity from the market. Furthermore, the limit price of an
order in P€ (limit price) and the number of shares traded (quantity) is used. The variable
win indicates if a specific transaction led to a (positive) profit. Last, the number of orders
submitted per participant is encoded by order count.
Two types of regression models are used to analyze the dataset. First, OLS regres-
sions are used to estimate the personal attributes’ influence on participants’ trading activity
(Equation 5.1) as well as on the profit per trade (Equation 5.3). Second, logistic regres-





order countp = i +β1 × CRThigh + β2 × TPLriskaverse
+β3 × ERQsuppress + β4 × ERQreappraise
Equation 5.1 connects participants’ personal attributes to participant’s market activity
proxied by the number of submitted orders. The personal attributes regarded comprise
cognitive reflection abilities, risk aversion, and emotion regulation strategies.
(5.2)
log(πinitializeπTrade ) = i +β1 × CRThigh + β2 × TPLriskaverse




+β6 × buyo + β7 × quantityo + β8 × limit_priceo
Equation 5.2 examines the trading strategy used (liquidity providing vs. liquidity taking)
whilst considering personal attributes on a per-order level. Furthermore, it is controlled
for different markets (Mi, i = {1, . . . , 12}, cf. Table 4.1), trading direction (buy), order size
(quantity), and price (limit_price).
(5.3)
profito = i +β1 × CRThigh + β2 × TPLriskaverse




+β6 × buyo + β7 × initializeo
Equation 5.3 relates the profit gained per order in P€ to personal attributes on a per-
order level. Again, this model controls for product-specific effects (Mi) and trading direc-
tion. Additionally, it is controlled for liquidity providing/taking trading behavior (initial-
ize).
(5.4)
log( πwinπTrade ) = i +β1 × CRThigh + β2 × TPLriskaverse




+β6 × buyo + β7 × quantityo + β8 × limit_priceo + β9 × initializeo
Equation 5.4 estimates the probability to submit a profitable order (in relation the final
outcome) as a function of personal attributes. Again, it is controlled for product-specific
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effects (Mi) and trading direction. Furthermore, order size (quantity), price (limit_price),
and liquidity providing/taking trading behavior (initialize).
The results of this study are presented in the following subsections. First, the trading
behavior in the market is analyzed, then the traders’ decision quality is regarded.
5.4.2 Trading Behavior
In the following the trading behavior in the market is investigated with two types of re-
gression models. First, the traders’ personal attributes (namely, cognitive reflection abilities,
risk aversion, and emotion regulation strategies) are connected with their activity proxied
by the order count on a per-user basis. Second, the personal attributes are investigated in
terms of trading strategy on a per-order basis. Therefore, orders are classified as liquidity
providing or liquidity taking via the variable initialize.
Activity
A linear regression model built to analyze how the activity per user depends on the per-
sonal attributes. As both models in Table 5.2 show, the activity is significantly higher
for participants with a high cognitive reflection (standardized coefficients: .16 in A1, .15
in A2). Also, risk aversion significantly increases the number of orders submitted to the
market (Model A1, std. coef.: .15). Even though risk aversion is significant positive cor-
related with the number of submitted orders (cor = .148, t-stat = 2.08), risk aversions’
influence declines and its significance fades to the 10 %-level when the participants’ emo-
tion regulation strategies are included (Model A2, std. coef.: .13). Similarly, ERQsuppress
is significantly negatively correlated with the number of submitted orders (cor = −.146,
t-stat= −2.07); both emotion regulation strategies have no significant effect in model A2
(using the logarithmized order count as dependent variable leads to similar results.). In
contrast to Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) and Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002), a robust
relation between risk aversion and activity have not been found.
Trading Strategy
In order to investigate the participants’ personal attributes on their trading strategy (i. e.,


















Adj. R2 3.69 % 4.05%
Num. obs. 196 196
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; ·p< .1, ∗p< .05,
∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001
results in Table 5.3 show that high cognitive reflection favors the initialization of trades
(Marginal Effects (mfx): .02 in I1 and I2, .01 in I3) whereas risk aversion hinders it (mfx:
−.02 in I1, −.03 in I2 and I3). While the strengths of those effects are about equal in
I1, they diverge more and more from I2 to I3. Like risk averse traders, ones using the
suppression strategy also tend to initialize less often (mfx: −.02 in I2, −.03 in I3) whereas
traders using the reappraisal strategy tend to initialize trades more often (mfx: .04 for I2,
.04 for I3). Although the limit price of an order is highly significant, its impact on initialize
is diminishable as those for the trading direction (buy) and trading quantity. Nevertheless,
those control variables do support the validity of Model I2, specifically the influences of
risk aversion and emotion regulation strategies. Putting it all together, it is shown that on
the one hand, high cognitive reflection leads to higher activity and – contrary to previous
research – drives liquidity taking, as reappraisal does; on the other hand, risk aversion and
suppression impels liquidity providing.
Result 1: Based on the analyzed personal attributes specific trading behavior can be iden-
tified.
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TABLE 5.3: Trading Strategy





















(Intercept) .08∗∗∗ .02 .13∗∗∗
(5.27) (1.19) (4.49)
AIC 48,001.96 47,885.59 47,399.02
pseudo-R2 6.42% 6.74% 8.11%
Num. obs. 34,729 34,729 34,729
Notes: z-statistic in parenthesis; AIC: Sakamoto et al. (1986), pseudo-R2:
Nagelkerke (1991); ·p< .1, ∗p< .05, ∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001
5.4.3 Decision Quality
The final value of all stocks in the dataset is known. To answer the question “What features
does a trader need to be successful?” the total profit of each trade is calculated based on
the final value of the corresponding stock. Furthermore, each trading decision is classi-
fied according to its profitability (in other words: as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’). From an ex-post




In order to analyze the influence of a trader’s personal attributes on her performance, a
linear regression is conducted on the profit in P€ on a per order basis (Table 5.4). A strong
TABLE 5.4: Trading Performance



















(Intercept) 330.02∗∗∗ 211.25∗∗∗ −816.32∗∗∗
(9.75) (5.17) (−13.91)
Adj. R2 .08 % .23 % 11.44 %
Num. obs. 34,729 34,729 34,729
Notes: t-statistic in parenthesis; ·p< .1, ∗p< .05, ∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001
significance for cognitive reflection (standardized coefficients: .02 for P1 to P3) and risk
aversion (std. coef.: −.02 for P1 and P2, −.01 for P3) can be seen in Model P1. The dataset
shows that cognitive reflection, risk aversion, and usage of the suppression strategy (std.
coef.: .04 in P2, .05 in P3) have significant influence on traders’ performance (Model P2).
In Model P3 even the reappraisal strategy has a significant influence (std. coef.: −.02).
Nevertheless, the trading direction has the strongest effect on the traders’ performance
and the highest contribution to the profit (std. coef.: .33).
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Probability to make a Profit
Comparing the OLS regression results for profit (Table 5.4, P3) with the logistic regression
for win (Table 6, W3), only minor changes can be seen in the estimators’ significance and
direction. Interestingly, the traders’ cognitive reflection ability has a significant influence
in Model W3 only (Marginal Effect (mfx): .01). (Obviously, highly cognitive reflective
traders do not robustly have a higher probability to make a profit, but if they gain, their
average profits are higher.) The suppression strategy improves decision quality and slightly
improves from W2 to W3 (mfx: .02 in W2 and W3). The usage of the reappraisal strategy
had a higher significance level through the models – and additionally keeps its sign (mfx:
−.01 in W2, −.02 in W3) as well. Contrary to that, risk aversion declines in significance
and strength from model W1 to W2, but still beats a strong 5 % significance level in model
W3 (mfx: −.02 in W1, −.01 in W2 and W3). Interestingly initialize plays no role in a
trader’s probability to make a profit. As earlier for limit price in Model I1 (Table 5.3),
strong significances in combination with weak (marginal) effects for the control variables
quantity and limit price can be seen in Model W3. Analogous to Model P3, buy has the
strongest effect in Model W3 (mfx: .14).
Summing up, high cognitive reflection leads to better trading performance, whilst it
does not (robustly) increase the probability to make a profit. Risk averse trader’s perfor-
mance is slightly worse, as are their chances to make a profit. Suppressors decide ‘better’
and are more likely to make a profit, whereas reappraisal tends to impair good decisions
as well as the probability to make profits.
Result 2: Personal attributes do significantly influence trading performance as well as
the probability to make a profit.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, advanced service analytics was applied in order to gain comprehensive in-
sights on participants’ market predisposition. Based on a relatively short questionnaire, the
trading history and regression models, it is possible to characterize participants’ trading
behavior and decision quality up to a certain degree. The applied methodology is hereby
not tied to the context of play money prediction markets and can hence be used throughout
similarly designed e-service systems like retail-trading systems. In particular, the influence
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TABLE 5.5: Probability to make a Profit
Model W1 W2 W3
win win win
CRThigh −.02 −.02 .04∗∗
(−1.16) (−1.43) (2.65)


















(Intercept) .34∗∗∗ .34∗∗∗ .04
(21.06) (17.44) (1.13)
AIC 46,493.89 46,464.39 44,060.04
pseudo-R2 6.31 % 6.40 % 12.73 %
Num. obs. 34,729 34,729 34,729
Notes: z-statistic in parenthesis; AIC: Sakamoto et al. (1986), pseudo-R2:
Nagelkerke (1991); ·p< .1, ∗p< .05, ∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001
79
Chapter 5 Analyzing Agent Behavior: Assessing Trader’s Market Predisposition
of a subjects’ cognitive reflection ability, grade of risk aversion and use of emotion regula-
tion strategies on trading behavior and decision quality in a play money prediction market
was investigated. Putting all results together, it could be shown that cognitive reflection
abilities have a significant positive influence on all investigated variables. One may argue
that traders with higher cognitive reflection abilities performing better and having a higher
probability to make a profit than the average is not very surprising. But traders in the high
CRT group also behave differently: they submit more orders and tend to be liquidity tak-
ers. Interestingly, risk aversion has a positive impact on the number of submitted orders
and a negative influence on a trader’s performance as well as on her probability to make
a profit. Finally, risk averse traders tend to be liquidity providers. Although neither emo-
tion regulation strategy has a significant influence on a traders’ activity, it can be shown
that emotion regulation influences the initialization of trades: traders who confirm using
the suppression strategy tend to provide liquidity, while the use of the reappraisal strategy
leads to liquidity-taking trading behavior. Looking at the traders’ performance, there is
also a clear distinction between the reappraisal and the suppression strategy; traders who
confirm using the suppression strategy make more profit on average and have a higher
probability to make a profit, whereas traders who make use of the reappraisal strategy
make less profit on average and have a smaller chance to decide profitable. Even if it may
look like in these findings that the emotion regulation strategies reappraisal and suppres-
sion are opposite effects a person has to decide between, they are not. Even though both
strategies seem to compensate each other in this study, one have to keep in mind that
they are two strategies of emotion regulation a person makes use of ‘simultaneously’ in a
different shape. Risk aversion has shown to affect the trading strategy towards liquidity
providing. Furthermore, it slightly influences trading activity positively. In case of deci-
sion quality, risk aversion proved to be obstructive; both for profit and for the probability
to make a profit.
Summing up, this study proved the possibility to categorize (potential) traders ex ante
with advanced service analytics. The implications of these results are at least twofold.
First, individual trading behavior can partly be predicted and therefore the market can
be adapted accordingly. One possibility is to alter the user interface depending on the
market predisposition of the particular user. A highly risk averse user with low cognitive
reflection abilities who regulates his emotions mainly by using the suppression strategy
is for instance less likely to need an order book since she tends to set limit orders in-
stead of simply taking the quoted prices. Based on such knowledge, it is possible to create
personalized and hence much clearer, user-centered trading interfaces. Second, a certain
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bonus/malus can be predicted a trader is going to experience in a market setting. This
enables traders to self-assess their market predisposition and behave accordingly; e. g., by
not joining a market. But even from the market providers’ point of view, these results can
be useful, since they can ex ante identify potential traders that do not have the ‘right’ pre-
dispositions. Additionally, they could identify potentially ‘aptly traders’ and recommend
them to trade specific products. By following those implications, it should be possible
to improve participants’ decision performance within the context of prediction markets,




Interpreting Agent Behavior: Reading a
Trader’s Mind
“ Thought is the seed of action; but action is as much
its second form as thought is its first.”
RALPH W. EMERSON, SOCIETY AND SOLITUDE (1870)
6.1 Introduction
VOTERS, politicians, campaign advisers, businessmen as well as the media set outto consume and publish information in the context of an election. They all have
a stake in the election outcome and seek to further their understanding of the election
dynamic with up-to-date electoral probabilities. Public poll information, as a reflection of
the public’s take on the current political climate, helps campaign advisers measure their
success and can influence informed voters’ decisions. Before a major election, new polling
results are published every other day in Germany by various institutes. As pointed out
in Hillygus (2011), modern scientific polling has come a long way from its beginnings in
1937 and has seen an explosive growth in the last decades.
The Internet has democratized information and now plays a crucial part in every elec-
tion. In fact, a recent study by Bitkom (2013) shows every third German to consider the
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Internet the decisive factor in the upcoming election.1 One of the most promising ways of
forecasting elections are prediction markets.
In prediction markets, participants trade contracts whose payoff depends on the out-
come of uncertain future events. For example, a market contract might reward a dollar
if a particular presidential candidate is elected. An individual who thinks the candidate
has a 65 % chance of being elected should be willing to pay up to 65 cents for such a con-
tract. Market participants form expectations about the outcome of an event. Comparable
to financial markets, they buy, if they find that prices underestimate the probability of the
event in question and they sell a stock, if they find that prices overestimate the probability
of an event. The Iowa Electronic Markets2 (IEM) are a well-known example for predic-
tion markets. One of the IEMs’ markets, the Iowa Presidential Stock Market (IPSM), is a
political stock market (PSM) which predicts, inter alia, the outcome of U.S. presidential
elections Forsythe et al. (1992). The IPSM features contracts that represent one nominee
each. Market participants buy and sell nominee contracts depending on their assessment
of the U.S. presidential election outcome.
PSMs have been used widely in different countries and electoral systems (e. g., Berg
et al., 2008; Forsythe et al., 1992). In contrast to the traditional, straight-forward process
of a representative part of the population eligible to vote answering a question like “What
party would you vote for, should the election take place this Sunday?”, in a PSM participants
are incentivized to trade on their expectation about the election outcome. Hence there are
two distinct differences. First, participants provide their beliefs about the election outcome,
opposed to simply stating his political preference in a poll. Second, the market mechanism
incentives early, timely and accurate predictions about the outcome.
One thought that immediately comes to mind is that traders may be biased by their per-
sonal preferences in their valuation of contracts. This would be no surprise, dealing with a
sensitive topic like politics. The judgment bias is well known from sports gambling, where
devoted fans of sports clubs show a substantial amount of wishful thinking Babad and Katz
(1991). In this study, the way political preferences help to shape traders’ decisions in a
German PSM is analyzed. It is found that traders excessively buy the party they prefer to
win the election. The bias differs in strength for different parties but is nonetheless con-
sistent, no matter what party preference. In general, it seems that it is most pronounced
for small parties. This result even holds for the small but identifiable subgroup of tactical
1The study relates to the German federal elections on 2013-09-22.
2Accessible at the URL http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/ .
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voters. As this bias is so consistent for subgroups and preference, a straightforward pre-
diction model can be provided to infer traders’ party preferences by analyzing the trading
behavior. This might reduce participants’ perceived as well as their effective anonymity in
prediction market and thus their behavior.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: First, a closer look at the core
ideas behind PSMs is taken to explain the way they work and why they have been found
to be so successful. A review of the literature regarding bias in prediction markets is
also provided, especially in PSMs and in light of the research questions. Subsection 6.3.1
provides specifics about the market on which this research is conducted. The empirical
results of this research are discussed in Section 6.4. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Related Work
6.2.1 Political Stock Markets and Polls
Political Stock Markets – as a subset of prediction markets – share their main objective,
namely aggregating information from its participants in order to create efficient real-time
forecasts for uncertain future events. In this case, these uncertain future events are of
political nature, i. e., elections, nominations for elections or policies.
As a forecasting method prediction markets offer many advantages. First off they pro-
vide the incentives for traders to truthfully disclose their information and an algorithm to
weight opinions (Arrow et al., 2008). Compared to statistical forecasting methods, these
markets can incorporate real-time information. As prediction market prices are updated
immediately when traders incorporate their expectation in prices, they provide continu-
ously and timely updated forecasts. Compared to eliciting expert opinions, prediction mar-
kets eliminate the effort of identifying experts and motivate their participation. In most
cases they allow anonymous participation, which may increase the likelihood of noncon-
formists to participate and reveal information and they do not need to deal with conflicting
opinions.
The question of PSMs’ performance compared to polls has sparked some attention in
the last years. Berg et al. (2008) analyze the results of more than ten years’ worth of
PSM predictions on the IEM against corresponding polls and conclude that market results
outperformed the polls in most cases. Similarly, Berlemann and Schmidt (2001) find that
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– though by a less broad margin – European PSMs significantly outperformed respective
polls as well. There has been some doubt in respect to the naive manner polls were used in
their comparisons, i. e., Erikson and Wlezien (2008) argue that polls needed to be properly
adjusted before comparison, but as Rothschild (2009) points out, fairly adjusting both PSM
and poll results yields PSM as the overall most accurate predictor again.
6.2.2 Biases in Political Stock Markets
In theory, there exists an ideal called rational trader. He is always instantly available to
trade when an opportunity arises to make a profit, maximizing which is his only objective.
If he is exposed to new information, he objectively incorporates it and updates his beliefs
accordingly. As all too often, reality tells a different tale: Traders act imperfectly out of
a variety of reasons, and PSMs are no exception from this rule. Different types of bias,
mostly already known from regular markets, betting markets, polling and other fields,
have been identified in various studies. A general consensus seems to be that traders’
judgment of probabilities can be impaired by favorite-longshot (cf. Wolfers and Zitzewitz,
2004; Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010) and judgment bias, while it is unclear whether these
individual biases sway the market on an aggregate scale. Here the focus is on the judgment
bias.
Anyone who has recently discussed the odds of a sports event with supporters of both
teams is very likely to know this effect. Supporters generally tend to overvalue their team
and therefore experience a judgment bias when predicting the outcome. Sports enthusiasts
show a significant amount of this aforementioned wishful thinking even after explicitly
being asked to stay objective (Babad and Katz, 1991).
Multiple subsequent studies (i. e., Babad et al. (1992); Babad and Yacobos (1993) as
well as Uhlaner and Grofman (1986)) show that a considerable amount of wishful think-
ing is also observable when it comes to politics. While the amount of wishful thinking
in a sports context is dependent mostly on emotionalism and level of fanhood, in case of
politics the preferred party plays an important role. The intensity of wishful thinking de-
creases, moving from right-wing towards left-wing on the political spectrum. Interestingly,
extreme left-wing supporters even show an inverse effect. Since the aforementioned stud-
ies measure voters’ intentions by inquiring predictions about election outcomes, it seems
natural that a judgment bias caused by wishful thinking is present in PSMs as well.
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As presumed, nearly all authors who investigate this effect in their PSM experiments,
report significant amounts thereof. Take Forsythe et al. (1992), who find the judgment
bias affecting trading behavior on average and most traders incapable of valuing prices
objectively. These results are replicated by Forsythe et al. (1998), Jacobsen et al. (2000),
and Berlemann and Schmidt (2001). Forsythe et al. (1999) provide a detailed discussion
about judgment bias and two effects that can cause it: (i) the false consensus effect, which
states that traders overestimate their own representativeness, and (ii) the assimilation-
contrast effect, which describes the tendency to interpret information overly in the direction
of one’s own preference. They find that although most individual traders are significantly
biased in their trading, overall market prices are not. As an explanation, a fraction of
traders is assumed to be aware of biased traders’ shortcomings, correcting market prices
while taking advantage of this information. Since they tend to set limit orders close to
market prices, they are known as marginal traders. However, this result does not seem to
hold universally: Berlemann and Schmidt (2001) find a judgment bias on the aggregate
scale in German PSMs.
6.3 Setting and Research Questions
6.3.1 Experimental Setting
A German PSM is used to examine the effects of traders’ political preferences on trading
activity . Specifically, data from the PIX for the German federal election 2013 is used. For
a detailed description of the PIX market refer to Subsection 4.3.1.
6.3.2 Research Questions
As the wishful thinking bias is so persistent, two questions arise. First, are all subgroups
equally biased in their trading decisions? One hypothesis is that different party preferences
lead to a more pronounced bias. Second, are tactical voters as biased as preference based
voters? Finally, if the bias is stable and constant over subgroups, research question 3 as
presented in Section 1.2 arises:
Research Question 3: How well can an unobtrusive analysis of trading behavior reveal
trader preferences?
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6.4 Results
In this section the empirical findings are presented, starting with descriptive statistics.
Subsequently, traders’ self-assessed party preferences are reported. Finally, traders’ party
preferences are predicted.
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Methodology
A day before the election, the average transaction prices were collected for all parties and
a final prediction was created. Table 6.1 illustrates the market prediction and displays
the election outcome for comparison. In general there was a lot of uncertainty about the
election outcome, due to potential strategic voting.
TABLE 6.1: Market Prediction and Election Outcome
CDU/CSU SPD LINKE Grüne FDP AfD Piraten Rest-of-field
Prediction 35.06 % 20.32% 8.47 % 7.63 % 6.70 % 15.15% 2.53 % 4.15 %
Outcome 41.55 % 25.74% 8.59 % 8.44 % 4.76 % 4.70% 2.19 % 4.03 %
Abs. Dif. 6.49% 5.42% .12% .81 % 1.94 % 10.45 % .34 % .12 %
Measuring the Judgment Bias
The wishful thinking judgment bias has already been covered in Subsection 6.2.2. Using
the questionnaire functionality, users willing to share this information were matched to
their preferred party. This enables to analyze the extent of individual false consensus
effect in the spirit of Forsythe et al. (1992), as a proxy of judgment bias. From 2013-06-21
until 2013-07-31 and from 2013-08-26 until 2013-09-23, the question “Which party can
you identify with the most, when it comes to national politics?” (cf. Sjöberg, 2009) was run.
Possible answers were CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, Grüne, DIE LINKE, Piraten, AfD, another party
and prefer not to say. Only one selection is permitted, allowing to match each participating
trader to exactly one party. For the subsequent analysis, it is assumed that this question is
truthfully answered and that preferences are valid and remain constant for the runtime of
the two markets.
The analysis of the individual false consensus effect is approached with the known
methods (cf. Forsythe et al., 1998). One possibility to determine whether supporters of
a party systematically preferred the corresponding contract is to analyze their portfolios.
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The judgment bias states that the preferred contract is overvalued, which should cause a
higher demand for that contract from affected traders than from the average trader. The
logical conclusion is that since he is expected to invest more money, the value share of the
preferred contract in a biased trader’s portfolio exceeds the average trader’s value share in













where i ∈ {1, . . . , m} is the position of party (with the captions CDU/CSU, SPD, . . . , rest-
of-field; leading to m= 8) in the portfolio. Vector vt is obtained by multiplying the ‘unbal-
anced portfolios’ (Forsythe et al., 1999, p.92) with the market prices at t aggregated for all
users that responded to the party preference questionnaire. Whereas, vt,party corresponds
to the multiplication of the ‘unbalanced portfolios’ with the market prices at t aggregated
for all users that prefer party. Hence, ξt,party describes the ratio of party’s value percentage
in the supporters’ portfolio compared to its value percentage in the aggregate portfolio.
Bearing the prior assumptions in mind, an existing, notable judgment bias would yield
ξt,party > 1. This is precisely what is empirically calculated in the portfolio analysis for
judgment bias.
6.4.2 Traders’ Reported Preferences
The PIX was used in several ways to collect data for this study. Since the author co-designed
the market and the underlying data structure, it was possible to store literally every piece of
information needed on events that take place on the PIX. Since the author co-designed the
market and the underlying data structure, it was possible to store all information necessary
to conduct this study. First and foremost, detailed information on events such as orders
and transactions was used.
This includes, e. g., whose order was matched on which exact date, and the price and
volume that was subsequently traded. Second, a survey function was added to the plat-
form: The questionnaire (Figure 6.1) allows for questions with a predefined list of answers
to appear on the PIX’s main page, one at a time. Adjustable settings include the question
mode, allowing only one reply selection or multiple. Equally important, it can be precisely
defined when, where and in what order questions are asked. These properties are defined
by a time window for question activity, and a priority ranking for the order of appearance.
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(A) Market-embedded Survey (B) Magnification
FIGURE 6.1: Screenshot of the Market-embedded Survey Functionality
(a: placement on website, b: magnification)
Obviously, it was made sure that every user can answer every question only once. For each
of the questions, the option “prefer not to say” was provided, due to the sensitive nature
of the questions. Users submit their responses by selecting the radio button or checkbox
and clicking submit. A self-made questionnaire infrastructure was used because this way,
traders can quickly reply to a question or two without leaving the website. Hence, will-
ing responder who do not want to go to an external website were not lost. 336 traders
participated in the experiment on the false consensus effect by providing their personal
political preference. Table 6.2 lists the results. Using this data, it is possible to measure
for judgment bias.
TABLE 6.2: Party Preference
CDU/CSU SPD LINKE Grüne FDP AfD Piraten Rest-of-field
Answers 28 25 16 22 23 204 8 10
Percent 8.33 % 7.44% 4.76% 6.55% 6.85% 60.71% 2.38% 2.98 %
Notes: N= 336
Using the questionnaire function, a subset of traders was also identified that can be
regarded as tactical voters. According to a measure developed by Heath et al. (1991),
called ‘Heath et al. measure’ in Fisher (2004), tactical voters can be directly identified
using a simple question. The Heath et al. measure was slightly modified for the context
of the German situation. Table B.2 in Appendix B depicts the full measure. This study set
out anticipating that tactical voters exhibit a difference in behavior, also on a PSM. The
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results of the questionnaire are that 21.6 % of traders belong to the class of tactical voters
based on their answers.
6.4.3 Traders’ Predicted Preferences
In this section, the empirical results from the collected data on the PIX including 2013-09-22
are presented. First it is shown that participants exhibit a strong and significant judgment
bias on the PIX. This result corresponds to previous findings in the existing literature on
judgment bias in prediction markets.
Using the party preference data as presented in Table 6.1 and traders’ portfolio on the
test day t = 2013/09/22, the judgment bias is measured. The results for ξt,party are listed
in Table 6.3. Recall that a ξ > 1 means that a group of traders holds a greater value in
their own preferred contract than all traders on average. The result indicates that this is
true for all major parties. For supporters of CDU/CSU, who ‘only’ hold 62 % more in their
own contract, the effect is not very strong. Parties with small numbers of participating
supporters, such as LINKE and Piraten, seem to be the ones to rely the most on their own
preferred contract. However it must be kept in mind that there is no statement about
significance of the effect yet. A smaller number of traders allows for higher variance. (The
rest-of-field contract has been left out since the concept of ‘rest-of-field-supporters’ does
not make sense.)
TABLE 6.3: Judgment Bias per Party
CDU/CSU SPD LINKE Grüne FDP AfD Piraten
ξt,party 1.62 2.05 7.23 3.29 4.00 1.95 9.30
N(party) 27 23 14 20 21 153 6
Notes: N = 264
This study aims to examine, if an individual’s preference for a given party is linked
with his ‘biased investment characteristics’. As biased investment characteristics, the ratio
of an individual’s investment in stocks of that particular party to the individual’s overall
investments is used. Hence, one simple OLS regression is conducted per party; describ-
ing the ‘investment characteristics’ by an intercept and a dummy variable indicating the
individual’s preference for party (Table 6.3). All seven regressions are significant to the
0.1 %-level.
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As a robustness check a time series with the values of ξ is constructed, since they are
time dependent. In order to do this, all relevant data (like portfolio structure) must be
counted back in time. In general ξ is well above 1 for all parties and increasing over time
towards the election. The time series of ξ values provide a good robustness check. From
the data it can be seen that the judgment bias is aggravated for the underdog parties3
(FDP, Grüne, LINKE, Piraten, AfD) compared to the established parties (average of 5.15 vs.
1.84).
According to the adjusted Heath et al. questionnaire 21.6 % of answerers are identified
as tactical voters which seems to be a relatively high figure. Unfortunately there is no
reference number for Germany as a whole. One might assume that tactical voters do not
exhibit the wishful thinking bias to the same extent as non-tactical voters. These two
classes of participants are compared and no statistical difference can be found (average
ratio invested in preferred contract: .43 vs. .39, p-value: .72).
Finally, a model was built to predict party preference by analyzing portfolio data. Specif-
ically, a simple tree based classification model is used. The party preference of a participant
p is predicted using the percentage of invested play-money per party and additionally the
net number of shares bought in each party.
In order to test the validity of the model the sample (N = 264) is split in a training
(~62 %; 164 observations) and a validation (~38 %; 100 observations) set. In the out of
sample test, the model correctly classifies 70 % of all instances. The party wise detection
rates (e. g., AfD: 93 % vs. CDU/CSU: 53 %) suggest that a higher number of supporters
in the training set leads to better results. Keep in mind that the base rate is one in eight
or 12.5 % – given that each participant could prefer one of the 8 parties. Moreover, as
the most intuitive and straightforward method is used to model the data, more predictor
variables (e. g., gender, age, other trading behavior or activity) or better methods such as
random forest, support vector machines (SVM), or neural networks are very likely to yield
better models. Hence, it can be concluded that prediction market data enables researchers
and practitioners to classify their trading population very easily.




The motivation behind this research is to understand how the increasing importance and
possibilities of online prediction models change the way people think of events like elec-
tions. While elections used to be like ‘blackboxes’ in past times, they seem to have become
predictable, almost to the point where the candidate with the best data analysts will win
the election such as stories from Issenberg (2012) would have made us believe.
Political Stock Markets are one of the new continuous available prediction methods.
They are based on the assumptions that market prices (in an abstract form of predictions)
are set by rational unbiased traders. The key question that is addressed in this study
is whether and to which extent traders stay objective or if they are biased by their own
preferences.
The participants’ preferences are collected using questionnaires directly accessible from
the trading website which are simple and do not require much time. This helps obtaining a
quite high number of answered questions and subsequent data to analyze (cf. Chapter 9).
Surprisingly, although this is the most personal question asked amongst multiple other
questions, it is still the most frequently answered question. It seems like traders are very
eager to identify themselves as supporters of their preferred parties, which leads to the
conclusion that most traders have strong opinions and that their political opinions are
among the reasons for trading.
This strong opinion does influence how they trade and act in the market, even though
they are incentivized to not do. Through a portfolio level analysis of trading data matched
with survey data it is possible to consistently predict voter intention in the market popula-
tion. Moreover, evidence is provided that the bias is consistent over all parties but elevated
for underdog parties. Surprisingly, analyzing subgroups no difference is found in the bias
between tactical and non-tactical voters.
As the bias is so consistent for subgroups and preference, it is possible to provide a
straightforward prediction model to infer a trader’s party preference by analyzing his trad-
ing behavior with 70 % accuracy. This is important because it might reduce participants’
perceived as well as their effective anonymity which is sometimes highlighted as a major




Extending the (IT) Infrastructure into
the Mobile World: Comparing Trading
Performance in Stationary and Mobile
Settings
“ I have always wished for my computer to be as easy
to use as my telephone; my wish has come true because
I can no longer figure out how to use my telephone.”
BJARNE STROUSTRUP, 1990
7.1 Introduction
WE often rely on information systems (IS) to filter, aggregate, and present informa-tion we need in a manner that supports decision making processes. A common
misbelief about decision making is that the more information available, the better our
decisions. In contrast, it has been shown that more information can lead to decreased
decision making performance, e. g., due to information overload (cf. Malhotra, 1982). For
electronic markets, Teschner et al. (2011, 2014) showed that more information can be
harmful for individual trading performance.
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With the rise of mobile information systems, the question arises how decision behavior
and decision performance are influenced by its usage. In general, two major developments
seems to influence the usage of IS here. First and obviously, mobile IS enables the usage
of IS in a mobile context. Hence, one is enabled to make use of IS in settings where it
was not possible before. This opens a whole new set of opportunities (e. g., Muntermann
and Janssen, 2005) and hindrances which can, for instance, result in faster reaction times
to news in a trading context as well as to a higher degree of distraction or uncertainty.
Second, mobile IS might also supersede traditional IS in certain settings. Mobile Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) often differs from its stationary counterparts (e. g., Schmiedl
et al., 2009) for a variety of reasons: inter alia different screen sizes (e. g., Brewster, 2002;
Adipat and Zhang, 2005), gesture controlled vs. mouse and keyboard, operation systems,
and reliability of network connectivity. Thus one might expect that these differences do
result in different outcomes in some cases. Therefore it is expected that users of mobile IS
will perform differently than users of stationary IS for a given task or problem.
In order to design mobile systems that support good decision making it is necessary to
analyze how participants search for information and how they incorporate this information
in their decision process. Moreover, behavioral aspects of IS users have to be linked with the
quality of their decisions in order to improve the design of mobile IS. More precisely, this
study tries to answer the following question: “How do different devices (and therefore user
interfaces) affect decision behavior and decision outcome?” Hence, a field study is conducted
on an electronic market to shed some light onto this higher research question.
Specifically, the research is conducted in a repeated market environment called Kur-
spiloten (cf. Section 4.2). The Kurspiloten market is a prediction market (cf. Wolfers and
Zitzewitz, 2006; Luckner, 2008) designed to forecast the stock exchange value of selected
stock indices and commodities on a weekly basis. This prediction market is set up as a con-
tinuous double auction, like in financial markets, with one stock representing each new
release of economic information. Participants buy if they think that prices underestimate
the probability of an event and sell if they think prices overestimate the probability of an
event. The prediction market thereby aggregates information in the same way a stock mar-
ket does, which is relatively efficient in an ex-ante information sense. In the Kurspiloten
field experiment with nearly 2,000 active participants the impact of mobile and stationary
interfaces on user behavior and decision performance is studied.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 discusses related
literature on decision making in the context of stationary and mobile information sys-
tems. The experimental setting, methodology used, and research direction is presented
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in Section 7.3. Subsequently, the results are discussed in Section 7.4. Finally, Section 7.5
concludes this chapter.
7.2 Related Work
7.2.1 Information Systems and Participant Decisions
Kauffman and Diamond (1990) highlight the importance of research on behavioral deci-
sion making and information presentation effects. They examine how behavioral effects
may become operative in screen-based securities and foreign exchange trading activities,
where users can choose among information presentation formats that support trader de-
cision making. They present a model to identify where and how information, heuristics,
and biases might affect decision making in trading environments. In the domains of de-
cision support systems and online shopping environments the influence of the interface
on decision behavior has been repeatedly demonstrated. Kleinmuntz and Schkade (1993)
find that information displays do influence decision processes by facilitating some deci-
sion strategies while hindering others. Decision makers balance the desire to maximize
accuracy against the desire to minimize effort. They further separate characteristics of
information displays into the form of individual items (numerical, verbal or pictorial), the
organization into meaningful structures (groups, hierarchies or patterns) and the sequence
(the order in which information element appears). In a follow-up study they show that or-
ganization strongly influences information acquisition while form influences information
combination and evaluation. Sequence had only a limited effect on information acquisition
(Schkade and Kleinmuntz, 1994). Investigating the relationship between problem repre-
sentation and task type in information acquisition, Vessey and Galletta (1991) develops
the cognitive fit theory. The theory proposes that the correspondence between task and
information presentation leads to superior task performance for individual users. In sev-
eral studies, cognitive fit theory has provided an explanation for performance differences
among users across different presentation formats such as tables, graphs, and schematic
faces (Vessey and Galletta, 1991; Vessey, 1994). Additionally they show that increasing
interface flexibility instead of an informed choice of display format may be harmful rather
than helpful to the problem solver. Similarly Speier and Morris (2003) compare the use
of visual and text-based interfaces for low and high complexity tasks. They find that in
low complexity environments participants perform better using text-based query tools.
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However in high complexity environments participants perform better with visual sup-
port. Turning to the optimal pool of available information in decision support systems,
empirical work has shown that users can handle only a certain amount of data.
Malhotra (1982) concludes that individuals cannot optimally handle more than ten in-
formation items or attributes simultaneously. Testing decision accuracy, Streufert et al.
(1967) show that as information load increases, decision making first increases, reaches
an optimum (information load ten) and then decreases. Finally, in an interactive home
shopping simulation, Ariely (2000) tested how the participants’ control over information
influences their utilization of this information. He compared four settings: if information
control was high-low and the task complexity was low-high. He finds out that increased
control over information leads to better performance in tasks with low complexity and
lower performance in the high complexity setting. He reasons that participants in the low
complexity setting, when demand on processing resources is low, more information is ben-
eficial. However, in complex situations the information is detrimental to performance due
to the additional burden of selecting the right information (Ariely, 2000). He concludes
that when cognitive load is high (e. g., when the task is novel or difficult) high information
control can be harmful.
To summarize previous work, the amount and control of information, as well as the
information representation does influence user behavior. On the one hand information
control improves performance by improving the fit between actions and outcomes. On the
other hand information control requires the user to invest processing resources in man-
aging the information amount and flow. As a conclusion, information control has both
positive and negative effects on performance. The two tasks of processing and managing
information are related and codependent. Finally, one must note that previous work has
mainly investigated the topic in laboratory settings. User behavior and decision perfor-
mance is analyzed in a field experiment setting, namely a prediction market.
7.2.2 Comparing Stationary vs. Mobile
Eriksson (2012b) compares the online self-arrangement experience of mobile device users
to stationary computer users in an electronic travel service experiment. Thereby he fo-
cuses on the three dimensions efficiency, effort, and anxiety. He found that mobile device
users experiences the given task more negative. In a follow-up study Eriksson (2012a)
compares the use of different channels in electronic travel services in Finland for 2004
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and 2011. There he found that most customers use only a computer to fulfill travel related
tasks. Nevertheless, there are a small and growing number of customers using only mobile
devices for such tasks. Interestingly, the number of customers using both computers and
mobile devices is much larger than the number of (solely) mobile device users. Altogether,
most users report the computer as their preferred interaction channel. Both studies focus
on user perception of the offered services.
In contrast to the studies mentioned earlier, Muntermann and Janssen (2005) focuses
on behavior and outcome depending on the used channel. They find that mobile financial
information systems can provide serious benefit to customers’ value. They investigate re-
alizable returns in a stock market subject to the users’ reaction time to incoming events.
In a simulation, based on a real-world dataset, they compare two different scenarios of
information latency. The results show that, in the low-latency scenario, customers gain
more than five percent of realizable returns compared to less than 2.5 percent in the high-
latency scenario. Due to the characteristics of mobile information systems users are able to
react nearly immediately to new information and transform their advantage into monetary
gains. In a market-based environment, Teschner et al. (2012) describe a method to dis-
tinguish between decision supporting and misleading information in mobile applications.
Their preliminary results suggest that the decision making process differs depending on the
device used. Besides the studies mentioned there exists hardly empirical work analyzing
decision performance in mobile applications.
7.3 Setting and Research Questions
7.3.1 Experimental Setting
This study was conducted on the Kurspiloten market. Kurspiloten is a prediction market
for selected stock market indices and commodities. Subsection 4.2 contains a detailed
market description.
Operationalization
In the following, the indicator variable Deviceo is 1 for a given order o when it was submit-
ted trough the mobile application, otherwise it is 0. The order type used for a given order
o is described by the indicator variable Market Ordero. It is 1 for a liquidity taking market
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order and 0 for a liquidity providing limit order that cannot immediately be matched. For
a buy order o the dummy variable TDo (“trading direction”) is 1, whereas for a sell order
it is 0. In this continuous market the outcome of each stock (i. e., the final value) can be
observed. Therefore the information content of each order can be measured ex-post. With
respect to the outcome of a stock, if the order moved the price in the correct direction it is
classified as informed, whereas an order moving the price in the opposite direction of the
outcome is classified as uninformed. Based on Teschner et al. (2011), the following score













1, priceoi ≤ fvi and otype = BUY
1, priceoi ≥ fvi and otype = SELL
0, priceoi > fvi and otype = BUY
0, priceoi < fvi and otype = SELL
The price of an order o for the stock i is represented as priceo,i. The fundamental final
outcome value of a stock is represented by fvi . In a way, the Scoreo,i can be interpreted as
an indicator for the profitability of an order and thus as the decision outcome of a trader;
Scoreo,i is 1 for a profit greater equals to zero and 0 otherwise.
Analyzing Decision Confidence
As described in the last section, two proxies are used to measure the participants’ decision
confidence and trading behavior. The quantity of a specific order is related to the device
used. As the different stocks exhibit different historic variances (e. g., the Dow Jones is
much more volatile than Bund-futures) the analysis is controlled for these variances by
adding the market indicator variables Mi. These control variables are included in all re-
gression models. To identify the influence of the device on the submitted quantity (first
confidence proxy) the following OLS regression is used:





For the second proxy it is necessary to look at how users submit their orders. For an
executed order there are only two possibilities; either an order is a market order (price
taking) or a limit order (liquidity providing). The market order initializes a trade by getting
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immediately matched against a standing limit order and thus taking liquidity from the
market. On the contrary, orders are counted as limit orders when they cannot immediately
be matched and thus executed. In this case, they are written to the order book and hence
provide liquidity to the market. As this is a binary outcome, a binomial logistic regression
model is used. If an order is initializing a trade, the dependent variable is 1 otherwise it
is 0. Equation 7.3 measures the device’s influence on the probability whether an order is










In order to calculate the influence of trader behavior on trading outcome Equation 7.3 is
adapted the following way. The dependent variable is the score (profitability) as defined
in Equation 7.1, which is 1 for a profit and 0 for a loss. As before, the analysis is controlled
for different risks in the market categories by adding the dummy variables M1-M12 and
receive the following equation:
(7.4)
log(πScoreπTrade ) = i +β1 ×Deviceo + β2 ×Market Ordero + β3 ×Quantityo
+β4 × TDo +
∑12
i=1(γi ×Mi)
The regression for the profit (Equation 7.5) is analogous to Equation 7.4, except that
the quantity has to be dropped due to the obvious high correlation with profit:






As more decisions are facilitated through mobile decision support systems, one of the most
urgent questions is “How to design interfaces that improve decision making?” In order to an-
swer this higher research question it has to be deeply understood if and how the interface
influences decision making. More specifically it needs to be analyzed how participants
search for information and how they incorporate this information in their decision pro-
cess.
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The second goal of this study is to link behavioral aspects of the market participants
with the quality of their decisions. Creating a link between behavioral aspects of the par-
ticipants and quality is important since the quality of the predictive power is directly neg-
atively affected if participants make systematically biased decisions. Hence, the second
research question is “How do different devices (and therefore user interfaces) affect decision
behavior and decision outcome?” The main research question of this study is introduced in
Section 1.2 as research question 4 and reads:
Research Question 4: Are decision behavior and decision outcome affected by the kind
of device used?
The experimental set up is well suited to studying the behavioral aspects of decision
making because in contrast to financial markets (i) the outcome of events in the market
is ultimately known and (ii) the ex-post trading performance of participants can be mea-
sured. To give indications for these research questions, the influence participants’ device
choices have on their information usage is analyzed. Following Ariely (2000), it is expected
that users choose different information items in order to adapt the interface to their in-
formational needs, needed to fulfill the given (decision) task (i. e., trade). Due to mobile
devices’ limitations, it is expected that this adaption leads to less consumption of informa-
tion items in case of mobile device users; whereas users of a stationary device consume
(slightly) more information items as they do not suffer from device related limitations.
Following the research model (Figure 7.1), based upon van Witteloostuijn and Muehlfeld
(2008), the Device usage is connected with the participants’ Confidence and Trading Behav-
ior in hypotheses H1. In order to measure the vague concept of confidence, two common
proxies are used: a) the order type used to trade and b) the order size in stocks. Particular,
the order type is distinguished between market orders and limit orders. A limit order is exe-
cuted for a given limit price, whereas a market order is an order that executes immediately,
but often at less favorable prices. Hence, the trader submitting a market order pays the
spread (i. e., the difference between the best buy and best sell prices), but is guaranteed
immediate execution. A less confident trader is less willing to trade immediately and will-
ing to wait for the market to move in his direction (Teschner and Weinhardt, 2012). The
second proxy to quantify trader behavior in financial markets is the size of the submitted
order (cf. Yang et al., 2012). As all traders have the same start portfolio the quantity of
a trade is a proxy for a trader’s confidence perception. If a trader has doubts about the
future development of an indicator he is likely unwilling to bet all on one – or just a few –
shot(s).
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FIGURE 7.1: Research Model
Summing up, the users’ device choice is connected with their decision confidence and
trading behavior by using the proxies order size and order type (market order or limit order).
Hence, the following hypotheses are stated:
Hypothesis 1a: Participants using mobile device submit orders with lower average quan-
tity.
Hypothesis 1b: Participants using mobile device have a lower probability to submit mar-
ket orders.
In the next step, the interplay between Confidence and Trading Behavior and Trad-
ing/Decision Outcome (H2 in Figure 7.1) is regarded. As described above, large orders
are expected to be more informative than smaller orders. In other words, an increased
order-size is expected to be a predictor for a profit (Hypothesis 2a). Previous research on
trading behavior showed that traders who set prices and use limit orders (market-making)
are less mistake-prone and appear to be more rational than traders using market orders
(price-taking) (Oliven and Rietz, 2004). Hence, traders using market-making trades (limit
orders) are expected to be more successful (Hypothesis 2b). The hypotheses related to H2
(Figure 7.1) are as follows:
Hypothesis 2a: Increased order-size is positively correlated with the resulting profit.
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Hypothesis 2b: Participants using limit orders are more likely to submit profitable orders.
Finally, and most importantly, by controlling for trading behavior it is analyzed how the
self-chosen Device influences the participants Trading/Decision Outcome (see H3 in Fig-
ure 7.1). The decision outcome of a submitted order can be analyzed depending on the
resulting profit or loss. The needed heuristic is detailed in Subsection 7.3.1. The intu-
itive reasoning is that more information can be displayed, understood, and incorporated
using the stationary device. As more information are expected to be beneficial a better
trading performance is expected (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). Moreover, one could argue that
participants can trade on ad-hoc information just when they are available and may use
this advantage to make a profit (cf. Muntermann and Janssen, 2005). In order to proxy
decision outcome two measures are used. The first is the likelihood that a trader makes the
‘right’ decision (i. e., she submits a profitable order; for details see Equation 7.1). Second,
the profit resulting from each order can be measured ex post. Thus the hypotheses for the
interface influence on decision accuracy (see H3 in Figure 7.1) are:
Hypothesis 3a: Participants using mobile device are less likely to submit profitable orders.
Hypothesis 3b: Participants using mobile device make less profit.
Those three steps combined provide an indication of the market interface and the in-
formational impact on trader behavior. Moreover, they provide insight into the inter-play
between device, information and decision making.
7.4 Results
This section summarizes the results of the conducted study. The three hypotheses pre-
sented in Section 7.3.2 are analyzed following the research model and the results are in-
terpreted. First, the device influence on traders’ decision confidence is reported. Second,
trading behavior and trading performance is analyzed.
7.4.1 Decision Confidence
Users accessing the platform through the mobile device were expected to use on aver-
age small order sizes (Hypothesis 1a). Using a simple t-test no significant difference was
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found between the order-sizes (quantity) of web and mobile traders (web: 1,038.28; mo-
bile: 1,276.55; t-stat = .84). Even when controlling for different factors (as described
above), no significant influence of the device used was found (Table 7.1). Turning to what
type of orders (i. e., market order vs. limit order) participants submit to the market, no
significant difference was found between orders submitted through stationary or mobile
devices (Hypothesis 1b). As described in Section 7.3.2, both measures (quantity and mar-
ket order) can be interpreted as proxies for confidence. Hence, it has to be concluded that
the decision confidence seems to be unaffected by the device used.
TABLE 7.1: Regression Model for Hypotheses 1a and 1b
Hypothesis H1a H1b
Quantity Market Order













Adj. R2 2.60 %
pseudo-R2 8.65%
N 131,561 131,561
Notes: t-statistic (left model) and z-statistics (right model) in
parenthesis; pseudo-R2: Nagelkerke (1991); ·p< .1, ∗p< .05,
∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001
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7.4.2 Trading Behavior and Performance
Following the research model, the effect of Trading Behavior on Trading/Decision Outcome
is analyzed (see H2 in Figure 7.1). Therefore, it is regard how profit and quantity of orders
are connected. Using Equation 7.5, the model on the right side of Table 7.2 is received.
TABLE 7.2: Regression Model for Hypotheses 2b/3a and 2a/3b
Hypotheses H2b/H3a H2a/H3b
Score Profit
Device (mobile) −.29∗ −263.64∗
(−2.53) (−1.97)
Market Order −0.63∗∗∗ 121.73∗∗∗
(−5.42) (8.98)












Notes: t-statistic (left model) and z-statistics (right model) in
parenthesis; pseudo-R2: Nagelkerke (1991); ·p< .1, ∗p< .05,
∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001
As one can see, quantity has a negative significant influence on profit. However, since
the effect strength is relatively small in comparison to the average profit (mean: 198.50,
sd: 2,561.52), it is doubtful that there is an economic significant effect of quantity on
profit and Hypothesis 2a cannot be proven. Turning to Hypothesis 2b, the model on the
left side of Table 7.2 is the result of applying Equation 7.4 to the dataset. Market order
has a small (marginal effect: −.015) negative influence on score and therefore supports
Hypothesis 2b. Interestingly, although market order has a small negative influence on score,
106
7.5 Conclusion
it has a positive influence on the overall profit, which leads to the conclusion that market
orders fail at being profitable more often than their counterparts, but if they do not, they
are much more profitable than limit orders.
Finally, the difference in Decision Outcome between the two interface types is regarded
(see H3 in Figure 7.1). As described, two proxies are used to measure decision outcome in
the market environment. First, the likelihood of an order being profitable (score) in regards
to the device the order was submitted from (see Hypothesis 3a as depicted in Table 7.2).
As one can see, device negatively affects this likelihood, although the regression controlled
for Trading Behavior (quantity, market order) and market specific effects (Equation 7.3).
Although the influence of device is rather small (marginal effect: −.07) and only significant
at the 5 %-level, this result supports Hypothesis 3a. Moreover, device significantly reduces
the average profit by about 264 currency units (see Hypothesis 3b in Table 7.2), and hence
supports Hypothesis 3b.
As both the likelihood for submitting a profitable order (i. e., score) as well as the aver-
age profit decreases if the device dummy is set to 1, it can be concluded that submitting an
order through a mobile device leads to worse trading performance compared to a station-
ary device. However, as this is a field experiment it cannot be identified to which extent
this effect is driven by the mobile device, or by the environment in which a participant is
trading with the mobile app (or even the mobile app itself). So both the mobile device and
the environment in which participants use their mobile device may negatively affect their
performance. However, it is not possible to give an explicit answer with the information
available in this field study.
7.5 Conclusion
By describing a prediction market which participants can access through stationary and
mobile interfaces the potential of analyzing decision processes in various device settings
has been shown. Participants’ confidence and trading behavior on a per-order basis has
been examined subject to the device used. Furthermore, the influence of trading behavior,
and the usage of a specific device class (namely, web or mobile) on trading outcome has
been analyzed. This study contributes three main findings:
First, it was not possible to proof that the device has an influence on participants’ de-
cision confidence as measured by two proxies (order-size and order-type). Since decision
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confidence is only one aspect of what can possibly be influenced by using a certain device
type, this study leaves room for further research.
Second, it could be shown that market orders, although they tend to lead to a higher
profit, lead to profitable transactions less often. These somewhat contradictory results
prompt the following interpretation: market orders fail more often, but if they do not,
the average gain is higher than the average loss is in case of failing. In order to deeply
understand trading behavior in this market, one has to analyze the trading behavior even
more thoroughly, e. g., by taking additional aspects of trading behavior into account or
simply by analyzing the data on a per-user basis.
Third, it has been found that orders submitted by a mobile device perform significantly
worse than their stationary counterparts. In particular, significantly lower profits, and a
significantly lower probability for submitting a profitable order were found when using a
mobile device. It remains unclear, if the usage of the device itself or indirect influences
are causing this ‘performance penalty’. One might assume that mobile traders are simply
distracted through an often-noisy environment. Another possibility is that mobile traders
are simply unable to obtain information necessary to perform well via the smaller screen
and other limitations of the user interface. As hinted at earlier, it is possible that the
information usage as well as the environmental influence is worth considering in a future
study.
A major limitation of this study is, that it can neither be ruled out that – in some cases –
traders used the web-interface in a mobile setting to submit an order (e. g., with a lap-
top or a smartphone web-browser) nor that a user in a stationary setting used the mobile
application for that purpose. Even though there are reason to believe that traders in a
stationary context prefer to use the web-interface as well as mobile traders tend to use the
KAPP, there are no reliable information about a user’s trading environment. Hence, fur-
ther research and a different, more controlled approach is needed to provide clarification
of these questions. Moreover, the data has a strong bias towards orders submitted via the
web-interface. One explanation for the few mobile orders could be that many participants
tested the mobile interface with a couple of orders once and decided to use the stationary
interface instead. Unfortunately, no acceptance-survey was conducted amongst users of
KAPP. As the majority of feedback received concerning the usability of KAPP was positive,
there is reason to believe that the few mobile orders are instead attributed to the partic-
ipants’ usage preferences of that particular market. In other words: Participants simply
made little use of the possibilities of mobile trading. Besides this weakness, all orders
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submitted via mobile devices are real world observations traders submitted without being
specifically incentivized to do so.
This study has two major implications: First, it illustrates that decision making perfor-
mance does not solely depend on the decision maker and her resources. Second, one need
to be aware of these differences when designing software artifacts using multiple devices
having different characteristics. Specifically in the domain of financial markets this study
is the first work to highlight the influence of mobile trading interfaces on trading behav-
ior and performance. Due to the close relation to decision processes, this study helps to




Improving the (IT) Infrastructure:
Interface Influence on the Disposition
Effect
“ Traders in any, perhaps all, markets have different
talents, interests, and abilities; they may interpret data
differently or be swayed by fads. However, as long as
not all traders are so influenced there is room for mar-
kets to function efficiently.”
ROBERT FORSYTHE, FORREST NELSON,
GEORGE R. NEUMANN, AND JACK WRIGHT, 1992
8.1 Introduction
IN 2002, 28 % of U.S. retail trades were executed via retail brokerage companies; oneyear later, U.S. online retail brokerage companies already managed more than 31 mil-
lion accounts (Bakos et al., 2005). In a more recent analysis Camargo and Fonseca (2013)
estimate the US self-directed online brokerage market to have reached over 40 million
customers in 2012. Furthermore, they report growth rates have slowed down since 2010
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which can be an indication of saturation. From a customer’s perspective, important distin-
guishing features for online retail brokerage companies are fees, trading capabilities, and
the functionality of their trading interfaces. As designing trading interfaces gives broker-
age companies an additional opportunity to differentiate themselves from competitors, a
lot of effort is put into designing ‘attractive’ trading interfaces for customers. Although it
is common knowledge, that a decision maker’s performance in general depends inter alia
on the user interface used (Speier and Morris, 2003), even a carefully designed and easy
to use interface may not prevent traders suffering from behavioral biases.
The disposition effect is such a behavioral bias, which often leads to individual losses and
missed gains. Although the disposition effect is well known in several research communi-
ties, it is not considered to be part of general knowledge. Therefore, providers of online
trading platforms might have a particular interest to inform their customers about that
bias, -and if possible provide tools to avoid the bias. On the one hand, the strength of that
bias is influenced by the individuals’ internal decision making processes and knowledge
about the specific bias and awareness. On the other hand, the individuals’ environment
(e. g., information presentation) might impact the effect strength.
In this study, performance indicators are identified as a driver of the disposition effect
and it is shown that their disuse can decrease the disposition effect and therefore its nega-
tive implications. Although, the question persists how individuals can be sensitized for this
bias. Evidence that textual information can work – even under difficult circumstances –
can for instance be found in the area of health warnings on tobacco. Hammond (2011)
could show that persons who noticed a textual warning sign, in some cases started to think
about changing their behavior. But he also emphasizes, that the information must “capture
[. . . ] attention and educate” (Hammond, 2011) in order to be effective. Another study in
the health domain examining effects of pictures and textual information found that only
using textual arguments led to minor changes in intended behavior (Boer et al., 2006).
To summarize, it has been shown that textual information can have an effect, although
it does not seem to be a strong one. The following research questions are addressed in
this study: (i) Is the knowledge about the existence of the disposition effect suitable to
lower the disposition effect exhibited by an individual? (ii) Does a trend indicator arrow
(like the ones often used in online trading screens) positively affect the strength of the
disposition effect exhibited by an individual? To answer these questions, an experiment is
set up in an online prediction market. Before addressing these questions it is first verified




The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: First, related research concern-
ing the disposition effect and prediction markets is presented in Section 8.2. Second,
the conducted experiment is described and the hypotheses are developed in Section 8.3.
Thereafter, in Section 8.4, a short description of the dataset is given and the methodology
used is outlined, before the findings are presented. Finally, results and their implications
are discussed and concluding remarks are made in Section 8.5.
8.2 Related Work
8.2.1 Disposition Effect
Across a wide range of markets, traders tend to hold on to paper losses for too long and
realize gains too early. This tendency is a deviation from rational behavior, where the
trader makes his decision based on relative gains and losses instead of the absolute val-
uation of his investment. Based on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, the
work of Machina (1982), and others, Shefrin and Statman (1985) examined this particu-
lar pattern and coined the term disposition effect (DE) for it. They developed a descriptive
theory that enabled a broader insight on this particular effect in real markets. But their
explanatory approach goes beyond prospect theory and also includes aspects of mental
accounting (Thaler, 1985), as well as the asymmetry of pride and regret (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1985), and self-control (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). The existence
of the disposition effect has been shown in stock markets (e. g., Lakonishok and Smidt,
1986), for a U.S. discount brokerage house (Odean, 1998) or for the Taiwan Stock Ex-
change (Barber et al., 2007), but also in experimental settings (e. g., Andreassen, 1988;
Weber and Camerer, 1998) or in prediction markets (e. g., Teschner et al., 2012). Al-
though the disposition effect can be shown in a wide range of markets, its strength seems
to depend on individual factors, such as professionalism, sophistication, and trading ex-
perience. Shapira and Venezia (2001) examine a dataset from an Israeli brokerage house
and found out, that independent investors tend to have a higher disposition effect than
professional investors. Seru et al. (2010) show that the disposition effect declines with
trading experience. But even a lower disposition effect for professional traders does not
mean, that disposition effect’s performance-degrading implication vanishes with growing
experience. Both studies imply that the strength of the disposition effect for an individual
is varying and can actively be influenced. Garvey and Murphy (2004) analyzes a success-
ful team of proprietary traders and found, that even though the traders were experienced
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and performed very well, their performance could have been better, if they would have
avoided the disposition effect’s trading pattern. Feng and Seasholes (2005) show, that a
combination of sophistication and trading experience can even eliminate investor’s reluc-
tance to realize losses, but it can only diminish the propensity of an investor to realize
gains. Summing up, the disposition effect has shown to hinder individuals trading perfor-
mance. Although, it can be diminished by traders’ experience and sophistication it cannot
be totally avoided.
8.2.2 Disposition Effect in Prediction Markets
Teschner et al. (2012) analyzed the disposition effect in a prediction market for macroe-
conomic indicators as described in Teschner et al. (2011) with a sample size of 96 active
traders. They conducted their analysis largely based on the work of Odean (1998). In line
with previous research, they found a disposition effect on the individual level (DE= .1582)
as well as on the aggregated level (DE = .2248). Furthermore, they found a significant
asymmetry in the disposition effect towards the percentage of gains realized. Interest-
ingly, there was no significant impact of the disposition effect on absolute forecast error
as well as no correlation between prediction accuracy and disposition effect. Hartzmark
and Solomon (2012) examined a dataset of a NFL betting market from Tradesports.com,
Inc.1 and found that prices followed a S-shaped curve instead of linearly matching the
underlying probabilities. They found this particular mispricing to be consistent with the
disposition effect. In another study, Borghesi (2013) found strong evidence for the disposi-
tion effect in Tradesports’ market for NBA totals contracts to lead to significant differences
between prices and underlying values, also consistent with the disposition effect. Sum-
ming up, there is evidence that the disposition effect exists in prediction markets.
8.3 Setting and Research Questions
8.3.1 Experimental Setting
A field experiment is conducted on a prediction market called Kurspiloten (cf. Section 4.2).
Additional specifics of that market are detailed in the next paragraph. Afterwards, the ex-
1Accessible at the URL http://www.tradesports.com/ .
114
8.3 Setting and Research Questions
periment, consisting of treatment-specific user interface changes is described. The treat-
ments actually used are explained in the last paragraph.
Market Details
Besides individual decisions, the disposition effect also depends on market price devel-
opments. For example, traders in a bearish market have simply less chances to realize
paper gains but more paper losses; the opposite applies to bullish markets. Since traders
might concentrate their trading on different stocks, this dependency might be problem-
atic for further analyses. In extreme situations traders might experience different or even
opposed market effects due to their different portfolios. However, it is expected that the
effect market price developments have on the disposition effect are rather small in this
market. First, the tradable stocks (Table 4.1) can roughly be grouped into stock indices
and commodities. Within those groups, the single commodities/indices are somehow in-
terdependent (e. g., DAX and MDAX, Gold and Silver.) and thus are unlikely to develop
in opposed directions for a longer period of time. Second, traders in Kurspiloten market
start with an identical portfolio and receive an identical endowment each week, therefore
tempting traders to trade all kinds of tradable stocks. As all traders participate in the very
same market, it is assumed that price market trends do not influence the disposition ef-
fect between individual traders significantly. Finally, traders’ profits are used as a control
variable in the following regression models (where appropriate), which further smoothens
the potential negative impact of market price developments on the comparability of the
individual disposition effect.
User Interface Modifications
The experiment is set up as a 2× 2 full factorial between subjects design. Both treatment
conditions are visual changes to the trade screen (Figure 8.1; Appendix A). The first change
(‘DE Info Text’) consists of a linked text “Do you know about the disposition effect?”2 just
above the price chart (see label (a) in Figure 8.1). When a user clicks on this text, a para-
graph explaining the disposition effect fades in. Appendix A contains the complete text
besides an english translation. As the experiment takes place in the field, compromises
must be made in some areas. Hence, traders are not forced to read the DE Info Text prior
to trading on the market. Instead the current time and user id is recorded with every click
2Author’s translation. Original phrase: “Kennen Sie den Dispositions-Effekt?”
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on the link to DE Info Text for further analyses. The second treatment condition (‘Trend In-
dicator’) extended the box “Your Performance”3 on the lower right of the trade screen by
one column (see label (b) in Figure 8.1). The basic interface only contains the information
“Average Purchase Price”4 (left column in the box “Your Performance”), whilst the second
treatment condition extended that box by a column named “Performance”, containing the
relative performance of stocks held. First, the percentage difference between the current
market price and the average purchase price for the corresponding stock is shown. Second,
a tiny trend direction arrow indicates whether this difference is negative, zero, or positive.
The arrow is colored red, grey, or green, respectively. It is similar to stock trend indicators
used in many online trading interfaces.
Treatments
All participants registered on the Kurspiloten market are assigned to one of the three treat-
ment groups or to the control group as shown in Table 8.1. Participants who registered in
the pre-market phase are randomly assigned prior to the start of the market. Participants
who joined after start of the market are assigned randomly at registration. Each trader re-
mains member of the assigned treatment group for the whole duration of the market. The
first group was confronted with both conditions described above (treatment Trend_Info)
and depicted in Figure 8.1. One group saw the trend info (treatment Trend), another one
the info text (treatment Info). No changes were made for the control group (Control), i. e.,
the control group saw neither the info text nor the trend info.
TABLE 8.1: Treatments and Research Design
DE Info Text w/o DE Info Text
Trend Indicator Trend_Info Trend
w/o Trend Indicator Info Control
8.3.2 Research Questions
This study tries to answer the afore-mentioned research questions 5 and 6 from Sec-
tion 1.2:
3Author’s translation. Original phrase: “IHRE PERFORMANCE”
4Author’s translation. Original phrase: “durchschnittlicher Kaufpreis”
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FIGURE 8.1: Trading Screen for Treatment Trend_Info
(Containing both user interface modifications made: a and b. A click on the linked text (a) fades in an info
text about the disposition effect. The whole disposition info text is depicted in Appendix A. Modification
(b) shows the ‘Trend Indicator’ element. Screenshots of the three remaining treatments can be found in
Appendix A. )
Heading: “Price development of Dax 2011-10-07”; In box (a): “Do you know about the disposition effect” (only available in
treatments Info and Trend_Info); Chart: price chart for Kurspiloten prices (red dotted line) and real-world prices (black line); middle
left: “Your Order for Stock . . . 2011”, radio buttons for buy and sell, information about the current real-world price of selected
stock (bold), input field for limit price, information about deviation of limit price from real-world price, input field for quantity,
information about buying power (bold), ‘execute’ button; Right column: 1st box: “My Portfolio”, own holdings, own holdings
available, and money (P€); 2nd box: “Market Information”, least recent price and closing date of current product; 3rd box:
“Orderbook”; 4th box: “Current News”, news stream from a major German financial newspaper; 5th box: “Your Performance”, average
purchase price of selected stock and relative performance (i. e., relative price difference of average purchase price and least recent
market price; only available in treatments Trend and Trend_Info)
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Research Question 5: Is providing information about the disposition effect suitable to
lower the strength of the disposition effect exhibited by an individual?
Research Question 6: Does a trend indicator arrow affect the strength of the disposition
effect exhibited by an individual?
As stated earlier, albeit the disposition effect (DE) is a well-known behavioral bias, it is
not part of a general education and can therefore not expected to be known by the vast
majority of participants of an online prediction market. As research has shown, knowledge
about the existence of the disposition effect can lead to a decreased disposition effect. This
study tries to shed some light on the question, if it is expedient to inform about the DE with
a short information text directly within an online trade screen or if a ‘deeper understanding’
of the disposition effect is needed. It is expected that reading an information text leads to
a lower disposition effect, simply by creating awareness for this particular deviation from
rationality, and thus increasing self-control.
Therefore, an – yet unspecified – interface change ‘DE Info Text’ is defined, consisting
of an information text about the disposition effect on the trading screen. Hence, in line
with current research, the information text is expected to reduce the disposition effect:
Hypothesis 4: Mean disposition effect is lower if ‘DE Info Text’ was read. (INFO < CTRL)
Moreover, self-control might be decreased by confronting a trader with the portfolio
state in a transparent fashion.The disposition effect is driven by the traders’ perception of
his portfolio development; e. g., if a trader cannot remember the purchase price of stocks,
he is obviously unable to tell if he is riding a gain or a loss. In a more complex market en-
vironment, traders repeatedly buy and sell different amounts of shares for different prices
resulting in a non-intuitive way to calculate the average purchase price. That purchase
price has to be compared to the current stock market price in order to determine the own
holdings’ performance. The easier a trader realizes his portfolio value, the more he might
be tempted to yield to the disposition effect.
Furthermore, it is well known that traders can fall victim to mental accounting. Show-
ing traders a transparent state of their portfolio on a per stock basis might intensify this
biased perception. In order to support traders with an objective and comparable method
to reflect about the portfolio performance, an interface change ‘Trend Indicator’ is defined,
that consists of a relative performance indicator of a trader’s portfolio price development
and a visual cue representing its direction. The ‘Trend Indicator’ is therefore expected to
increase the disposition effect:
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Hypothesis 5: Mean disposition effect is higher if ‘Trend Indicator’ is present. (TREND> CTRL)
From a theoretical point of view, it is not expected that an information text about the
disposition effect and a trend indicator for the own portfolio’s price development should
influence each other. Therefore, the following hypotheses are developed:
Hypothesis 6a: ‘Trend Indicator’ does increase the mean disposition effect, even if ‘DE Info Text’
is present. (TREND_INFO > INFO)
Hypothesis 6b: ‘DE Info Text’ is suitable to reduce the mean disposition effect, even if
‘Trend Indicator’ is present. (TREND_INFO < TREND)
The trend indicator is expected to induce a higher order activity, since it reflects the
state of a portfolio in a more transparent way and thus might make trading opportunities
more obvious. Hence, the fourth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 7: ‘Trend Indicator’ leads to an increase in the traders’ activity.
8.4 Results
In this section the empirical findings are presented, starting with descriptive statistics.
Afterwards, the overall and individual existence of the disposition effect is shown, before a
detailed look at the disposition effect with regard to the four treatments introduced earlier
is taken. Finally, we shed some light on the traders’ order-based activity per treatment.
8.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Methodology
This study uses the dataset from Kurspiloten market as described in Section 4.2. The dis-
position effect is only calculated for traders who submitted at least 12 orders. Additionally,
traders that had no chance to realize a gain or a loss and traders that did not realize at least
one gain or one lose are filtered. Due to these circumstances the disposition effect can be
determined for 514 traders. The sizes of the three treatment groups and the control group
are nearly balanced out: NTrend_Info = 123, NTrend = 126, NInfo = 123, and NControl = 142.
About one quarter of the traders, who could click on the info text link, actually made use
of this possibility: NclickedTrend_Info = 30, N
clicked
Info = 30. The average account age lies between
69.10 days (Trend) and 67.26 days (Trend_Info) with an overall mean of 68.05. Traders’
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performance – measured by their total trading profit – differs significantly (t-stat = 2.34,
p = 2.04%) between treatments Info and Trend. Hence, variable Profit is used in the re-
gression analysis to control for that fact. Besides, variable Trades per Day is used to control
for different trading activity. Although the number of trades per day does not significantly
differ between treatments, it does for traders that clicked on the info link in comparison
to those who did not (t-stat= 2.51, p= 1.24%).
The disposition effect is mainly measured based on Odean (1998). The only exception
is the length of the time slices used. Since the trading period per product was rather
short (seven days), the users’ sessions are used to differentiate between paper gains and
losses instead of trading days; e. g., if a traders’ average purchase price was below the
highest and lowest market price in the regarded session it is counted as a paper gain. The
disposition effect (DE) is calculated as DE= PGR−PLR where PLR denotes the Proportion




# realized losses+# paper losses
(8.2) PGR=
# realized gains
# realized gains+# paper gains
8.4.2 Disposition Effect on Prediction Markets
In line with current research, an aggregated disposition effect (DE) can be shown in the
Kurspiloten market (DE= .154, PLR= .041, PGR= .196) which is slightly smaller than in
a similar study of Teschner et al. (2012) (DE= .225, PLR= .018, PGR= .242) and higher
as in studies using data of online brokers (e. g., for an U.S. discount broker Odean (1998)
measured DE = .05, for a German online broker Weber and Welfens (2007) measured
DE = .09). On the individual level the disposition effect is 0.148 and thus comparable to
a similar study on a play-money prediction market conducted by Teschner et al. (2012)
(DE = .158). Further details are displayed in Table 8.2. As one can see PLR, PGR and
DE are significantly greater than zero. Additionally, the disposition effect is asymmetric,




TABLE 8.2: Mean Individual Disposition Effect
Value t-stat (x > 0) Correlation (DE, x)
PLR .094 11.67 −.69
PGR .242 21.84 .85
DE .148 9.89 —
Notes: N = 514 (complete groups); both correlations are significant
at a 1 %-level
Result 3: The disposition effect is prevalent in the regarded market on an aggregated as
well as on an individual level.
8.4.3 Disposition Effect’s Influence on Trading Performance
As the disposition effect is prevalent in the market, the question arises, how the disposition
effect influences the market. Since this study focuses on the trader, there is a particular
interest in the disposition effect’s influence on traders’ performance. Therefore, the corre-
lations between the traders’ profits and the disposition effect, as well as their relative rank
and the disposition effect are regarded. (Relative rank here indicates the rank within the
514 regarded traders instead of the overall rank among all registered traders.) Neither
a significant correlation between profits and the disposition effect (ρ = .011, Pearson’s
product-moment correlation, t-value = .24), nor between the disposition effect and the
traders’ rank (ρ = −.028, Pearson’s product-moment correlation, t-value = −.62) can be
found.
8.4.4 Disposition Effect per Treatment
Table 8.3 (Figure 8.2a) shows the mean disposition effect in each treatment group and the
control group. The differences between Trend_Info and Trend (δ = .019), Info and Control
(δ = .052), Trend_Info and Info (δ = .036), and Trend and Info (δ = .017) are not signifi-
cant. Solely, the disposition effect for Trend_Info as well as for Trend is significantly higher
than for Control (both on a 5 %-level; Trend_Info: δ = .088, t-stat= 2.15, p-value= .016
and Trend: δ = .069, t-stat= 1.78, p-value= .038). At first glance, this result seems to
support Hypothesis 5. But as mentioned earlier, even if all traders in treatments Info and
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Trend_Info may read the disposition effect info text, it has not been controlled whether
they actually did expand this info text yet.
TABLE 8.3: Mean Individual Disposition Effect per Treatment (Complete Groups)
DE Info Text w/o DE Info Text
Trend Indicator .185 .166
w/o Trend Indicator .149 .097
Notes: N = 514 (complete groups)
(A) complete groups (B) subsample
FIGURE 8.2: Mean Individual Disposition Effect per Treatment
Therefore, the former analysis is repeated with a slight adaption: Table 8.4 (and Fig-
ure 8.2b) shows the mean disposition effect for a subsample, in which only traders in the
Info and Trend_Info treatment were taken into account that clicked on the info text link.
Furthermore, the disposition effect for those traders is calculated on the basis of trades
they executed after they first clicked on the info text link. Hence, N is slightly smaller.
As one can see, there is hardly difference between the treatments Trend_Info and Info
(δ = .001, not sign.). Also, the differences between Trend_Info and Trend (δ = .038),
Info and Trend (δ = .038), Trend_Info and Control (δ = .031), as well as Info and Control
(δ = .031) are not significant. Solely, the disposition effect for Trend is significantly higher
than for Control on a 5 %-level (δ = .069, t-stat = 1.78, p-value = .038). Again, this
finding supports Hypothesis 5. However, theses results cannot confirm Hypothesis 4.
Result 4: Textual information about the disposition effect has no influence on its strength
(cf. Hypothesis 4).
Result 5: Treatment Trend shows a significantly higher disposition effect than the control
group (cf. Hypothesis 5).
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TABLE 8.4: Mean Individual Disposition Effect per Treatment (Subsample)
DE Info Text w/o DE Info Text
Trend Indicator .128 .166
w/o Trend Indicator .128 .097
Notes: N = 328 (subsample: all traders who have not clicked on the
‘DE Info Text’ link mentioned in subsection ‘User Interface Modifications’
are filtered.)
When taking a look at the tiny difference between Trend_Info and Trend (δ = .001) in
Table 8.4 in contrast to the rather big difference of 0.069 between Trend and Control, one
might assume that the treatment condition ‘DE Info Text’ might have an influence on the
treatment condition ‘Trend Indicator’. It seems reasonable to examine, if the info text does
hinder the trend indicator’s increasing influence on the disposition effect. To control for
such an interaction effect, the regression model shown in Table 8.5, Model 2 and 4 is used.
To control for such an interaction effect, the regression model shown in Table 8.5, Model 2
and 4 is used.5 Additionally an ANOVA was applied. Neither method shows an interaction
between the treatment conditions ‘DE Info Text’ and ‘Trend Indicator’. That means, neither
of the treatment conditions do have a stronger or weaker effect under the premise that the
other treatment condition is present or absent. Furthermore, Models 3 and 4 control for
potential differences in treatment groups. Nevertheless, all models in Table 8.5 show a
positive influence of the trend indicator on the individual disposition effect.
For the sake of completeness, Table 8.6 contains the result for the complete treatment
groups. The result of the OLS regression and the ANOVA are qualitatively similar to what
has been presented for the subsample (Table 8.5), including the trend indicator’s influence
on the disposition effect.
Result 6: No interaction effects have been found between the disposition effect and show-
ing visual cues (cf. Hypotheses 6a).
There is reason to believe, that the trend indicator itself does increase the individ-
ual disposition effect strength. Therefore, the average disposition effect of all traders
who can see the trend indicator (mean DE = .176) is compared, with those who cannot
(mean DE= .121). In other words, the joined treatment Trend and Trend_Info is compared
against treatment Info and the Control group. This analysis results in a significantly higher
5 Please note, that the dummy-coding was adjusted for ‘DE Info Text’ appropriately.
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TABLE 8.5: Measuring Interaction Effects (Subsample)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Effects Interaction (1) + Controls (2) + Controls
Trend Indicator .060· .069· .061· .070·
(visible=1, hidden=0) (1.66) (1.78) (1.70) (1.81)
DE Info Text −.05 .031 −.014 .020
(visible=1, hidden=0) (−0.09) (.41) (−.27) (.27)




per Day (1.89) (1.87)
Profit .000 .000
(−.35) (−.36)
(Intercept) .102∗∗∗ .097∗∗∗ .088∗∗∗ .084∗∗
(3.96) (3.66) (3.33) (3.07)
Adj. R2 .25 % .06% .76 % .56 %
N 310 310 310 310
Notes: OLS regression estimates on subsample; dependent variable: disposition effect; t-statistics in paren-
thesis; ·p< .1, ∗p< .05, ∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001
value for traders who see the trend indicator on a 5 %-level (δ = .054, t-stat = 1.82,
p-value = .034, N = 514). Again, the repetition of this analysis for the subsample from
above leads to analogous results (δ = .060, t-stat= 1.66, p-value= .049, N= 310).
Result 7: Displaying visual cues such as trend arrows increases the individual disposition
effect (cf. Hypothesis 5).
8.4.5 Activity per Treatment
As mentioned in section Hypotheses, treatment Trend is expected to have a higher num-
ber of orders submitted (Hypothesis 7). Therefore the number of (i) orders submitted
and (ii) logarithmized number of orders submitted is compared between all treatment
groups. The logarithmization is used, since it diminishes the effect of extreme values.
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TABLE 8.6: Measuring Interaction Effects (Complete Groups)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Effects Interaction (1) + Controls (2) + Controls
Trend Indicator .054· .062· .055· .062·
(visible=1, hidden=0) (1.83) (1.94) (1.83) (1.95)
DE Info Tex −.017 .014 −.025 .005
(visible=1, hidden=0) (−.37) (.21) (−.54) (.08)




per Day (1.57) (1.56)
Profit .000 .000
(−.29) (−.31)
(Intercept) .123∗∗∗ .120∗∗∗ .114∗∗∗ .111∗∗∗
(5.75) (5.43) (5.16) (4.87)
Adj. R2 .28% .17% .37 % .26 %
N 514 514 514 514
Notes: OLS regression estimates on subsample; dependent variable: disposition effect; t-statistics in paren-
thesis; ·p< .1, ∗p< .05, ∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001
One significant difference is found between Info and Control (δ = 382.24, t-stat = 1.71,
p-value = .045) for comparison ‘i’ and four differences for case ‘ii’: logarithmized trad-
ing activity in treatment Info is slightly higher than in Control group on a 0.1 %-level
(δ = 1.126, t-stat = 3.91, p-value < .001). Additionally, the logarithmized trading ac-
tivities for treatment Trend_Info and Info are significantly higher than for treatment Trend
(Trend: δ = 1.059, t-stat = 3.55, p-value < .001, Trend_Info: δ = .819, t-stat = 2.81,
p-value = .003). Finally, the logarithmized trading activity for treatment Trend_Info is
significantly higher than for Control (δ = .885, t-stat= 3.15, p-value< .001).
Since this analysis uses the afore-stated subsample (only traders who clicked on the
‘DE Info Text’ link), the result may also be interpreted in a different way: the more orders
a trader submits, the more often she sees the ‘DE Info Text’ link. Therefore one may argue,
that it is more likely for her to click on this link, which will result in such a pattern. To
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TABLE 8.7: Activity per Treatment
DE Info Text w/o DE Info Text
Trend Indicator 5.479 4.922
w/o Trend Indicator 5.502 4.855
Notes: N = 514 (complete groups); mean logarithmized number of or-
ders submitted per Treatment
clarify that question, the complete group was analyzed, but no significant differences were
found (Table 8.7). Hence, Hypothesis 7 is rejected.
Result 8: The trend indicator does not lead to a higher trading activity (cf. Hypothesis 7).
8.5 Conclusion
As the results show, the disposition effect can be aggravated by a tiny modification of the
user interface. The modification consists of a simple percentage value and a trend direc-
tion arrow showing the traders’ portfolio value, as used by online trading sites throughout
the web as trend indicator for stock prices or for similar applications. Surprisingly, even
such a small change does significantly increase the strength of the disposition effect. Those
changes are not expected to only have a downside. On the upside, it is assumed that traders
seeing the interface elements described above do submit more trades, since it shows the
current state of the traders’ portfolio in a fast and easy recognizable manner. But interest-
ingly this assumption could not be verified. As private investors are regularly confronted
to trading interfaces containing such elements, those results are especially interesting for
providers of market interfaces. For market interface providers like retail brokers, these
results imply to not use trend indicators. Nevertheless, currently most online brokers do
make excessive use of such interface elements, at least for the reason of easier recognition
of relative (price) changes. In order to help retail investors to avoid the disposition effect
– which has previously been shown to reduce investor welfare – online brokers should con-
sider redesigning their interfaces. These results also have an implication for regulators.
They should carefully think about obligating online brokers to elucidate customers about
behavioral biases, which are known to degrade their performance. As the results suggest,
textual advices do not seem to be the best possible solution in this case. (Besides, the
results put the effectiveness of textual information and advices already given to traders in
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question.) Regulators might furthermore think about banning certain types of visual cues
that are known to lead to a great share of ‘wrong’ decisions and a substantial degradation
of performance. Further research is needed to show, if the visual cue examined in this
study does satisfy the requirements to belong into this category. Nevertheless, retail bro-
kers should be interested in a good user experience and are hence motivated to deliver a
‘good’ user interface, which is supporting instead of misleading. Innovative retail brokers
might even use results like these to create a unique sales proposition, playing a pioneer
role in providing disposition effect-reducing user interfaces.
The disposition effect is a well-explored deviation from rational behavior. As many stud-
ies show, the disposition effect can have a negative impact on the decision performance in
trading environments. This study analyzed the disposition effect on aggregated and indi-
vidual level in an online prediction market with nearly 2,000 active traders and more than
200,000 orders. In line with research, a disposition effect could be found at both levels.
Furthermore, a field study with over 500 traders was conducted for which the individ-
ual disposition effect could be measured. Although, it could not be verified that creating
awareness of the disposition effect via textual information could decrease its strength, it
could be shown that even tiny visual cues can significantly increase the strength of the
disposition effect. Nevertheless, this study leaves room for further research. On the one
hand, the trend indicator was solely used to represent the average purchase price of the
traders’ portfolios in contrast to the current market price. A future study could examine, if
the disposition effect is also affected if trend indicators are used to represent price changes
of tradable stocks. On the other hand, it has been reported, that only about one quarter
of traders clicked on the link to the offered info text. Furthermore, even if a trader clicked
on the link, there was no possibility to validate that she has (i) understood the text and
its implications or (ii) read the text at all. A laboratory experiment could be set up to con-
trol for these factors; an additional questionnaire could provide certainty if a participant
has read and understood the concept of the disposition effect and its implications on her
trading performance. In a follow-up field study, a reposition of the offered link in a more






“ An understanding and appreciation of existing insti-
tutions, good theory, good computational modeling and
well-designed experiments are critical ingredients to a
successful design.”
HAL R. VARIAN, 2002
9.1 Introduction
ACCURATE and reliable forecasts of future short- and long-term events are a crucialcompetitive factor for companies, regions, and countries and an important founda-
tion for political decision making. Advances in information systems are changing informa-
tion aggregation in many contexts: political institutions increasingly open up for grassroots
feedback and open discussion of societal innovation, ad-hoc communities use social media
to coordinate, and companies gradually shift decisions towards a broad basis of employ-
ees and allow for user-driven innovation. An underlying theme of this trend is using the
collective intelligence and wisdom of the crowd.
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There are various ways to utilize the wisdom of crowds or collective intelligence such
as using wikis, reputation systems, or polling mechanisms. Another way to aggregate
dispersed information is by using a Prediction Market (cf. Chapter 3.) In these markets,
participants trade contracts whose payoff depends on the outcome of uncertain future
events. For example, a market contract might reward one dollar if a particular presiden-
tial candidate is elected. An individual who thinks the candidate has a 65 % chance of
being elected should be willing to pay up to 65 cents for such a contract. Market partici-
pants form expectations about the outcome of an event. Comparable to financial markets,
they buy if they find that prices underestimate the probability of the event in question and
they sell a stock if prices overestimate the probability of an event. The track record of
prediction markets suggests that markets may help to better foresee future developments
and trends. Although, prediction markets have their strengths in quantitative predictions
and even make conditional predictions possible – albeit complicated – (cf. Berg and Rietz,
2003), they are not well suited when it comes to qualitative predictions. The strength
of prediction markets is the collaborative valuation of given contracts (i. e., the mapping
between payoff, event outcome, and event date). Since all valuation is based on quanti-
tative values (i. e., prices), qualitative information can only be induced into the market in
the contract design, which falls to the market operator. For example, questions like “What
will the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of country A be in 2015” fit perfectly to prediction
markets, whereas “How can productivity be improved?” is better suited for surveys.
Complex forecasts, such as conditional or qualitative judgments are better gathered with
traditional forecast methods such as survey-systems. However, traditional survey-systems
also have some known drawbacks. First of all, the success of surveys largely depends on
the participant selection (Ammon, 2009; Gordon, 2007). The most common selection cri-
terion is reputation, which is based on perceived expertise. However, Tetlock (2005) shows
that perceived expertise does not correlate with individual forecast accuracy. The second
drawback is the decreasing participant motivation over the study’s course. The long, rigid
and tedious process leads to decreasing participant numbers (Cuhls, 2003). Ilieva et al.
(2002) conducted a literature review and found response rates for online surveys from low
as 6 % (Ranchhod and Zhou, 2001) to high as 67 % (Kiesler and Sproull, 1986). Deutskens
et al. (2004) conducted a study with different types of surveys. Evans and Mathur (2005)
analysed the pros and cons of online surveys in contrast to traditional mail surveys and
discussed the online surveys’ best uses. Inter alia, he found online surveys are best to use
if timeline is vital, strong methodological control is sought (e. g., order of the questions), and




There are at least two ways surveys can benefit from an accompanying prediction mar-
ket; motivation and pre-selection of experts. Prediction markets motivate participants to
contribute continuously through incentives and by providing constant feedback; both on
the aggregate and the individual level. More participants might be willing to participate
(at least partly) in a survey if they have indicated that they have information regarding a
topic. The question is how to figure out when a participant has information about a topic?
This can be detected through the prediction market. If participants change the market
price, they most likely have information about a certain topic and might be willing to fill
out some related qualitative and possibly more complex questions. In previous studies
(e. g., Chen et al., 2005), surveys run in parallel to prediction markets but in separate sys-
tem. Survey participants had to leave the known platform, fill out a survey, and return to
continue trading. Potentially, participants might find it convenient to answer survey ques-
tions right on the same platform. Moreover, Teschner et al. (2011) show that individual
forecast input can be measured and objectively evaluated in prediction markets. Hence,
this might help to pre-select experts not based on their reputation but on their previous
forecast performance.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 9.2 gives a review of
related work on prediction markets and surveys. The experimental setting and research
questions are detailed in Section 9.3. Subsequently, Section 9.4 describes the dataset and
the methodology used. Finally, Section 9.5 concludes this chapter.
9.2 Related Work
9.2.1 Prediction Markets and Surveys
Prediction markets offer a number of advantages over surveys. Prediction markets are
continuous and ongoing, allowing immediate revelation of new information Rothschild
(2009). As they are usually open around the clock, participants can trade whenever they
like and therefore react to news immediately (Snowberg et al., 2007). This also applies
mostly to (traditional) mail surveys (e. g., Dillman, 1991) or internet surveys (e. g., Zhang,
1999).1 Although some surveys offer a small incentive in return for participation, the in-
centives earned by traders in a prediction market increase in proportion to the quality of
1See Cook et al. (2000) for an interesting overview on the response rates of internet surveys.
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the information provided. Unlike surveys, a market provides immediate feedback to par-
ticipants, allowing them opportunities to reassess their own information and to respond.
The feedback enables participants to learn on two levels; first by actively trading, partic-
ipants might gain experience and hence improve over time. Second, by observing their
performance participants might realize their low ability and consequently leave the mar-
ket (Teschner et al., 2011). The market interface is interactive and the setting gamified,
in marked contrast to most surveys, providing further incentives for participation. Most
surveys rely on random samples for validity and accuracy. In prediction markets, on the
other hand, those with the best information are the best participants – the very individuals
who are most likely to self-select into the market. Additionally, as successful participants
accumulate their profits they gain forecasting weight over time compared to less successful
participants. With surveys, this process of self-selection would introduce a sampling bias,
but with markets, the incentive system forces low performers out of the market. Turning
to the disadvantage of markets over surveys, one has to mention the higher complexity
burdening participants (Graefe et al., 2010). First, they have to understand the trading
mechanism and second, they have to understand how events are related to contracts. This
process is more structured and better researched for surveys. The forecast performance
of prediction markets is still in debate. On the positive side, they have proven repeatedly
to be very potent information aggregation mechanisms (e. g., Berg et al., 2008; Ledyard
et al., 2009; Bennouri et al., 2011). Although, other evidence suggests that the relative
performance advantage of markets may be small compared to surveys or polls (e. g., Erik-
son and Wlezien, 2008; Rothschild, 2009; Goel et al., 2010). Prediction markets have a
long track of successful field applications, e. g., in political elections (Berg et al., 2008),
sport events (Luckner and Weinhardt, 2008), finance (Bennouri et al., 2011), and pre-
dicting market development (Spann and Skiera, 2003). See Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)
and Ledyard et al. (2009) for reviews. However, to the best of the author’s knowledge,
prediction markets and surveys have never been combined during the prediction making
process.
9.3 Setting and Research Questions
9.3.1 Experimental Setting
For this study a German political stock market, PIX, during the 2013 federal election hosted
on the EIX market is used (cf. Section 4.3.1). In order to compare the integrated to stan-
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dalone surveys two treatment groups (integrated vs. standalone) are set up. All traders are
randomized in one of the groups. An extensive questionnaire with 73 items consisting of
6 parts was created: 1) General questions and platform feedback, 2) Election outcome, 3)
Information sources, 4) Personal questions, 5) Political coalitions, and 6) Election Polls.
While the integrated group could answer the questions one by one directly on the platform
the standalone group was presented with a link to an external survey software (LimeSur-
vey, 2014) where participants had to answer all questions in one pass (Figure 9.1). The
integrated questionnaire allows for questions with a predefined list of answers to appear on
the PIX’s main page, one at a time. Adjustable settings include the question mode, allowing
only one reply selection or multiple. Equally important, it can precisely be defined when,
where and in what order questions are asked. These properties are defined by a time win-
dow for question activity, and a priority ranking for the order of appearance. Obviously, it
was made sure that every user can answer every question only once. Since these questions
are of sensitive nature, each contains the option “prefer not to say”. The answers can be
selected via radio buttons, before users can submit their answers by clicking on a button.
It was decided to use a self-made questionnaire infrastructure to enable traders replying
quickly to a question without leaving the website. As a consequence, willing responders
who simply not want to go to an external website were not lost.
(A) Integrated Survey (box labelled ’a’) (B) Standalone Survey
FIGURE 9.1: Integrated Survey (a) and Standalone Survey (b)
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(A) Ad Hoc Post-Trade Question (B) Magnification
FIGURE 9.2: Trigger-based Survey on Top of Trade Overview Screen (a) and Magnification (b)
Additionally, every participant is asked an ‘ad hoc post-trade question’ (trigger-based
survey) using a self-made trigger-based survey-system. In order to gain a better under-
standing of the trader’s thought processes, after every submitted order the trigger-based
survey-system was called in order to decide, if the current participant should be asked
the trigger-based survey. The algorithm used determines on the basis of the participant’s
trading history, number of already answered ad hoc post-trade questions in the last 21
days and a random component, if the question will show up immediately after the sub-
mission of an order or not. The parameters are configured in order to ask each trader at
least once in three weeks per tradable product. The trigger-based survey asks the trader
for the reason of his last order. Possible answers are: 1) I feel, that party/candidate was
under/overvalued, 2) I can/cannot imagine to vote for that party/support that candidate, 3)
I like to see a lower/higher price for that party/candidate on this prediction market, 4) I need
stocks/money to sell/buy a bundle, 5) other reason.2 The trigger-based survey (Figure 9.2)
motivates participants to rationalize their trading decision ex-post and opens an interesting
area for further field-studies on decision behavior.





The integration opens up several research questions. First, how well (measured by re-
sponse rate, total number of answered questions, response speed) does an integrated sur-
vey work compared to a standalone version? Surveys often have a quite low response
rate of about 10 % (e. g., Ranchhod and Zhou, 2001; Deutskens et al., 2004). Finding a
way to increase the response rate would be highly beneficial. In some applications such as
ad-hoc questionnaires regarding recent events, researchers aim for a fast response speed.
Moreover, how well does the trigger-based survey tool, polling participants who are stating
that they have new information perform? Second, previous work shows that in prediction
markets experts can be identify ex post by their performance. This raises the question of
when to ask the experts? This study tries to address the question of how to best acquire
information from the market’s experts. Additionally, online surveys are sovereign in re-
sponse speed and the ability to methodologically control the filling process. According to
Evans and Mathur (2005), online surveys fit best for the given purpose. Hence, a compar-
ison of different types of online surveys is made. Specifically, common standalone surveys
and market integrated surveys are used. The main research question, as introduced in
Section 1.2 as research question 7 is:
Research Question 7: Are integrated surveys more accepted by participants of a predic-
tion market than standalone surveys?
The ‘acceptance’ is measured by response rate, total number of answered questions,
and response speed. Additionally, a first experimental study on trigger-based surveys is
run.
9.4 Results
In this section results of the study are presented. First, descriptive statistics are shown.
Second, differences in response rate and reaction time are reported, followed by a closer
look on the number of answered items. Third, an application of the trigger-based survey
is presented and its response rate and acceptance is reported.
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9.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Participants were invited to fill out either the integrated or the standalone survey from
2013-07-29 until 2013-08-25 (28 days). Both groups are nearly equally sized (integrated:
N = 1, 864, Nact ive = 706; standalone: N = 1,731, Nact ive = 657) and hardly different in
their trading activity (integrated: 71.57/7/466.83, standalone: 101.78/7/685.36 (#or-
ders mean/median/sd)). Traders are counted as active, if they submitted at least one order
while the market was active.
9.4.2 Response Rate and Reaction Time
The integrated survey has a higher response rate; both complete responses and partial
responses are higher for participants using the integrated survey. The standalone survey
leads to 6 (.91 %) complete and 38 (5.78 %) partial responses in contrast to 32 (4.53 %)
complete and 124 (17.56 %) partial responses in the integrated survey. (Percentages relate
to active traders in corresponding groups.) The advantage of integrated surveys over stan-
dalone surveys cannot conclusively shown here, due to the small response rates. Here, the
integrated survey leads to an increase of 533.33 % in complete responses, and 326.32 %
in partial responses compared to the standalone survey.
Next, the duration from the moment the survey was available until a participant an-
swered his last question (‘reaction time’) is compared. In treatment integrated, partici-
pants that only partly answered the questionnaire have a median reaction time of 10.01
days (mean= 12.21) compared to 13.26 days (mean= 14.66) in treatment standalone. To
completely fill the survey participants’ reaction time is on median 6.52 days (mean= 7.80)
in treatment integrated and 13.64 days (mean = 12.48) in treatment standalone. Sum-
ming up, treatment integrated delivers completely filled questionnaires (t-stat = 1.535,
p = 6.68 %) as well as partially filled questionnaires significantly faster (t-value = 1.786,
p= 3.94%).
Result 9: The integrated survey delivers results significantly faster (24.51 % – 52.20 %).
9.4.3 Number of Answered Items
As shown, the difference between reaction times for partial responses is lower than for
complete responses. As a rather long questionnaire was used, the number of items an-
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swered in total and per survey participant are also of interest. Those measures can help to
estimate participants’ acceptance of the duration of this particular survey and the possible
response rate a shorter survey would have (had). In treatment integrated participants an-
swered 3,522 items and 28.40 items per participant (median= 11). Treatment standalone
leads to 2,497 answered items and 65.71 per participant (median = 64.71). Altogether,
participants in treatment integrated answered on average significantly (Wilcoxon rank sum
test, W = 1,214, p < 0.01 %) less items than in treatment standalone. It is assumed, that
the reason lies in the ‘entry barrier’ of standalone surveys; i. e., in contrast to an integrated
survey, which a participant might start, suspend, and continue as he pleases, an invitation
link to a standalone survey represents a certain barrier. Participants might think twice be-
fore leaving the main web site to take part in a survey of unknown length and cognitive
effort.
Result 10: The integrated survey lead to 41.05 % more answered items.
9.4.4 Trigger-based Survey
Last, the response rate for the trigger-based survey is analyzed. A total of 3,691 questions
were triggered to 699 different traders resulting in 3,388 responses from 681 traders. As it
cannot be distinguished if a participant answered “other reason” or denied to answer, the
resulting response rate of 91.79 % is a lower bound. Participants decided to not answer a
trigger-based survey 303 times (152 unique traders). 547 participants or 78.25 % never
declined to answer a trigger-based survey.
Result 11: Trigger-based survey: high response rate (91.79 %) and widely accepted (78.25 %).
In order to illustrate how the two survey types can be used in conjunction, some pre-
liminary data will be shown, matching both surveys on a per participant basis. Results
of the trigger-based survey are shown in Table 9.1. Column “Answer” lists the possible
responses as described in Section 9.3; column “Total” contains all data gathered with the
trigger-based survey; column “Party/Candidate” shows only results of the trigger-based
survey for traders who stated their preferred candidate/party via the integrated survey.
Obviously, answer 1 was the major reason for trades (66.59 %), regardless if traders sub-
mitted an order for their preferred party/candidate (62.04 %) or for any other party/candidate
(65.35 %). Hence, the majority of orders were reportedly submitted based on (subjec-
tively rational) economic considerations and thus might be more ‘sensibly priced’ as orders
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TABLE 9.1: Judgment Bias per Party
Total Party/Candidate
Preferred Other
Answer Count Percentage Count Percentage Count Percentage
1) under/overvaluation 2,458 66.59 % 206 62.05% 1,107 65.35 %
2) potential support/vote 511 13.84 % 75 22.59% 267 15.76 %
3) like to see lower/higher price 175 4.74 % 22 6.63% 76 4.49 %
4) bundle 244 6.61 % 18 5.42% 112 6.61 %
5) other reason/no answer 303 8.20 % 11 3.31% 132 7.79 %
Sum (answered) 3,388 91.79% 321 96.69 % 1,562 92.21%
Sum (total) 3,691 100.00% 332 100.00 % 1,694 100.00%
that were submitted for reasons 2 and 3. Similar to answer 1, answer 4 indicates subjec-
tively rational trading behavior, as trading bundles is profit neutral. Altogether, over 80 %
of participants reported to make their decisions based on rational considerations, which
seems pretty reasonable. Although, there is a considerable proportion (18.58 %) where
participants report, they want to see higher/lower prices or (not) support a certain candi-
date/party. At first glance, this seems to indicate irrational trading behavior. Nevertheless,
this answer does not strictly exclude rational consideration (e. g., one might ‘know’ a cer-
tain candidate is overvalued, but prefer answer 3 over 1 anyway.). Therefore there is no
reason to doubt participants answered truthfully on a large scale.
When comparing the percentual responses of all participants with those of participants
that reported their party/candidate preferences, two salient contrasts can be seen. First,
the differences between “Total” and “Preferred” are on average higher than for “Total” and
“Other”. Second, the biggest difference is present between “Total” and “Preferred” for an-
swer 2 (8.75 %). Both observations might indicate, that participants’ political preferences
do affect their trading decisions. This might complement findings like the one that traders
tend to buy more stocks of their preferred party (e. g., Kranz et al., 2014). Nevertheless,
most differences between “Total” and “Preferred”/“Other” are rather small and – at first
glance – the major tendency that roughly 2/3 chose answer 1 looks consistent.
Scratching the surface, it seems that trading behavior matches stated behavior in both
surveys and survey responses are most widely consistent between both surveys. Summing
up, the combination of integrated and trigger-based surveys provides a promising way to
analyze individual trading behavior more deeply in further research.
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Result 12: The integrated survey and the trigger-based survey seem to deliver consistent
results.
9.5 Conclusion
In the age of near-ubiquitous internet access through an expanding variety of connected
devices, it has not only become possible to conduct a greater number of polls, surveys,
and preference elicitation tasks that involve a greater number of people; it is also possi-
ble to obtain more and richer information from each respondent. Nowadays, a popular
way to gather that information on a continuous and repeated way is to run prediction
markets. Their track record suggests that these markets may help to better foresee future
developments and trends. Markets are powerful instruments for aggregating dispersed
information, yet there are flaws. Markets are too complex for some users, they fail to
capture massive amounts of their users’ relevant information, and they suffer from some
individual-level biases (e. g., Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004, 2006).
In this study a large-scale prediction market is integrated with a survey in two dis-
tinct ways. First, trading in prediction markets indicates that participants believe to have
additional information. Consequently, a one-question survey is randomly triggered after
a trade. The response rate for these types of question is with 91.79 % extremely high
compared to typical online surveys. This approach reveals two advantages: (i) those par-
ticipants who trade have information and (ii) they are actually interested to share that
information. Both, having information and willingness to share information are usually
out of scope of an online survey. Second, participants might find it convenient to answer
survey questions right on the same platform. Hence, a survey feature was integrated. In
a large-scale field experiment with over 3,500 participants, consistency and the response
rate of the integrated survey was tested and compared to a standalone version. The in-
tegrated survey was found to deliver robust responses and a 3.16 % (533.33 % relative)
higher response rate. Although the higher response rate could not be proven conclusively,
both findings highlight the great possibilities for surveys to integrate with prediction mar-
kets. However, one has to be aware of structural differences between those survey types
(e. g., participants might change their mind during an integrated survey).
Online surveys allow for qualitative responses and more complex question design. Es-
pecially given the fact that simple fill-in-the-blank and multiple choice questions give way
to enhanced graphical interfaces that can capture probability distributions over response
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categories, even from people not familiar with distributions (Goldstein, 2013). Hence,
combined forecasting with surveys and prediction markets can handle both; continuous,
incentive-compatible forecasting as well as complex, quantitative question design.
As a direction for future research, it seems fruitful to develop adaptive survey systems
that provide to ask participants only if the participant is expected to respond to it. In order
to achieve that, it has to be evaluated whether it is possible to model the likelihood of a
response. Moreover the trigger-based question, in its present form leads participants to
rationalize their trading behavior. This leads to the question whether the trigger-based
questionnaire leads to a different trading behavior. The limitations of the present work
are straightforward: Most importantly, one instance of an integrated system of surveys
and markets was explored in a political context. In order to increase external validity,
the next step is to explore other information settings and implement surveys in prediction








Conclusion and Future Research
“ If you try to make something just to fit your unin-
formed view of some hypothetical market, you will fail.
If you make something special and powerful and honest
and true, you will succeed.”
HUGH MACLEOD, 2004
10.1 Contributions
CONTINUOUS Market Engineering has shown to be suitable to create, maintain, andrefine successful and sustainable markets that are able to adapt to changing demands
and requirements. The work at hand documents the application of Continuous Market
Engineering on two electronic markets. Applying the presented Continuous Market En-
gineering Process to both prediction markets studied in this work has lead to numerous
improvements and insights. These contributions are demonstrated in the previous chap-
ters, whereas this section recapitulates them in a more brief manner.
This thesis attempts to answer the following seven research questions:
• How do selected personal attributes (RA, CRA, and ERS) influence trading behavior
in markets?
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• How do selected personal attributes (RA, CRA, and ERS) influence decision quality
in markets?
• How well can an unobtrusive analysis of trading behavior reveal trader preferences?
• Are decision behavior and decision outcome affected by the kind of device used?
• Is providing information about the disposition effect suitable to lower the strength
of the disposition effect exhibited by an individual?
• Does a trend indicator arrow affect the strength of the disposition effect exhibited
by an individual?
• Are integrated surveys more accepted by participants of a prediction market than
standalone surveys?
The answers to these research questions can be summarized as follows.
Contribution 1: How do selected personal attributes (RA, CRA, and ERS) influence trading
behavior in markets?
It has been known for long that personal attributes influence individual behavior. Nev-
ertheless, the question of which attributes influence behavior in the domain of electronic
markets is not completely answered yet. The work at hand specifically attempts to under-
stand the interplay of risk aversion, cognitive reflection abilities, and emotion regulation
strategies with two aspects of trading behavior, namely trading activity and liquidity pro-
viding. By analyzing trading data in conjunction with a questionnaire containing estab-
lished personality tests, valuable insight on that interplay could be gained. Both cogni-
tive reflection abilities (CRA) and risk aversion (RA) significantly improve trading activity
(around 1.65 (RA) and 1.92 (CRA) additional orders per day). However, the tendency
to provide liquidity is decreased by cognitive reflection and increased by risk aversion.
Neither emotion regulation strategies (ERS) have shown to significantly influence trading
activity, but both strategies have a significant impact on the tendency to provide liquidity.
Participants using the emotion regulation strategy of suppression tend to provide liquidity,
whereas participants using the reappraisal strategy tend to be liquidity takers. In sum-
mary, with only one exception, all regarded aspects of individual behavior are influenced
by the assessed personal attributes. Specifically, only individual trading activity was not
influenced by the emotion regulation strategy used.
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Contribution 2: How do selected personal attributes (RA, CRA, and ERS) influence decision
quality in markets?
Turning to personal attributes and decision quality, the following results can be summa-
rized. First, cognitive abilities are shown to significantly improve trading performance
(around P€120 per trade) and probability to make a profit. Second, risk aversion impairs
trading performance (around P€90 per trade) as well as the probability to trade prof-
itably. In contrast, risk-averse traders tend to provide liquidity. Third, emotion regulation
strategies influence the regarded constructs. Emotion-suppressing traders perform signifi-
cantly better (around P€270 per trade) and have a higher chance of submitting profitable
orders, whereas using the reappraisal strategy leads to lesser gains (around P€100 per
trade) and a smaller chance to decide profitably. Wrapping up, cognitive reflection and
using the suppression strategy turns out to be beneficial for traders, whereas reappraisal
and risk aversion impairs the regarded measures.
Contribution 3: How well can an unobtrusive analysis of trading behavior reveal trader
preferences?
When predicting future events, it can be important to know whether and to which extent
prediction market participants – in this case traders – stay objective or whether they are bi-
ased by their own preferences. Through a portfolio level analysis of trading data matched
with survey data it is possible to consistently predict voters’ intention in our market popula-
tion. Furthermore, evidence is provided for a judgment bias consistent over all parties but
elevated for small parties. Surprisingly, no significant difference occurs when comparing
the bias between subgroups of tactical and non-tactical voters. Due to the bias’ consistency
across subgroups of tactical and non-tactical voters as well as different party preferences,
a straightforward prediction model can be provided, which infers a trader’s party prefer-
ence from his trading behavior. The derived model correctly predicts party preferences
in the validation set with an accuracy of around 70 %. Simply speaking, traders presum-
ably unknowingly and unwillingly reveal themselves by their trading behavior. On the
one hand, this implication somehow contradicts the traditional view on prediction mar-
kets, as anonymity is often seen as a major reason for participants to truthfully reveal their
expectations – and thus eventually prediction markets’ forecasting performance. Albeit,
the intra-participant anonymity stays unaffected, awareness of this result might reduce
participants’ perceived anonymity and thus their trust attitude towards prediction markets
(especially when dealing with ‘sensitive’ questions). This can in turn impair participants’
willingness to participate on such markets. On the other hand, it supports existing the-
ory on prediction markets by showing that traders tend to reveal their true preferences
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on prediction markets by submitting orders accordingly. In the end, preference-consistent
trading behavior – as encountered in this prediction market – is the foundation to infer
individuals’ preferences from their trading behavior.
Contribution 4: Are decision behavior and decision outcome affected by the kind of device
used?
After demonstrating the interplay of personal attributes and preferences with decision out-
come, the influence of device choice was shown. In a comparison of mobile and stationary
trading interfaces it is illustrated that orders submitted from a mobile device perform sig-
nificantly worse than orders submitted via a stationary trading interface. Interestingly, a
significant influence of the device choice on the traders confidence (measured with two
proxies) could not be proven. This result illustrates once more that decision making per-
formance does not solely depend on the decision maker and his (cognitive) resources.
Instead, awareness of differences between devices when designing software artifacts has
shown to be important.
Contribution 5: Is providing information about the disposition effect suitable to lower the
strength of the disposition effect exhibited by an individual?
A well-explored deviation from rational behavior is the disposition effect. Its negative
impact on trading performance has been shown in many studies of trading environments.
To assess the individual and aggregated disposition effect, a field study was conducted on a
prediction market on which the disposition effect could be determined for over 500 traders.
In line with previous research, a significant disposition effect on both the aggregated and
the individual level was found in the regarded market. As a debiasing method, half the
participants could access an information text about the disposition effect. By analyzing
the information text access, it could not be shown that this textual information is suitable
to significantly impact the traders’ individual disposition effect.
Contribution 6: Does a trend indicator arrow affect the strength of the disposition effect
exhibited by an individual?
Although creating awareness of the disposition effect via textual information could not ver-
ifiably decrease its strength, even tiny visual cues have shown to significantly increase the
disposition effect’s strength and thus letting traders deviate from rational behavior. Specif-
ically, a performance indicator arrow transparently showing if a trader’s portfolio value is
positive or not significantly increases the disposition effect by around 12 % compared to
the market’s average (up to 71 % compared between treatment groups). This result is of
particular importance, as such interface elements are widely used in online brokerage in-
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terfaces, and thus also has an implication for regulators. Hence, it might be worthwhile to
consider mandating online brokers to educate customers about behavioral biases, which
are known to degrade individual performance. As the previous result (cf. Contribution 5)
implies, textual advice seems not to be a proper solution in this case. Thus, it might be
sensible to consider interface design itself as a regulatory object.
Contribution 7: Are integrated surveys more accepted by participants of a prediction market
than standalone surveys?
In the age of near-ubiquitous internet access through an expanding variety of connected
devices, it has not only become possible to conduct a greater number of polls, surveys, and
preference elicitation tasks that involve a larger number of people; it is also possible to ob-
tain more and richer information from each respondent. In this study, two types of surveys
were combined with a prediction market on which over 1,400 participants traded actively.
Following the assumption that conducting a trade indicates that a participant believes to
have information about the product traded, a one-question survey (‘post-trade question’)
was randomly triggered consequently upon a trade. Compared to typical response rates of
online surveys, this post-trade question’s response rate was with 91.79 % extremely high.
Assuming that participants of an online platform prefer to answer surveys right on the
same platform due to convenience reasons, a second study was conducted. It aimed to
identify if the effort to integrate a rather long survey on an existing platform – in contrast
to using a specialized standalone survey system – pays out through a substantial increase
in response rate or data quality. Hence, half of the participants were offered an integrated
survey system, whilst the other half were redirected to an external survey system. Subse-
quently, the response rate and consistency of both surveys were compared. The integrated
survey delivered robust responses and a 3.16 % (533.33 % relative) higher response rate.
Albeit the higher response rate could not be proven conclusively, these results emphasize
the potential in integrating surveys into online markets.
All presented contributions were derived from studies carried out on a special form of
web-based electronic markets, namely prediction markets. This implies the presence of
certain market specifics (play money, virtual products, and the like) most other electronic
markets lack. Furthermore, the conducted studies mainly focus on the three facets Agent
Behavior, Interfaces, and Auxiliary Services. Consequently, the unrestricted generalizabil-
ity of the results and their implications for any market might not be given. Nevertheless,
the reported contributions can be seen as a first step in demonstrating how to refine ex-
isting electronic markets against the backdrop of Continuous Market Engineering. Thus,
these studies pave the way for market engineers in identifying entry points for improving
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markets.
10.2 Outlook
Having presented the main contributions from applying Continuous Market Engineering
on two Prediction Markets, on-going work and ideas for future research are described.
Improve questionnaire on trader’s Market Predisposition The presented set of per-
sonal attributes assumed to influence individual trading behavior and thus representing
an individual’s Market Predisposition is – albeit suitable – neither complete nor optimized
(cf. Chapter 5.5). Further research is needed to improve the questionnaire used. First, it
seems fruitful to evaluate additional constructs that might have an explanatory value for a
trader’s Market Predisposition. Second, especially since it most certainly will be beneficial
to include additional constructs, the duration of the Market Predisposition test is object to
optimization. One starting point can be the use of reduced alternatives to established tests,
e. g., a shortened version of the Ten-Paired Lottery by Holt and Laury (2002) as presented
in Teubner (2013) or the application of a different risk preference test (see, e. g., Charnes
et al. (2013) for an overview).
Feedback on trader’s Market Predisposition and adaptive interfaces A straightfor-
ward question on assessing a trader’s Market Predisposition is whether traders that are
informed about their individual Market Predisposition (i) would alter their decision to join
a certain market and (ii) if they will change their willingness to improve their own abilities
according to their measured predisposition immediately or over the course of time. Those
questions could be answered in a follow-up study on a given electronic market with minor
intervention. To examine question (i), existing and potential participants would have to
be separated in one control as well as one treatment group. In the treatment group each
existing participant would have to undergo a yet to be refined Market Predisposition test.
Potential participants in the treatment group would have to conduct the very same test as
first step of the market’s registration process. The result of the test would then have to be
presented to the participants instantly and individually. An accompanying survey could be
used in the proposed study in oder to reflect the participants’ understanding of the pre-
sented results and their implications. In order to examine question (ii), additional panel
surveys would have to be conducted amongst control and treatment groups in a yet to be
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defined interval. For a market provider, like an online retail brokerage company, such an
individual measure could be used to easily cluster participants along their predisposition
and thus their inherent need for support. Practically, it might be beneficial for participants
with a lower predisposition to be redirected to a more simplified and supportive trading
interface whereas the more proficient traders can be confronted with a full-featured expert
interface.
Comparing Web and Mobile interface in a laboratory experiment The study pre-
sented in Chapter 7 showed that even though participants’ decision confidence was not
decreased, when participants chose to submit orders via a mobile device their decision
performance suffered. As discussed in Section 7.5 the conducted field study is by design
not suited to examine questions of environmental influences and participant’s acceptance.
To rule out that the performance decrease is solely driven by environmental factors, a lab-
oratory experiment could be conducted. Such an experiment offers the chance to gain
additional insights; for instance concerning acceptance of the mobile interface offered via
a Technology Acceptance study (cf. Venkatesh, 2000; Venkatesh and Davis, 2000).
Control for understanding of Disposition Effect information text As has been shown
in Section 8.4.1, only about one quarter of participants accessed the offered disposition
effect information text. Even for participants accessing that information text, it was neither
possible to validate that (i) the text and its implications were understood nor (ii) read at
all. A laboratory experiment could be set up to control for these factors; an additional
questionnaire could provide certainty if a participant has read and understood the concept
of the disposition effect and its implications on trading performance. Furthermore, in such
a follow-up laboratory experiment, a reposition of the offered link in a more conspicuous
location is worth considering.
Validate superiority of integrated surveys The integrated survey in its present form
(see Section 9.3) proved its superiority over an external specialized survey system in one
specific market instance. The next logical step is to increase external validity. Hence, it
seems fruitful to explore other settings of online communities and different lengths and
types of surveys as well as different survey systems.
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Towards a combination of Prediction Markets and Delphi Method Accompanied by
the motivating results of the survey integration study (see Chapter 9), a combination of
Prediction Markets with a more sophisticated kind of survey technique, namely the Delphi
Method (cf. Dalkey and Helmer, 1963), appears encouraging to further improve predictive
quality by gathering additional information from participants for the following reason. On
the one hand, Prediction Markets are known to be very apt performing quantitative predic-
tions and are able to react rapidly to changing situations and newly emerged information.
However, they are not a very appropriate forecasting instrument for quantitative or condi-
tional predictions – albeit it is possible to apply them to such settings. On the other hand,
the Delphi Method is profoundly suited for such kind of settings. Nevertheless, it has a
drawback when it comes to selecting the ‘right’ participants in sense of information or
expertise of subjects, which in turn is a major strength of prediction markets, as well per-
forming (and thus, in a way, predicting) participants can be easily identified by their past
performance (cf. Equation 7.1). The dynamics of a Prediction Market offers additional op-
portunities to identify situations in which participants might have important information.
An indication for such a situation is, for instance, when a trader that used to predict well in
the past submits an order with a limit price that strongly diverges from the current market
price. In such a case, the presented trigger-based question (Section 9.3.1, Figure 9.2b) can
be used to instantly prompt that participant for the reason behind his action. As shown
in Chapter 9, the technical foundations for integrated surveys have already been laid as
part of the work at hand in case of the Economic Indicator eXchange. However, impor-
tant questions on how to combine those forecasting approaches remain open for further
research.
Examine rationalization effect of trigger-based question The trigger-based question
(see Section 9.3.1) leads participants to rationalize their trading behavior. This is achieved
by simply prompting the market participant immediately after submitting an order to an-
swer why the order was submitted with respect to the current market price of the product
in question and the order’s limit price. Answering such a question forces the participant
to rationalize ones behavior retrospectively, which in turn leads to the question whether
the trigger-based questionnaire leads to a different trading behavior in subsequent trading
decisions. At first glance, present data seems to support the hypothesis that traders have
a tendency to decide more on rational reasons after being confronted to a trigger-based
question. Nevertheless, further research is required to answer that question adequately.
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Enhance Prediction Markets with User Generated Content Prediction markets make
use of the so-called Wisdom of Crowds (cf. Surowiecki, 2004) to obtain their predictive
power. The participating actors of an actual prediction market instance can be separated
in market participants (Agents) and market operators (Market Engineers). Currently, most
prediction market providers are responsible for the technical market operation, a certain
set of trading rules and the selection of forecasting goals (i. e., tradable products). Whereas
the market participants’ stake is to trade their information on that market and thereby
generating and improving a certain prediction. A more progressive approach could fur-
ther enable the Crowd to participate in the market, not only by predicting, but instead
by contributing User-Generated Content (cf. Krumm et al., 2008; van Dijck, 2009) through
defining the forecasting goals itself. Ultimately, such an enhanced prediction market sys-
tem would shift the market providers role to (i) a pure provider of a trading rule set and
(ii) a technical market operator, whereas the participants role would broaden towards cre-
ation of content in the form of products. This flexibility would open up a broad range
of new questions regarding interface design and user guidance in setting up new product
proposals. In order to prevent thin markets, a major challenge will be to figure out a mech-
anism for deciding which product proposal to approve for trading. One approach would
surely be to define an Initial Public Offering (IPO) phase in which the product proposal is
reviewed by the market provider, presented to the public, and has to raise a certain amount
of money (cf. Book Building) in order to get approval for future trading. In case a defined
amount of money can be raised, one can assume that sufficient interest of participants ex-
ists to trade the proposed product. The evaluation of the illustrated approach could take
place on an existing prediction market, since by design, user-generated products would be
able to co-exist with ‘traditional’ products.
Incentive Engineering As discussed in Section 3.3, a properly designed incentive sys-
tem is essential for a play-money prediction market. Straub, Gimpel, and Teschner (2014)
showed that incentive systems influence the effort so-called crowd workers are willing to in-
vest for a certain task. In a related study Straub, Gimpel, Teschner, and Weinhardt (2014)
investigate the influence of competitors’ performance on individuals’ effort (i. e., task com-
pletion rates) as well as on individuals’ premature abandonment rates. They find that the
strength of competitors decreases both regarded individual measures. It seems reasonable
to believe that those relationships also tend to hold in the domain of prediction markets. A
future study might examine, (i) whether those results are applicable to prediction markets
and – if so – (ii) whether and which additional aspects of their trading behavior are influ-
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enceable by incentive design decisions. Ultimately, guidelines for a purposefully Incentive
Engineering might be derived from this research.
10.3 Summary
In this Chapter, the main contributions to literature based on the results contained in this
thesis were presented. First, a Continuous Market Engineering Process based on related
theory was presented and discussed. Subsequently, the application of Continuous Market
Engineering methodology on two play-money prediction markets with a focus on Agent
Behavior, Interfaces, and Auxiliary Services was documented. The results presented help
market engineers to better understand trader behavior in electronic markets and highlight
numerous approaches to analyze, support, and improve traders’ market interaction. Fi-
nally, several opportunities for further research focusing on Agent Behavior in the context
of Continuous Market Engineering have been sketched. The outlined research directions
are appropriate to further explore participants’ behavior in electronic market systems. I
would be pleased if the contributions of the work at hand help to widen the understanding








Texts and Trade Screens
Disposition Effect Info Text
Information text used in the study presented in Chapter 8.
Original:
“Entgegen der alten Börsenregel, nach der Anleger Gewinne laufen lassen und
Verluste durch Verkauf begrenzen sollen, ist an fast allen internationalen Kap-
italmärkten genau das Gegenteil zu beobachten. Aufgelaufene Gewinne wer-
den meist zu früh realisiert, während sich Anleger von Aktien in der Verlust-
zone häufig viel zu spät trennen. Diese irrationale Verhaltensweise wird als
Dispositionseffekt bezeichnet. Der Dispositionseffekt führt häufig zu individu-
ellen Verlusten und entgangenen Gewinnen. Anleger, die den Dispositions-
effekt vermeiden, können deutlich höhere Gewinne erzielen.”
Author’s translation:
“In contrast to the well-known stock market rule that investors should ride
gains and sell losses, precisely the opposite is observable from nearly all in-
ternational capital markets. Profitable stocks are often sold too early, whilst
traders depart from losing stocks way too late. This irrational behavior is
known as disposition effect. The disposition effect often leads to trader losses
and missed gains. Investors, who resist the disposition effect may realize sig-
nificantly higher gains.”
I
Appendix A Texts and Trade Screens
Trade Screens per Treatment
This Section contains screenshots for the different treatments presented in Chapter 8. For
an overview refer to Table A.1.
TABLE A.1: Overview of Treatments and Screenshots
DE Info Text w/o DE Info Text
Trend Indicator
Trend_Info Trend
(Figure 8.1) (Figure A.1)
w/o Trend Indicator
Info Control
(Figure A.2) (Figure A.3)
II
FIGURE A.1: Trading Screen for Treatment Trend
(Containing one user interface modification. Modification (b) shows the ‘Trend Indicator’
element.)
III
Appendix A Texts and Trade Screens
FIGURE A.2: Trading Screen for Treatment Info
(Containing one user interface modification. A click on the linked text (a) fades in an info text
about the disposition effect. The whole text is depicted in Appendix A.)
IV




Heath et al. measure
The adapted Heath et al. measure, as used in the study presented in Chapter 6 is shown
in Table B.2. The original Heath et al. measure is depicted in Table B.1.
TABLE B.1: Wording of the Heath et al. measure (Heath et al., 1991)
Which of these comes closest to the reason for your decision
with regard to the [. . . ] in the last federal election?
[. . . ] N Reply
first vote 1 I always vote that way.
2 I thought it was the best candidate.
3 I really preferred another candidate, but he had
no chance of winning in this constituency.
4 Other reason
5 Prefer not to say
second vote 1 I always vote that way.
2 I thought it was the best party.
3 I really preferred another party, but I wanted to allow
another party to overcome the 5% threshold.
4 Other reason
5 Prefer not to say
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TABLE B.2: Wording of the modified Heath et al. measure (based on Heath et al., 1991)
Welche dieser Aussagen lag Ihrer Wahlentscheidung
zur [. . . ] in der letzten Bundestagswahl am ehesten zu Grunde?
[. . . ] N Reply
Erststimme 1 Ich wähle immer so.
2 Aus meiner Sicht war es der beste Kandidat.
3 Ich zog einen anderen Kandidaten vor, aber dieser
hatte keine Aussicht auf den Wahlsieg.
4 anderer Grund
5 keine Angabe
Zweitstimme 1 Ich wähle immer so.
2 Aus meiner Sicht war es die beste Partei.
3 Ich zog eine andere Partei vor, wollte aber einer weiteren
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